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My dissertation intervenes in prevalent debates between nationalists and 
cosmopolitans that have dominated American Indian literary theory and displaced 
alternative questions about the empowering potential of local identities. Both positions 
too often categorize American Indian literature with a reductive dichotomy that 
opposes traditionalism against assimilation, resulting in the seizing of mechanisms that 
coordinate change and in the unwarranted archival exclusion of many authors—such 
as those I discuss—who speak to historical problems with present effects. Seeing past 
this dialectic requires a fresh look at what precisely is gathered under “assimilation” 
and “traditionalism”—a reassessment I initiate by arguing that Cherokee 
representations of dynamic, agentive identities proceed from traditional, adaptive 
strategies for addressing cultural and historical dilemmas. My project is organized into 
two sections of two chapters, the first of which introduce principled practices from 
several scholarly perspectives then applied to primary texts in the subsequent chapters. 
In the first, I examine an array of traditional religious dispositions and the critical 
theories that have been advanced to interpret and apply them to Cherokee literature. In 
the second I take up gendered religious innovations in the memoirs of Catharine 
Brown, a nineteenth-century Christian convert, and in the science fiction of 
contemporary novelist Sequoyah Guess, both traditionalists who synthesize identities 
through pragmatic accommodation and find not erasure but support for Cherokee 
 culture through traditional practices like “gaining knowledge.” The third chapter looks 
at traditional political structures, providing a cultural context for discussion of Elias 
Boudinot’s and John Ross’s contentious (and again gendered) rhetoric in chapter four. 
I argue here that failure to understand the tension over Cherokee Removal to 
Oklahoma in the (de)structure of political centralization, which vacated the discursive 
spaces that once forged consensus, has led too many critics to authorize nationalist 
rhetoric uncritically. I emphasize the major themes of worship and dissent herein 
because they most often suffer misapplications of the assimilated/traditional 
dichotomy that simultaneously says so much and so little. I hope my work opens 
American Indian literary criticism to critical theory, opens theory to American Indians, 
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Since the 1990’s, debates between nationalists and cosmopolitans have 
dominated American Indian literary theory, displacing theoretical and political 
arguments not immediately concerned with either camp’s political programs. Looking 
to literature for creative articulations of communities’ shapes among Cherokee people, 
Cherokee critics like Jace Weaver, Daniel Justice, and others have taken Craig 
Womack’s cue in approaching literature from theoretical perspectives grounded in 
some aspect of relevant tribal culture.1 Major trends have included emphasis on 
traditional orature, ties to and relationships with land, embeddedness in tribal history 
or political problems, and connections with communities of various shapes. On the 
occasions that literary critics confront the problematic work of Cherokee authors like 
Catharine Brown, Elias Boudinot, John Oskison, or Will Rogers, they seem compelled 
to apologize for the writers’ assimilationist appearances, adopting a historical pattern 
of dismissal that reduces Indian identity to dichotomies wherein Indians are either 
traditional or assimilated, and the latter is a code for “not really Indian.” 
Disassembling this too-long enduring, heteronomous dialectic requires an 
reassessment of what precisely is meant by assimilation and traditionalism. I argue 
that Cherokee authors employed traditional adaptive strategies to resolve cultural and 
historical problems. At the edges of the already liminal, smaller groups of Cherokee 
                                                 
1 Jace Weaver, That the People Might Live (New York: Oxford UP, 1996) 1-36; Daniel Justice, “‘Go 
Away, Water!’ Kinship Criticism and the Decolonization Imperative,” Reasoning Together: The Native 
Critics Collective, by Janice Acoose, et al., ed. Craig Womack, Daniel Justice, and Christopher Teuton 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2008) 147-68; Daniel Justice, Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee 
Literary History (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2006) 7-10; Craig Womack, “The Integrity of 
American Indian Claims (Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love My Hybridity,” American 
Indian Literary Nationalism, by Jace Weaver, Craig Womack, and Robert Warrior (Albuquerque: U of 
New Mexico P, 2006) 91-177; Craig Womack, Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999) 1-20; Craig Womack, “Theorizing American Indian 
Experience,” Reasoning Together, 353-410. 
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people have long coalesced around common causes and shared interests like fostering 
traditional values, organizing opposition to colonialism, or advocating technological 
education. I propose that theorizing a nimble pluralism inhering in what Pierre 
Bourdieu calls the habitus,2 or a given society’s network of principles and practices 
that guide its operation, that is adept at defining challenges and delimiting the scope of 
their resolution, can help us understand how Cherokee traditionalism mediates among 
cultural forces in tension. The authors herein rarely advocate context-free and eternal 
solutions; rather, they are precisely and inextricably historically and culturally 
situated. While the values and practices that shape their conclusions extend from 
conservative traditions, culture and belief in the lived lives of Cherokee communities 
are not so immutable as criticism has rendered them, nor did the authors intend to 
inscribe definitive and abiding ethnological identifications of difference in their 
discourse on often-times very narrow problems. Their works are instead persuasive 
efforts in an ongoing historical process in particular discursive contexts, that forge 
novel connections across traditional beliefs and practices. 
This interpretive plurality resonates with Cherokee traditionalism, which is 
accustomed to multiplicity. Medicinal plants, for instance, are thought to have seven 
different uses. Rarely does one person know or expect to know all of them for every 
plant, and rather than jealously insisting upon his exclusive understanding, he respects 
that of others. Should American Indian literary criticism open itself to such 
conjunctive interpretation, such cooperative knowledge, where it formerly found only 
displacement or loss of tradition it might come to see agency in the development of 
both internal and external societies. While some Cherokee theorists have formulated 
culturally-grounded strategies for interpreting Cherokee literature, the archive’s 
                                                 
2 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, Les Editions de Minuit, 1980 (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1990) 53. 
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diversity resists integration under any single paradigm. Daniel Justice, for instance, 
explores recurrent cultural themes of belovedness and what he dubs a Chickamauga 
consciousness, respectively corresponding to patterns of accommodative conciliation 
and nationalist resistance. Mary Churchill elaborates the former by drawing on the 
religiously-inflected “White Path” tradition of achieving harmony through a mediating 
balance of opposition. Eva Garroutte and Jace Weaver emphasize the importance of 
community attachments to authors and their work, though they trace different 
ramifications of those affiliations.3 All these theories offer certain advantages and 
clear readings of some texts, yet too often they tend toward monistic interpretation, as 
if the particular cultural value or practice each identifies is the differentiating or 
overriding principle of Cherokee literature and culture, and that it offers the best 
interpretations of the entire Cherokee canon. The complexity and depth of the works I 
discuss in the succeeding chapters are but gestured at by these paradigms, however, 
when their authors are not dismissed as Cherokee in name only. The inability to 
understand how these authors fit into the field of American Indian literature—not only 
by theorists of Cherokee literature but also of American Indian literature—points up 
the need not for a newer and better totalizing framework, but one(s) more variegated, 
dynamic, and pluralist. For these reasons, the practice-oriented theory I advance here, 
which concerns itself with a range of cultural and social behaviors and the principles 
connected with them, is less a narrow prescription than a meta-theoretical justification 
of theoretically applying multiple principled practices disfavored or as yet 
untheorized. 
                                                 
3 Justice, Our Fire 19-42; Mary Churchill, Walking the White Path: Toward a Cherokee-Centric 
Hermeneutic for Interpreting Cherokee Literature, diss., U of California at Santa Barbara, 1997 (Ann 
Arbor: UMI, 1997) 137-87; Eva Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and Survival of Native America 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 2003) 99-152; Weaver, That the People vii-xiv, 26-45. 
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Of late, American Indian literary nationalists like Womack, Weaver, Robert 
Warrior in American Indian Literary Nationalism, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, and others 
have proposed theories grounded in autonomous Native intellectual traditions and 
practices directed towards greater political and intellectual sovereignty for tribal 
nations. Their theories, however, have imprecisely articulated the relationship between 
the national political apparatus—the nation-state—and the national cultural body—the 
nation-people.4 Nationalism, whether colonial or anti-, is the insinuation of the 
political sphere into the personal through narratives of commonality. In Benedict 
Anderson’s terms, it shapes communities’ imaginations of themselves via various 
strategies, structures, and epistemologies.5 Opposing nationalists on many points, 
cosmopolitan theorists like Arnold Krupat and Elvira Pulitano reject their privileging 
of indigenous voices in criticism and their separatist approach to literature and 
experience. Fearing the ossifying, mystical, or political misrepresentations of 
essentialist arguments, cosmopolitans who argue that culture should be understood as 
hybrid rather than “pure” believe that nationalists have failed to address challenges 
facing stable conceptions of identity and to recognize the progressive advocacy of 
global over nationalist consciousness.6 Rather than trying to stretch one or another of 
these theories to accommodate the infinite array of strategies, values, dilemmas, and 
resolutions in the Cherokee world, my reading of Cherokee practice argues for 
                                                 
4 Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “The American Indian Fiction Writers: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, the 
Third World, and First Nation Sovereignty,” Why I Can’t Read Wallace Stegner and Other Essays: A 
Tribal Voice (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1996) 78-96; Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “Literary and Political 
Questions of Transformation: American Indian Fiction Writers,” Anti-Indianism in Modern America: A 
Voice from Tatekeya’s Earth (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 2001) 34-44; Robert Warrior, Tribal Secrets: 
Recovering American Indian Intellectual Traditions (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1995) 1-44. 
5 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1983) 5-7. 
6 Elvira Pulitano, Toward a Native American Critical Theory (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2003) 61-62; 
Arnold Krupat, Red Matters: Native American Studies (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2002) 109-
12. 
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multiplicity in interpretation. It opposes neither nationalism nor cosmopolitanism in 
toto, joining with both in the support of Indian peoples’ right to self-determination and 
understanding the distinction between long term visions and short term goals, which 
occasions acceptance of the state as a periodic or temporary means of effecting 
immediate positive change.7 It departs from them, however, insofar as they fail to 
confront the depredatory, coercive powers available to tribal nation-states that even 
now centralize power, hamper public discourse, segregate populations, and 
disenfranchise groups considered refractory or simply distasteful. Nationalists might 
counter that their faith in human political institutions is borne of historical necessity 
vis-à-vis the singular force of colonialist power, but to address Indian audiences 
familiar with the real and potential abuses of the tribal-state and to omit discussion of 
effective means of resistance or effecting its improvement does little to empower 
agency at its root. Cosmopolitans’ trust extends from liberal, humanist optimism for 
the potential of the nation-state to foster human development, a position with a long 
and respectable philosophical genealogy, but not without problems for Indian people, 
particularly in its secularism and its long-term goal of the replacement of tribal or 
other local identities with a utopian vision of affiliation-at-will.  
My methodology borrows from cosmopolitanists a willingness to engage with 
postcolonial theory, from nationalists an insistence on tribal specificity not least for 
the sake of empirical validity, but most fundamentally from the Cherokee authors I 
study a praxis that justifies multiple positions by their productive interpretation. 
Attuning my readings to an understanding of internal variety encourages swifter and 
more sustained discussion of theoretical issues than has been formerly possible, when 
critics were hampered by the expectation that readers required rudimentary instruction 
                                                 
7 Noam Chomsky, “Goals and Visions,” Chomsky on Anarchism (Oakland: AK, 2005) 190-211. 
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in who American Indian authors were, not to mention focused critical problems 
surrounding them. The time has come for close comparisons of under-evaluated Indian 
generalities with local specifics, and while I hope a range of Indian and non-Indian 
thinkers will find this a useful approach, I understand that other tribes’ circumstances 
differ dramatically from the Cherokees’. Few are the tribes that have not been 
disparaged by allegations of assimilation-induced contamination, however.  
 
American Indian Literary Nationalism 
Much of Indian nationalists’ arguments merit retention and expansion, and if, 
as identity theorists have it, experience is pertinent to interpretive truth and theory, 
then American Indian voices can offer illuminative interpretations that have been 
marginalized if not wholly ignored in mainstream discourse. Their insights derive not 
from some genetic access provided by Indian blood, but because culture matters to the 
ways people behave with and understand each other.8 American Indian critics’ novel 
analyses of Indian and other literature testify to the importance of their perspectives 
for all literary critics but particularly for Indian readers, who before the Native 
nationalists began writing were largely without visible academic role models. They 
thus helped inaugurate an internal discourse among Indian thinkers familiar with 
intellectual and cultural particularities, ready to move beyond introductory matter, and 
prepared to engage in concrete political action. Even though the early wave of 
criticism treating the major texts and authors of the American Indian literary 
                                                 
8 William Wilkerson, “Is There Something You Need to Tell Me?: Coming Out and the Ambiguity of 
Experience,” Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism, ed. Paula 
Hoya and Michael Hames-García (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 2000) 251-78; John 
Zammito, “Reading ‘Experience’: The Debate in Intellectual History among Scott, Toews, and 
LaCapra,” Reclaiming Identity, 279-311; W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quintessence: 
Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine, ed. Roger Gibson (Cambridge: Belknap, 2004) 31-
53; Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995) 8-10; Sean Teuton, 
Red Land, Red Power: Grounding Knowledge in the American Indian Novel (Durham: Duke UP, 2008) 
16-17. 
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renaissance attempted to situate the literature culturally and historically, theirs was 
largely a project of discovery frequently limited to the anthropological or ethnological 
records and positioned on the outside of the tribes they investigated. Not every internal 
tribal community is available to every Native critic, but their affiliation with one or 
more can open them to knowledge absent from official archives. Together with their 
attention to internal politics, their interests have sometimes led them to turn their 
attention to the marginalized, intra-tribal voices of homosexual, lower class, 
traditionalist, and other groups.9 
Womack outlines his concept of nationalism: “The concept of nationhood itself 
is an intermingling of politics, imagination, and spirituality. Nationhood encompasses 
ongoing treaty relations with the U.S. government. Nationhood has to do with federal 
Indian law, and tribes’ testing of the sovereignty waters through new economic 
developments and other practices,” positioning culture in nationalist discourse as a 
means to political ends.10 Weaver asserts Native nationalism “sees itself as attempting 
to serve the interests of indigenes and their communities, in particular the support of 
Native nations and their own separate sovereignties.”11 This paramount political 
advocacy—the increase of tribal nations’ sovereignty—appears from one perspective 
their most attractive program, especially in its issue from a cultural campaign that 
following Warrior they have dubbed “intellectual sovereignty.”12 Warrior, Womack 
and Weaver define the term differently, but each agrees it encompasses the self-
                                                 
9 Warrior, Tribal Secrets 106; Womack, Red on Red 271-303. 
10 Womack, Red on Red 60. 
11 Jace Weaver, “Splitting the Earth: First Utterances and Pluralist Separatism,” American Indian 
Literary Nationalism, 15. 
12 Warrior, Tribal Secrets 87-98; Cook-Lynn, “Literary and Political Questions” 41-42, Womack, Red 
on Red 59. 
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determined intellectual, cultural, artistic, and political expression of the nation-people. 
Notwithstanding claims that the political is the natural executor of the cultural, 
nationalism is foremost about politicism, which propagates uniformity, and not about 
heterogeneity, which complicates the solidarity under which nationalism operates 
most expeditiously. 
Insofar as they support the increased sovereignty of the nation-people, 
including over the nation-state, theirs is a compelling project, but their willingness to 
authorize the nation-state as uncomplicatedly representative of the nation-people 
evidences a philosophical misalignment. Nationalists may well mean to strengthen 
tribal-state power specifically against U.S. and state governments and intend only to 
remind their self-professed primary audience of Indian readers that resistance to 
fourth-world colonialism requires their readers’ attention. Upon objection to any given 
tribal-state policy, nationalists may make recourse to the distinction between the 
government and the governed, but as isolated exceptions insufficient to warrant 
reevaluation of the rule. Nationalists have claimed in several places that theirs is not a 
closed discussion, that they are only sketching the outlines of a discourse about 
political and cultural nationalism, but seldom in their advocacy for the strengthening 
of sovereignty have they suggested what limits they would impose on tribal-state 
power, or according to what principles or processes it should be supervened. This 
nebulous relationship between the cultural and political, which for an eponymous 
nationalist by default defers to the latter—they do not call themselves tribalists or 
communitarians, after all—jeopardizes the personal and communal sovereignty of the 
nation-people in its a priori authorization of the natural procession of the cultural into 
the political.13  
                                                 
13 Justice, Our Fire 19-26; Justice, “‘Go Away, Water’” 150-55. 
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Cosmopolitan critics mount another objection to nationalism in their critique of 
a perceived atheoretical or anti-theoretical rhetorical posture in nationalist 
separatism.14 Womack defends this elision, “I do not bother much in this book with 
the skepticism of postmodernism in relation to history. It is way too premature for 
Native scholars to deconstruct history when we haven’t yet constructed it.”15 For their 
part, nationalists have slightly demurred cosmopolitans’ point, agreeing that they do in 
fact use non-Native theory but asserting that their goal of fostering discourse among 
American Indian voices requires that their theories be privileged.16 For nationalists, 
their eschewal more accurately reflects distaste for postmodern and postcolonial 
theories of hybridity and mediation than unawareness or incomprehension of them, 
believing these approaches poorly accommodate Natives’ fourth world conditions and 
do not confront Native material realities, when they have deigned to examine Native 
peoples and their literatures at all.17  
To be sure, American Indian literary nationalists have seldom engaged directly 
with nationalist scholarship by mainstream theorists like Benedict Anderson, Eric 
Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, or Anthony Smith, for instance, or with postcolonial 
scholarship by the likes of Frantz Fanon, Partha Chatterjee, or Homi Bhabha. Instead, 
they foreground preliminary scholarship by prominent Indian figures like Simon Ortiz 
and Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, attempting to develop an independent discourse more 
sympathetic to nationalism than elsewhere available. This discourse is most troubling 
                                                 
14 Pulitano 61-62, 70, 87-88, 97-100; Eric Cheyfitz, The Columbia Guide to American Indian 
Literatures of the United States since 1945, ed. Eric Cheyfitz (New York: Columbia UP, 2004) 104-06; 
Krupat, Red Matters 26-28. 
15 Womack, Red on Red 3. 
16 Womack, “Integrity” 101; Warrior, Tribal Secrets xvi-xxi. 
17 Weaver, “Splitting the Earth” 39-40; Womack, “Integrity” 100. 
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to pluralist practice in its myopic insistence on overtly political discourse on narrowly 
prescribed issues over sovereignty, which extends to artistic and literary expression, as 
the sole respectable principle of colonial resistance, a programmatic stance that not 
only fails to describe alternative actual or potential ways of maintaining communities, 
but often fails even to look for them. Further problematizing interdisciplinary 
exchange is the negative connotative baggage accruing around terms like 
“nationalism” or “sovereignty,” especially in theoretical circles that almost without 
exception understand nationalism—in the best cases—as a temporary evil pending 
supersession by a higher, post-nationalist consciousness. Finding in Native literature 
and criticism a celebration of a posture they disparage as atavistic, progressively-
minded thinkers accuse nationalists of short-sighted provincialism, chauvinistically 
insisting on their difference.  
 
Cosmopolitanism 
 Cosmopolitan critics argue that what is needed instead is exploration of 
similarity, especially among peoples allied in anti-imperial resistance. They believe 
with their philosophical forebears that armed with a sympathetic intellect, they may 
find themselves at home anywhere, literally as citizens of the cosmos. With an etic 
perspective, they understand source material in relation to generic patterns in 
American Indian, pan-Indian, and global indigenous literature. Their familiarity with 
continental and postcolonial theory has brought sophisticated inquiry into the study of 
American Indian literature and in facilitating its visibility has generated increasingly 
widespread academic interest. The anti-colonialist, subversive spirit of non-hegemonic 
American Indian literature seems to draw many cosmopolitans, who may then act as 
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translators or mediators in helping to introduce other audiences to an unfamiliar body 
of work.18 
Allied by a common enemy in colonialism, cosmopolitanism does not oppose 
nationalism at every turn. Arnold Krupat, the chief proponent of a cosmopolitan 
critical position in American Indian literary criticism, however, articulates a hesitancy 
toward possible nationalist misrepresentations: “For Womack, the most important 
thing in any approach to Native literatures ‘should be a study of the primary culture 
that produces them’ [Red on Red] (25). Here, one might ask—as also with Cook-
Lynn—whether culture and nation are synonymous...(And there are dangers, as a 
number of writers have pointed out, in treating the ‘people’ or the ‘nation’ as a unitary 
force or indivisible essence).”19 The dangers to which Krupat alludes might include 
the absence of administrative transparency and accountability, suppression of dissent, 
and the disenfranchisement of citizens. Even nationalist sympathizer Lisa Brooks in 
her afterword to American Indian Literary Criticism wavers, pondering nationalism’s 
downside: “I’ll admit that talk of nationalism makes me wary. For me, like many, it 
calls to mind the setting of boundaries, both physical and cultural, and defending those 
boundaries with force...It recalls the potential for violence.”20 To rescue the term, 
Brooks has “a different kind of nationalism in mind...a nationalism that is not based on 
the theoretical and physical models of the nation-state...but rather relies on the 
multifaceted, lived experience of families who gather in particular places.”21 Brooks 
retains her optimism for a distinct, people-centered nationalism despite nationalists’ 
                                                 
18 Krupat, Red Matters 13, 17. 
19 Krupat, Red Matters 10. 
20 Lisa Brooks, “At the Gathering Place,” American Indian Literary Nationalism 244. 
21 Brooks 244. 
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insistence that theirs is axiomatically a political criticism devoted to expansion of the 
tribal nation-state’s political power. Krupat explains that this expansion of sovereignty 
“means a decrease in the ‘dependency’ of Native nations on the federal government 
and a greater degree of ‘autonomy.’ But it is not clear just what political forms 
expanded sovereignty for the people—as the ‘agency that lays claim to a monopoly of 
decision-making power’...and the sole possessor of ‘legitimate force’ (Ree 87)—might 
actually take.”22 Krupat rightly critiques nationalism’s failure to articulate its ideal 
political forms, that is, to offer a definite, positive statement of program, but he 
himself, other cosmopolitans, and their philosophical confederates hardly meet this 
burden of proof, either. 
If nationalists or quasi-nationalist cosmopolitan supporters advocate a dramatic 
reformulation or just an alternative structural design of the tribal political apparatus, 
they have not said as much. Whatever misgivings they may have, cosmopolitans gloss 
over the de facto problems of state power and remain dedicated to the enhancement of 
Native nations’ sovereignty—especially as a thorn in colonialism’s side—but not 
strictly because they support the nationalist goals of Native peoples or governments.23 
They see nationalism and its generative consciousness as a necessary evil, an 
intermediate point in materialist history’s progress toward a higher loyalty to a “new 
humanism” or an “internationalist” consciousness, in Frantz Fanon’s language 
approvingly cited by Krupat.24 That would be scanned: Fanon anticipates an “occult 
                                                 
22 Krupat, Red Matters 5, citing Jonathan Ree’s “Cosmopolitanism and the Experience of Nationality” 
in Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998) 87. 
23 Krupat, Red Matters 18. 
24 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington, 1961 (New York: Grove, 
1963) 246; Krupat, Red Matters 7, 22; Bruce Robbins, “Introduction Part I: Actually Existing 
Cosmopolitanism,” Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, ed. Pheng Cheah and 
Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998) 2. 
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instability” in this novel identity, the characteristics of which he declines to clarify,25 
although he hints at its enabling structure:  
As we see it, a program is necessary for a government which really 
wants to free the people politically and socially. There must be an 
economic program; there must also be a doctrine concerning the 
division of wealth and social relations...What can be dangerous is when 
they [“African and indeed all underdeveloped peoples”] reach the stage 
of social consciousness before the stage of nationalism. If this happens, 
we find in underdeveloped countries fierce demands for social justice 
which paradoxically are allied with often primitive tribalism.26 
For Fanon, nations must first buy into Marxist ideology (and perhaps Leninist 
statism—the “program” that will ensure compliance with the “doctrine”) before they 
can develop the capacity to understand their local concerns’ rightful, secondary place. 
Further, subscribing to a materialist historical model, Fanon and his cosmopolitan 
followers unwittingly echo imperialist self-justificatory dismissals of others’ cultural 
differences as manifestations of inferiority, insinuating with the language of 
primitivism a lingering savagery. 
Besides their supercilious valuation of tribalism, many cosmopolitans inherit 
Fanon’s general philosophic sympathy for the state as a civilized institution and 
administrator of the “programs” charged with advancing humanist goals.27 
Cosmopolitan theorist Kwame Anthony Appiah philosophically grounds his version of 
cosmopolitanism in the principles and practices of Western liberalism.28 Classical 
liberalism in its search for new forms of democratic political organization and 
authorization calls for regular justification and careful scrutiny of state institutions 
                                                 
25 Fanon 227. 
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“because they are both necessary to so many modern human purposes and because 
they have so great a potential for abuse. As Hobbes famously saw, the state, to do its 
job, has to have a monopoly of certain forms of authorized coercion; and the exercise 
of that authority cries out for (but often does not deserve) justification.”29 While 
Appiah maintains humanism’s focus on basic human rights, he subtly eases the call for 
perpetual review of the concomitant structures intended to enable their protection in 
his assertion that “the primary mechanism for ensuring these entitlements remains the 
nation state.”30 Taking the nation-state’s existence as authorization for it nullifies the 
need for critique that should be ongoing, not formulated once and forever. As 
liberalism increasingly aligned itself with state-sympathetic politics, insistence on 
regulation of state became state regulation. The authority of the nation-state to carry 
on its wide range of functions thus becomes vested. As for whether Appiah has proven 
the nation-state is indeed the “primary mechanism for ensuring” human rights—much 
less whether it ought to be—I am not persuaded, given the vagaries of national and 
tribal-national politics.  
Krupat is in fact more suspicious of the state than Appiah, though both share 
the progressive vision of an internationalist humanism against colonialism and late 
capitalism.31 He writes, “in my view, cosmopolitans will probably find themselves 
supporting not only nationalitarian [internationalist] forms of nationalism, but also—if 
warily—most nationalisms directed against an oppressive colonial order.”32 Diverging 
                                                 
29 Appiah, Ethics 245. 
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from Appiah and other state-sympathizers, Krupat enters a dilemma: how to support 
Native nations’ pitch for greater political sovereignty while maintaining scrutiny over 
the nation-state. He conveniently redeems Native nationalism by extending Brooks’ 
suggestion that its conception of the nation is premised upon a cultural formulation of 
the people rather than of the state, writing in Red Matters, “Native American 
nationalisms…differ from other nationalisms…in that they do not seek the creation of 
postcolonial states,”33 news which may surprise tribal nation-states. According to 
Krupat, not only do Native people not desire a nation-state, “The ‘sovereign political 
entities’ that Native nations were and continue to be were not and are not states.”34 He 
does not define “state” in Red Matters, or anywhere else that I can find. Rather than 
working through a challenging contravention, Krupat simply denies it exists. 
In his equation of peoplehood with nationhood, nationalist Daniel Justice also 
avails himself of this ready dismissal of the connection between the tribal state and 
tribal people, proclaiming “Indigenous nationhood should not, however, be conflated 
with the nationalism that has given birth to industrialized nation-states.”35 If tribal 
people exercised no agency in the creation of the nation-state, the political arm of the 
Cherokee Nation must be a colonialist prosthesis grafted onto a people powerless to 
control their political lives, a condition inconsistent with nationalists’ insistence on 
cultural and political sovereignty. Whether the tribal nation-state conforms to 
Cherokees’ ideal political structure is worth careful inquiry, but it cannot proceed well 
from the assumption that Cherokee people were not involved in its creation or are not 
implicated in its perpetuation. Whether understood as authority possessed of 
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legitimized violence, a centralized political structure with a monopoly of decision-
making power, a body of legislators, the arbiter of justice, a standing bureaucracy 
subject to codified legislation and regulation, the administrator of education, promoter 
of welfare, maintainer of order, or any other common standard, the Cherokee Nation 
and many other tribal nations meet the qualifications.36 The Cherokee Nation 
administers a police force, whose officers are trained by federal law enforcement 
agencies, have the authority to use (and have used) deadly force, and are cross-
deputized with county and municipal entities; maintains headquarters; employs 
administrative, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic officials; operates schools, child 
welfare offices, firefighter corps, and health clinics, among other governmental 
responsibilities, under the rule of law, beginning as a centralized body in the 1820’s. 
The Cherokee nation-state now oversees the business entity Cherokee Nation 
Industries, an electronics company that manufactures among other things wiring 
harnesses for the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey combat-troop carrier helicopter, under a 
federal Department of Defense contract. The Osprey, originally designed for use in 
combat situations, crashed several times in testing and is now used in the Iraq war 
primarily to transport troops and supplies close to the fighting front.37 (The wiring 
harness has in no way been implicated in the Osprey’s design troubles.) How such 
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Whether through ignorance or willful misrepresentation, cosmopolitanists’ and 
nationalists’ disregard for actual conditions and tribal peoples’ agency in the state’s 
establishment and on-going problematic activities is difficult to resolve, but it likely 
proceeds from the optimistic if sometimes utopian visions that here are divergent from 
or at least secondary to American Indian communities’ immediate goals. Some of 
these admittedly include the pressing need for jobs in impoverished areas, the 
discussion of which I must reluctantly set aside here. In addition to the automatic 
authorization of state authority, the humanist position undergirding cosmopolitanism 
advocates two features that clash with my reading of principled practice in Cherokee 
literature: 1) the dissolution of nationalist boundaries and subsequent birth of Fanon’s 
aforementioned “new humanity” that will “define a new humanism,”38 and 2) an 
associated secularist privilege. This new model of affiliation, liberated from 
narrowness and born of “occult instability,” is couched as objective and enunciatively 
unencumbering, but there may be some strings attached.  
The vision for the new humanity precludes loyalty to any of the internationalist 
collective’s national or tribal forerunners, supplanted by a humanity-wide imperative 
to be enforced by what cosmopolitanist scholar Pheng Cheah calls “an ideal 
institutional framework for regulating the anarchic behavior of states,”39 that is, a state 
without coercive powers or the need for them. Edward Said concurs with Fanon’s 
value-laden indictment of tribalism, which he calls nativism: “The tremendous 
ressentiment in nativism aside…there are two reasons for rejecting, or at least 
reconceiving, the nativist enterprise.” The first is that it is not “the only choice for a 
resisting, decolonizing nationalism.” More importantly for Said,  
                                                 
38 Fanon 246. 
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...to accept nativism is to accept the consequences of imperialism, the 
racial, religious, and political divisions imposed by imperialism itself. 
To leave the historical world for the metaphysics of essences like 
négritude, Irishness, Islam, or Catholicism is to abandon history for 
essentializations that have the power to turn human beings against each 
other; often this abandonment of the secular world has led to a sort of 
millenarianism if the movement has had a mass base, or it has 
degenerated into small-scale private craziness...40 
What little may be discerned of this shadowy, new-humanist opacity might well alarm 
American Indian communities. First is its genesis in the proposition—perhaps accurate 
in its description of African or Islamic groups but untenable among American 
Indians—that tribal divisions are the product of colonial agency; second is the 
pejorative description of those divisions as “primitive,” and third is his disingenuous 
equation of religiosity with fanaticism. Should the uncharacteristic vitriol in Said’s 
quote prove characteristic of humanist adherents, it is unclear if anti-tribalist theorists 
would reexamine their hard-thought stance in light of American Indian historical and 
cultural contexts. 
While colonialism undoubtedly effected alteration to tribal social boundaries, 
to ascribe all divisions to imperialism and to stop with this conference repudiates 
Native history, disavows Native epistemology, and nullifies Native agency. Tribal oral 
histories that predate and narrate the time before European contact incontrovertibly 
distinguish among tribes. Perhaps Said would discount such orature, equating the 
manifest “historical world” to which he refers with the written record of Western 
historicism, in a reprisal of the colonialist expunction of Native history. But as he 
argues elsewhere, discounting Others’ histories clears a narrative space for historical 
retelling that authorizes imperialist intervention in the name of progress and 
humanity.41 Further, by declining to investigate the roles that Native peoples have 
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played in establishing their own social orders that persist into the present, re-writing 
socially organized tribalism as a colonialist divide-and-conquer tactic totalizes the 
myth of Western agentive supremacy in the very grand-narrative history that anti-
imperialist criticism seeks to unsettle. Given such manifest contempt for broadly 
considered indigenous social structures, humanist cosmopolitanism gives American 
Indian traditionalist conservatives good cause to doubt whether they will offer greater 
tolerance for closely considered, specific tribal practices. Its theoretical effects in its 
attempts to persuade others to its own universalist account, then, differ not enough 
from imperialist erasures and divestitures at both local and broad structural levels.  
Marshalling an auspicious intellectual genealogy in Fanon, Appiah, and Jean-
Paul Sartre (to whom we could add Said, Homi Bhabha, and more), Krupat wonders 
with them if “we”—humanity, presumably—are ready for the “transcendence of 
racism and an end to violence” through internationalist affiliation, though he more 
pointedly asks the question in the context of American Indian literature.42 More clearly 
positioned, then, the question is if Indians are ready for the new humanism. To 
American Indian communities desirous of preserving their religions, cultural practices, 
epistemologies, and everyday comings and goings, many practical effects of old 
evangelical and new humanist interests in them are indiscernible. Both relegate Native 
interests to a subordinate status and see in their final goals a nullification if not an 
erasure of tribalism: its cultural differences, political traditions, religious beliefs—any 
loyalty below a transcendent humanity.43 Before paternalistically deigning to wonder 
if Indians are “ready” for progress in this particular course, perhaps someone should 
first ask if indeed “we” at all want it. Cosmopolitanism and humanism offer insights 
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for American Indian literary criticism to be sure, but we should approach them well-
informed of their goals, of Indian groups’ relationship to them, and our own capacity 
for reshaping them to suit internal needs.  
 
Pluralist Praxis 
But what is the boundary separating the internal from the external? We should 
be leery of attempting to define what feature distinguishes groups, for such an attempt 
is ultimately an invitation to join forces with a pre-contact version of traditionalism 
against the civilizing hordes—an invitation to lock in to the same dichotomy that 
ossifies identities and prescribes cultural agency. By shifting focus away from 
monistic markers of culture toward a consideration of a range of the practices by 
which culture is maintained in times of stability, challenge, and development, however 
incomplete the exploration of that range must be, we can nevertheless more 
completely describe Cherokee culture and its volitional capacities. We can do so at 
least to the extent that we can correlate common principled practices obtaining in 
decision-making or behavior across diverse conditions among a group calling 
themselves and called by others, Cherokee. These “principled practices”—formed in 
conversation with cultural values and their own histories, shaped by and shaping them, 
and present in but operating without necessary conscious theorization—manage the 
incorporation of alteration to the social structure in belief, habit, practice, or the 
structure itself. Their developmental regulation tends toward the perpetuation both of 
themselves and the matrix of conditions that enable them.  
This is the culturally conservative, even the traditionalist, nature of what Pierre 
Bourdieu calls the habitus: 
 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring 
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structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices 
and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes 
without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery 
of the operations necessary in order to attain them.44 
 The “outcomes” of these principles are as important as their mode of operation 
inasmuch as the habitus “ is always oriented towards practical functions.”45 Such goals 
may be either concretely social, such as accumulating economic or symbolic capital, 
as Bourdieu discusses in his analysis of marriage strategies, or they may be meta-
social, such as maintaining the valuations of that capital and the economic or social 
conditions determining and supporting them. Bourdieu understands this “durability” as 
intrinsic to the dispositional practices constituting habitus, claiming it “tends to ensure 
its own constancy and its defence against change through the selection it makes within 
new information by rejecting information capable of calling into question its 
accumulated information” and “tends to protect itself from crises and critical 
challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as 
possible,”46 which it achieves through actors’ internalization of historic social schema. 
But because dispositions inhere throughout the matrix of the social structure, “the 
habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products—thoughts, perceptions, 
expressions and actions—whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated 
conditions of its production.”47 The habitus’ situation in time, that is, in socio-
historical context, thus becomes a condition of dispositions’ existence but neither 
precludes their practical operation or pertinence, nor their altering development into 
the future, beyond the habitus’ historically-constituted present condition.  
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Though Bourdieu makes much of the habitus’ traditionalist refusal to alter 
when it alteration finds, his emphasis on its conservative tendencies results from his 
attention to its every-day operation. It is as present, however, in moments of 
inescapable crisis and rupture, but still exerting its principle of parsimonious 
regulatory alteration. While mindful of the historical limits on the habitus’ capacity for 
improvisation, Bourdieu does not fail to describe its “infinite capacity” for 
generation—infinite because its epistemic boundaries do not so much vivisect a 
culture’s interior as they circumscribe the perimeter of the entire range of a culture’s 
practices, beliefs, and representations (in a deep history, no less), which interact with 
each other across the entirety of the social matrix. Neither the habitus nor its limits are 
strict prohibitions on practices’ applicability, and certainly they far from monolithic 
indices of cultural identity.48 Formed of principled practices—a term I use more or 
less synonymously with Bourdieu’s “dispositions” to reiterate their interdependent 
relationship—that exist only in their enactment, and this in forever fluctuating 
circumstances that cannot but effect some change, the habitus itself might be better 
understood as dynamic process rather than static amalgamation. Bourdieu inclines 
more toward reifying the habitus, but given its constitution in practice, conceiving it as 
such does not fundamentally alter our understanding of its functions: perpetuating the 
practices and conditions constituting it, and regulating change. It is this agentive 
capacity born in multiplicity that can help unambiguate the components subsumed 
under the appellations “traditional” and “progressive” and help trace their fluctuant 
influence. 
  Several attempts have been made at identifying abiding, necessary, and 
sufficient markers of tribal and/or American Indian cultural difference, that is, some 
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measure of who Indians are individually and collectively and what it is that makes 
them such. The leading contenders are philosophical or spiritual beliefs about land, 
kinship or blood ties, indigenous language use, retention of mythical stories, self-
identification, community recognition, ceremonial participation, religious beliefs, a 
history of treaty-making, geographic residence, and historical or cultural awareness. 
For some, phenotype undoubtedly remains an indication of Indianness; for others, 
Indianness might well be precluded by membership in too high an economic class. 
Over time, all have waxed and waned in importance in the critical literature. I do not 
dispute that any of these practically function in the formulation of cultural boundaries 
by certain actors, but the numerous glaring exceptions in the historical record and 
common experience to each of the proposed limiters, people(s) who are almost 
universally regarded as Indian but fail to conform to one or more of the theoretical 
standards, point up the need for theories better attuned to anomaly and complexity.  
I also question the desirability and practicality of many of these markers and 
the rhetoric used to advance them. In arguing that Indian culture depends on its 
connection with ancestral land, how are we to make sense of tribes that have been 
relocated? How many tribes were not? As for those living on the lands where they 
were before European invasion, if their country has on average been constricted by, 
say, a generous seventy five percent—are they one-quarter the Indians they once 
were? What is gained by arguing that loss of indigenous languages heralds the loss of 
culture entirely? Is interest in learning the languages increased, or are non-speakers 
alienated and discouraged? Too often the rhetoric of imminent demise reinforces the 
myth of the vanishing Indian, and where the dominant discourse once fixated us in the 
past, we are now writing ourselves out of the future. 
 This is not to say that such boundary-drawing practices are not important 
(although we would surely like to see some left in the past); quite the contrary—they 
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are of enormous importance and are made yet more so and made more powerful 
through their interrelationships with each other and with the innumerable other 
principles and practices that constitute the tribal habitus. The strength accruing in the 
connections between principled practices dispersed in the habitus also mandates a 
responsibility on the part of theorizing agents to maintain others that lend each their 
salience and force. One’s death might diminish the others, but it necessitates no self-
immolation. If there is a locus of cultural difference, perhaps it resides not in any 
singular, discrete feature but gathers together and migrates across the infinite 
combinations of thought and unthought beliefs and practices. These capacities for 
innovative, combinatory strategies can help us theorize not only historical agency but 
also potential strategies for present and future challenges. The principled practices 
related to worship, deliberation, and diplomacy, only a few of many, are among those 
I would like to consider in Cherokee literature, as authors not only mitigated the 
rupturing force of colonial history but also exercised agency in the developmental 
preservation of Cherokee culture.  
 
Cherokee Literature  
The authors I study in the ensuing chapters most often bear the brunt of 
accusations of assimilatedness, often for the very practices that I here attempt to 
reclaim as traditional dispositions. These dispositions, too, acutely intersect with 
contemporary issues facing the Cherokee and many other tribal peoples but suffer 
from deficient contemporary theorization. In each of the sections that follow, I have 
attempted to look into principles and practices thoroughly and have thus offered in 
each section a preliminary chapter on traditional dispositions. These may seem to 
some literary readers to spend an inordinate amount of time and space reviewing 
critical material originating outside literary scholarship, in anthropology, ethnology, 
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sociology, religious studies, history, biography, and more. Too often it seems to me 
that literary criticism makes generalized, unsupported allusions to Indian cultures 
without the support of either experience or comprehensive research. If this 
interdisciplinary, social-science theoretical perspective on literary reading seems 
slightly unorthodox, so once did arguing for literature’s historical contextualization.  
An objection might here arise to the apparent privilege afforded knowledges 
produced about rather than by Cherokees. I should admit that I actually believe the 
converse to be true—that culturally-aware Cherokees understand Cherokee culture 
better than the best non-Cherokee researchers, not inherently, but as a function of 
context, familiarity, and experience. A non-Cherokee with a similarly embedded 
background would no doubt be similarly equipped, if differing in experience. In any 
case, I do position Cherokees’ analyses alongside non-Cherokee voices in these 
chapters. My belief in their greater general authority does not mean, however, that 
western-originated research is invalid or not useful. Rather than acquiesce to another 
stifling, preclusive dichotomy, I have attempted to situate western and indigenous 
knowledges in complementary conversation, believing with Robert Burns and the 
Cherokee authors here in the potential benefits of seeing ourselves as others see us. 
Each section’s preliminary chapters are thus linked to those following, where 
Cherokee writers’ voices take primary place and afford vital opportunities to test 
theory against praxis. I further disavow any private privilege my subjective position as 
a Cherokee might seem to bestow. I claim no special experience, and have tried to find 
corroboration of all of my references to Cherokee experience or culture in publically 
available resources. Certainly I can lay no claim to any special knowledge or 
expertise, as many marvelous and rewarding interactions with Cherokees infinitely 
more knowledgeable than I am about Cherokee traditions have shown me only too 
clearly.  
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As an initial step in dismantling the bankrupt assimilated/traditional dichotomy 
plaguing American Indian literary criticism, the first section examines select 
traditional religious practices and theorizes religious innovations in works by two 
nearly unknown Cherokee authors: the memoirs of Catharine Brown, a nineteenth-
century convert to Christianity; and Kholvn, a novel by contemporary traditionalist 
Sequoyah Guess.49 In these works Brown and Guess narrate forms of traditional 
practices like “gaining knowledge,” a process of community edification through 
education in which new ways of knowing and potential solutions are vetted against 
inherited beliefs and traditions. The historical course of alterations to spiritual and 
religious principles and practices, though often maligned as a sinking of tradition, 
instead follows a gendered trajectory tending always toward the habitus’s 
perpetuation, and as such charts both male and female culturally-preservative agency, 
even as it sometimes entails changes more drastic than expected.  
Nowhere has interweaving internal and external systems been a seamless 
historical process, however. The second section looks at a particularly devastating 
transition through Elias Boudinot’s and Chief John Ross’s political rhetoric of 
civilization during the Removal crisis of the 1830s, read against a centralizing and 
again gendered movement away from traditional political dispositions of consensus-
building and debate. A key problem for the combined chapters of this section is the 
linkage of dissent with assimilatedness, a correlation that discourages any articulation 
of sentiments that might be thought counter-hegemonic. That connection to 
assimilation is the primary basis of my emphasis on political dissent and religious 
worship, for progressive practices in these areas in particular have been and continue 
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to be most regularly and unproblematically characterized as evidentiary of an identity 
that has abandoned or neglected Native traditions—that has crossed over to the light 
side, as it were. As important as they might be to some specialists, progressive and/or 
altered dispositions in fields like dress, labor, diet, education, transportation, art, 
military service, language, and so on have largely escaped the prevailing scrutiny 
against already-constituted expectations of allegiance to political and religious habits 
that exerts such a polarizing influence on American Indian populations. Subtextually 
uniting the sections is an analysis of the gendered currents of alterations to religious 
and political dispositions, which as I hope to show, are by no means ubiquitously 
positive simply by virtue of being volitionally conceived, nor simply by benefit having 
been done by Cherokees. As Theda Perdue has argued, many of the political 
transformations of the early nineteenth century systematically divested Cherokee 
women of political and economic power. Such disempowering maneuvers directed at 
internal subgroups paradoxically contributed to the disempowerment of the whole of 
the population. On the other hand, women in assuming spiritual leadership roles 
sought not to empower themselves through the appropriation of men’s power but to 
strengthen people generally by providing communal spiritual resources. 
Perhaps such local examples of agency seem like small potatoes to nationalists 
or cosmopolitanists who look to the state as a prime force for human development. To 
them, perhaps, questioning the expansion of political sovereignty may seem 
retrograde, but a moment’s reflection on the history of imperialism should check this 
expectation of support for government on the part of American Indian tribes. The 
statist campaign against American Indians hardly belongs to the remote past, either; in 
the 1970s the Indian Health Service was involuntarily sterilizing Indian women,50 and 
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at the time of writing, in opposition to the Cherokee Nation’s bid to disenfranchise the 
Cherokee Freedmen, members of the Congressional Black Caucus have introduced a 
series of bills threatening to terminate the trust relationship between the U.S. and the 
Cherokee Nation.51 That American Indian tribes would oppose U.S. statism seems 
banal; more complicated is the attitude toward tribal statism, which as it consolidates 
power moves away from rule by consensus and restricts the sphere of debate—
symptoms that at least attend if they do not themselves structure such conflicts as 
Freedmen citizenship. The Cherokee nation-state reincorporated under the Indian 
Reorganization Act, survived the termination era, and has in many ways prospered 
during the current self-determination policy, and many writers have celebrated the 
advances made in tribal sovereignty.  
The distance between the Cherokee bureaucracy and the Cherokee people, 
however, is widening. Even as the nationally-owned Cherokee Nation Industries 
manufactures military helicopter components, the executive branch enables the 
disenfranchisement of Freedmen, the judicial branch denies the right of same-sex 
marriage, and the legislative branch conspires to undermine the validity of the United 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, literary critics are silent about how national 
rule might be brought in closer accord with the express will of Cherokee people, how 
their opinions might be better solicited, or how they might manage their affairs with 
greater independence. According to nationalists, whatever objections tribal people 
might have to the tribal nation-state are pre-empted by their loyalty to the centralized 
political body, but the literature of many Cherokee authors tells another story, one 
with deep-seated doubts about centralized power in the hands of anyone, including 
other Cherokees.52 Their demand for local control and their accounting of the state’s 
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responsibilities in representation, justice, access, frugality, and restraint sets a 
precedent the Cherokee Nation and nation-people would do well to emulate. A fresh 
look at Cherokee traditions, beliefs, and practices with an eye toward the full range of 
their application to the complexities of being Indian in America can not only improve 
our political structure but can also embolden our communal imaginations.
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The status of religion or spirituality in academic discourse is a delicate matter 
and is contentious even within the traditionalist nationalist movement. Craig Womack 
affirms the connection, “A compassionate literary nationalism makes religious studies 
a key feature of its interests…[an important] reason for making religion a cornerstone 
of a materialist theory is because spiritual matters are paramount for Indian people 
themselves and no discussion of art or politics can proceed without referencing 
them.”1 In the same volume, Robert Warrior equivocates this religious focus with his 
advocacy of secularist criticism that will observe the difference “between having 
religious beliefs and invoking those religious beliefs and demanding of others 
agreement with them in intellectual discourse.”2 Among cosmopolitans, secularism in 
discourse is more nearly dogmatic than religiousity, with the latter systematically 
cordoned off into discrete areas of religious studies.3 From a purely pragmatic 
perspective akin to Womack’s, religiosity resounds in many Cherokee authors’ works, 
Catharine Brown’s and Sequoyah Guess’s to be sure, and an analysis of that trend is 
incumbent to responsible scholarship. This practice accords with Eva Garroutte’s 
“Radical Indigenism” methodology, which for her recognizes “that sacred elements 
are absolutely central to the coherence of our knowledge traditions and that if we 
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surrender them, there is little left in our philosophies that makes any sense.”4 
Spiritually-minded Native scholars have lamented the critical gulf between 
religiously-inflected reasoning and discourses that bristle at fundamentalist or 
essentialist thinking,5 but we can find in the Cherokee literary archive authors who 
built their own bridges between apparently unlinkable points. Understanding their 
engineering remains to critics. 
Prior to European contact, Cherokee religious beliefs and practices, though not 
codified in written archives, obtained a permanence comparable to the doctrinaire 
Christianity promulgated by the missionaries who streamed into Cherokeeia in the 
nineteenth century. Both religions underwent tumultuous and sometimes reciprocal 
change during this time, but the trauma induced by the US’s relentless imperialist 
assault on Cherokee land and culture took a heavy toll on traditional religion, at least 
its most overt structural presences. A series of historical and social shifts issuing in 
response to cultural revival, defensive military maneuvers, and developments in 
gender and political roles posed serious challenges to old shapes of Cherokee religion, 
yet the habitus’s omnipresent, self-perpetuating material and political influence 
safeguarded many traditional beliefs and practices, or found consonances between 
them and those introduced by missionaries. Although Cherokees did not convert to 
Christianity in significant numbers until the late nineteenth century, early syncretistic 
patterns—enacted by all types of blending, modification, adoption, and/or rejection of 
apparently contradictory religious elements—instantiated ingenious progressive 
traditions that have conserved and adapted Cherokee culture up to the present. 
                                                 
4 Garroutte 104. 
 
5 Craig Womack, “Theorizing American Indian Experience,” Reasoning Together: The Native Critics 
Collective, by Janice Acoose, et al., ed. Craig Womack, Daniel Justice, and Christopher Teuton 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2008) 363-68; Garroutte 102-03; Jace Weaver, That the People Might Live 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1996) 28-32. 
 32 
Though separated by nearly two centuries, both Brown and Guess 
diplomatically negotiate across non-Indian and intra-Cherokee gendered, cultural, and 
religious groups, forging imaginative alliances. Brown was among the first Cherokee 
converts to Christianity, and her memoirs, collected from various diary entries, letters 
from her, and reminiscences of others have slowly gained critical attention for the 
first-hand glimpses they provide into the Cherokees’ daily lives at a crucial historical 
juncture. Scholarship on Brown and the Memoir, however, has only skimmed the 
surface of the possible meanings and potential strategies for asserting a culturally-
specific agency her writing suggests. Like Brown, many other Native writers who 
pronounce some position that seems too far afield of accepted ways of being 
religiously, politically, or economically Indian have been dismissed as duped, 
assimilated, or internally colonized. Situating her writing and conversion in a tribal 
social history reveals far stronger attachments to Cherokee people as Cherokee people 
than her critics have yet been able to see. Her theology blends, modifies, adopts, and 
refashions Christian and Cherokee religious beliefs and practices into an innovatively 
spun web at once complicated in its cultural distinctions and simple in its controlling 
tenet of proving “useful for her people.”  
Sequoyah Guess, a self-published Keetoowah Cherokee author from rural 
northeastern Oklahoma, mainly authors science fiction/horror novels that draw on 
Cherokee oral traditions, landscapes, and culture for his monsters, settings, and 
characters. While some nationalists have seen Guess’s work as exemplaric of 
sovereignty-centered polemic, such forced readings belie his prevailing synthetic 
plurality that de-centers the nation-state as the arbiter of Cherokeeness, or indeed any 
supposed necessary and sufficient marker of Cherokee identity, like citizenship, blood, 
religion, or language. Though fantastical, Guess’s world is anchored in the realities of 
northeastern Oklahoma Cherokee life, and it reflects the diversity of that geography, 
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particularly in his characterizations of both Cherokee Nation and United Keetoowah 
Band citizens, Cherokee traditionalists, white and Indian Christians, and non-
believers—none of whom find themselves unilaterally equipped to manage the 
conflicts they face. This spirit of complementarity extends in Guess’ novels through 
his style, content, plots, light pedagogic tone, hospitable treatment of 
mixedbloodedness, and comparative theological inquiries. This pluralism, by no 
means achieved without complication, contrasts with the oppositional positions taken 
by the two Oklahoma Cherokee tribes snarling over resources and with the divisive 
rhetoric of critics who insist that traditional and Christian identities cannot fuse.  
Guess’s additive sense of identity is remarkable not only for its resonance with 
Brown’s but also in its directionality; that is, insofar as it originates from a source 
aligned in significant ways with conservative traditionalism. In many respects, he 
voices the traditionalist perspective that critics claim they champion, yet they elide his 
advocacy of accommodation in favor of emphasizing separatism, however qualified. 
Such insularity finds little expression by many traditionalists themselves, like Guess or 
Crosslin Smith, the Keetoowah leader of a stomp grounds in Cherokee country.6 To be 
sure, they advocate strengthening community and political sovereignty among 
Cherokee people, but they find in cross-cultural, pragmatic accommodation not 
wholesale eradication of tribal identity but rather means of strengthening and 
preserving Cherokee culture via selective application of effective knowledges and 
strategies culled from multiple sources. 
                                                 
6 Crosslin Smith, “The Good Mind,” lecture given at 14th Annual Symposium of the American Indian, 
Northeastern State U, Tahlequah, OK, April 1986, videocassette; Crosslin Smith, “The Way of the 
Sacred Eagle,” lecture given at 16th Annual Symposium of the American Indian, Northeastern State U, 
Tahlequah, OK, April 1988, videocassette. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Paths of Righteousness 
 
To help contextualize the next chapter’s readings of Catharine Brown’s 
memoirs and Sequoyah Guess’s Kholvn, this chapter introduces traditional Cherokee 
religious beliefs and practices that pertain to some of the less conspicuous cultural 
presences in their works, particularly regarding harmony and cooperation, 
righteousness and charity, continuity and education, and purity and cleansing. I 
specifically look to social and religious developments that have been under-
emphasized in much scholarship on Cherokee religion, which has instead been more 
often interested in exploration of an alternative, if not romanticized, harmonious 
relationship with the natural world. Without discounting such differences in ecological 
worldviews, or the insightful theorization that Cherokee cosmology extends kinship 
relations to the non-human world, I want to explore how spiritual beliefs also inform 
right relationships to other humans, not only as a feature of a loose-knit cultural 
spirituality but also as concrete religious edicts. I further position this Cherokee sacred 
humanism in relevant historical moments: the decline of the traditional priesthood at 
separate moments in oral history and priests’ later separation from the polity, the 
introduction and spread of Christianity, and the gendered transformation occasioned 
when men moved to political from religious leadership roles. In many ways women 
assumed these last as Christianity spread, setting the historical religious stage for 
Brown’s and Guess’s narratives and offering an example of women’s innovation 
mobilized from within the habitus. 
This chapter’s selection of principled practices by no means intends a 
comprehensive or even middling representation of Cherokee religion, but only a 
narrowly bordered weaving of a handful of dispositions at particular times. Despite my 
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subjectively constricted scope—perhaps even because of its adumbration—I hope that 
it might nevertheless illustrate the wealth of innovative interlockings of traditional and 
progressive practices and beliefs available along even a single thread in the richly 
varied fabric of the habitus. Much of the traditional Cherokee religion I discuss 
concerns Keetoowah societies, which have their roots in oral histories that proclaim 
the ancient town of Kituhwah as the original nucleus of the Cherokee. The modern 
religious incarnations of the Keetoowah were developed near the turn of the twentieth 
century through Redbird Smith’s direction of the communal recovery of ancient 
traditions. I offer nothing revelatory about Cherokee religion or the Keetoowah 
Society.1 I have relied on sources long publically available or offered publically by 
religious leaders, for several reasons: 1) to respect traditional practitioners’ right to 
privacy and the protected nature of much religious knowledge; 2) to acknowledge my 
own position as an outsider to these traditions, without authority to speak 
representatively or definitively; and 3) to keep the lines of discourse open, using the 
plentiful information already at general disposal. If traditional religious leaders want 
to gain more exposure or to make more information available, they will do so, as they 
have done in the past. In the meantime, interpreting what they have already offered us 
can keep us busy for some time, if we are open to new ways of approaching, 
understanding, and applying it. 
 
The White Path: Harmony, Righteousness, and Community 
The traditional Cherokee principle that has received the most critical attention 
is that of harmony, according to which a Cherokee maintains positive “relationships 
with his fellow Cherokee by avoiding giving offense, on the negative side, and by 
                                                 
1 I offer still less about other stomp dance religion societies like the Four Mothers or the Seven Clans 
societies, who are less conspicuous in the historical record, for reasons that might include greater 
reticence, factional disputes, lower membership numbers, or others.  
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giving of himself to his fellow Cherokee in regard to his time and his material goods, 
on the positive side,”2 as anthropologist Robert Thomas has it in an early discussion. 
Drawing on Thomas, Fred Gearing emphasizes the former injunctive dimension: “The 
single focus which created pattern in Cherokee moral thought was the value of 
harmony among men…this principle of harmony appears to direct those Cherokees 
today, cautiously and virtually at all cost, to avoid discord. The emphasis in its 
application is negative—thou shalt not create disharmony—rather than positive.” 
Gearing elevates harmony from a “basic principle” as in Thomas’s formulation to a 
supreme, singular guiding principle, even as he admits “This Cherokee ethos cannot 
be demonstrated directly by the historical record.”3 I understand him to mean by this 
disclaimer that while Cherokee actors endeavored to maintain harmony, they did not 
enunciate it as a principle per se, and that proving a negative like avoidance or non-
action, by showing how a disrupter of harmony might have been shunned, say, cannot 
be accomplished with the historical record.4 These anthropological considerations of 
harmony mainly confined themselves to interpersonal relationships in a community. 
First seen mainly in the social sphere, theorists have begun to discern the harmony 
ethic’s influence in literature, religion, politics, cosmology, epistemology, and 
elsewhere. 
Mary Churchill’s dissertation presents such an expansion of the theoretical 
applications of the harmony principle: its definition, examples in oral history, and as a 
structural attitude informing Cherokee literary theory. For her, harmony exemplifies 
                                                 
2 Robert Thomas, “Cherokee Values and World View,” unpublished manuscript, U of North Carolina, 
1958. 
 
3 Fred Gearing, Priests and Warriors: Social Structures for Cherokee Politics in the 18th Century, 
Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association 64.5, Part 2, Memoir 93 (1962): 31. 
 
4 As it turns out, Chief John Ross regularly invoked harmony in his rhetoric, and to multiple audiences, 
during the factional disputes over Removal. John Ross, The Papers of Chief John Ross, ed. Gary 
Moulton, vol. 1 (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1985) 265, 271, 303, 337. 
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the socially-oriented synthesis of forces in (typically) dialogic opposition, but their 
equality results in a binary more durably static than in a Hegelian system of conflict 
and conquest of one element by another. This codependent, durable tension defines for 
Churchill the concept of balance, which is connected to harmony but refers 
specifically to the opposition she identifies between, for instance, genders, directions, 
color symbology, war and peace, and other paired complements. Like harmony, the 
concept of balance has taken center stage in studies of Cherokee religion and features 
prominently in the literary theoretical perspectives of Churchill and Daniel Justice.5 
Both also appear in the voluminous writings on American Indian religion not 
specifically focused on that of the Cherokee, although most authors tend to treat the 
two more synonymously than does Churchill, with harmony extending to relations 
with non-human realms. I will return to Churchill’s influential formulation later in this 
chapter, following discussion of some of the other principles, practices, and historical 
circumstances impacting Cherokee traditionalism that will help contextualize the ideas 
of harmony and balance. 
Without attempting to dislodge harmony from its privileged place in 
indigenous religious studies, I would like to suggest here that it is not so originary a 
concern in Cherokee morality as the critical literature suggests. Ample evidence in 
oral and written history and in literature testifies that harmony and balance are guiding 
principles, to be sure, but overly-focused attention to them as such seems relatively 
recent and may reflect an internalization of a discourse concerned more with broad, 
“Indian” questions rather than close study of Cherokee or other cultures specifically. 
Such influence entails no necessary contamination of the Cherokee theorizing of 
                                                 
5 Mary Churchill, Walking the White Path: Toward a Cherokee-Centric Hermeneutic for Interpreting 
Cherokee Literature, diss., U of California at Santa Barbara, 1997 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1997) 137-87; 
Daniel Justice, Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2006) 27-34. 
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Church, Justice, and others; if anything, it suggests that Cherokees have affirmed those 
values as broadly consonant with their other concerns. Other, locally-oriented 
philosophies focused on alternative principles predate attention to harmony and 
balance, however, and these have received but little scholarly treatment. While 
pervasive, dispositions maintaining harmony are inseparable from conditions deemed 
favorable enough to warrant their perpetuation, and they are assessed not simply on 
the basis of an absence of discord but on the extent to which they provide the same 
sorts of happiness any people seek: some measure of love, liberty, security, creativity, 
etc. The Cherokee religious concept of the White Path symbolizes some of the 
principled practices thought to enable these goals in conditions that make possible a 
harmony worth preserving.  
Though the White Path, also called the Path of Peace, is discussed somewhat 
spottily in oral histories and secondary literature, several characteristics recur in 
speeches and writing explicitly and metonymically about it. Thomas offers a useful 
summary: “[God’s law] is the ‘Law’ or ‘Rule’ which God laid down for the Indian to 
follow. It consists not only of ‘following the White Path,’ that is being peaceful, 
friendly, and observing the rest of the moral virtues; but also of keeping up the old 
Cherokee customs, such as the fire, stomp dancing, etc.”6 He emphasizes here the 
White Path’s social dimension, which is inseparable from its culturally preservative 
function. Foremost a religious concept, the idea of the White Path urges peace and 
harmony in social, natural, and cosmological relations through language, hunting, 
doctoring practices, etc., all governed by an idea of “righteousness” as a means of 
achieving “a good mind” or “becoming right-minded.” Anthropologist Albert 
Wahrhaftig argues that harmony is more an effect of righteous living according to the 
                                                 
6 Robert Thomas, The Origin and Development of the Redbird Smith Movement, master’s thesis, U of 
Arizona, 1953, 150. 
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law symbolized by the White Path than it is a causal force, inasmuch as social and 
individual contentment is evidentiary, providing “the ultimate sign that [the Cherokee] 
are living according to sacred design.”7 Keetoowah Society leader Crosslin Smith 
describes the White Path as “a white righteous road” that connects the four peoples 
across the four corners of the earth via a “white road, the first cross of extreme, deep 
religious meaning. It is the same law that was passed on in to the Bible—this is pre-
history time.” He clarifies the law’s fundamental precept: “‘Love one another and love 
me’: this was the first law. The same law gives full complemence [sic] to the new law 
called Ten Commandments.”8 Here and elsewhere, the connection between 
righteousness and divine law is made explicit. While the Keetoowah divine law is 
plainly not as detailed as, say, the Bible, it similarly and foundationally concerns the 
proper attitude humans should have towards the Creator and towards each other. 
Ceremonies, dances, and prayers all reinforce these attitudes as do the instructions for 
living related in oral histories. 
Even as Smith emphasizes the injunction(s) to love the Creator and others, we 
see it presupposes certain entities—you, one another, Me—and right ways of treating 
them—with love, which may be of a different sort for the human and the deity—that 
are not explicitly defined and can only be understood by reference to other laws, 
habits, principles, beings, and so on. Upholding this law will require reference to a 
great deal else in order to find its own complemence. If upholding the primary law, 
itself a social principle, may be taken as practicing righteousness, the plurality of the 
attitudes constituting it reinforces the sense that it, too, is not a monistic foundation of 
Cherokee cosmology or worldview but rather another forceful principle among many 
                                                 
7 Albert Wahrhaftig, “We Who Act Right: The Persistent Identity of Cherokee Indians,” Currents in 
Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Sol Tax, ed. Robert Henshaw (New York: Mouton, 1979) 263. 
 
8 Crosslin Smith, “The Good Mind,” lecture given at 14th Annual Symposium of the American Indian, 
Northeastern State U, Tahlequah, OK, April 1986, videocassette. 
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in the web of the habitus, perhaps more influential or far-reaching than others but still 
not sufficient unto itself. 
To help clarify the primary law, Keetoowah traditions retain and impart others, 
the laws of the Seven Clans. Citing Janet Jordan, Churchill recounts six: 
 
Be peaceful and loving, they say. 
Have a white, a pure and cleansed heart, they say. 
Do not falsely judge another, they say. 
Do not do people harm, they say. 
When people make demands upon you, fulfill them. 
Love thy neighbor as theyself [sic].9 
In personal conversations with stomp grounds members, I have also been told of four 
other guidelines for interpersonal relations, here paraphrased: love each other 
unconditionally; treat every person as a sacred creation; cling to each other; and be 
stingy with one another (that is, don’t use each other up). The categorical 
differentiation of humans and the attention focused on them specifically in these 
traditional religious teachings are often overlooked in scholarship on the Cherokees 
and other American Indians. Many scholars are attracted to the cultural components of 
Indian beliefs and practices that promote less consumptive environmental dispositions, 
but few investigators have seen—or they have declined to see—the religious 
connections that lend them their force, divorcing ecological beliefs and behaviors from 
the spiritual, social, and material emphasis on taking care of other people that 
traditional practitioners themselves profess to be at the heart of their philosophies. 
This concern for others manifests itself in principled practices like charitable giving, 
ready hospitality, and community labor.  
A focus on community takes center stage for two important Cherokee theorists 
of Indian identity and literature, sociologist Eva Garroutte and Native American 
                                                 
9 Churchill 183, citing Janet Etheridge Jordan, “Politics and Religion in a Western Cherokee 
Community: A Century of Struggle in a White Man’s World” (Ann Arbor: Xerox University 
Microfilms, 1975) 127. 
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studies-theologian Jace Weaver. Garroutte’s Real Indians surveys the most common 
ways American Indian identity is reckoned in legal, biological, cultural, and personal 
discourses and in its latter chapters proposes an alternative set of criteria based on 
kinship as a way of defining community. For her, “a definition of identity founded in 
kinship responds to at least two themes that one encounters across a range of tribal 
philosophies. One of these reflects a condition of being, which I call relationship to 
ancestry. The second involves a condition of doing, which I call responsibility to 
reciprocity.”10 The first may be seen in genealogical or ancestral connections, 
although Garroutte hastens to point out that those she imagines concern not 
bloodedness nor pedestrian, racialized identity markers. If this hereditary state of 
being still suggests an essentialism, it is a well-qualified, Native version open to 
alteration through adoption, communal vetting, and other processes.11 Garroutte’s 
second criteria is more germane to consideration of traditional religious dispositions, 
both in its emphasis on doing, or what I call principled practices, and in her insistence 
that others’ social concerns are also of paramount concern to the individual’s 
comportment and constitution, in voluntary behaviors that “contribute to tribal 
survival” through generosity of time, resources, and spirit.12 The interview 
respondents she quotes severally underline the importance of helping behaviors that 
maintain “The People—those who understand themselves as bound together in 
spiritually faithful community,”13 again emphasizing the religious aspects of 
community-mindedness. The behavioral responsibilities they point to as embodying or 
                                                 
10 Eva Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and Survival of Native America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U 
of California P, 2003) 118. 
 
11 Garroutte 118-27. 
 
12 Garroutte 128. 
 
13 Garroutte 129. 
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enacting Garroutte’s idea of reciprocity often concern the immediate, this-world, 
material well being of the community by providing for others’ food, safety, labor, or 
economic needs in accordance with spiritually-understood “Original Instructions… 
sacred stories, and historic practices.”14 Each of these, Garroutte argues, helps 
constitute tradition, which she defines as “fundamentally a sacred concept.” She 
affirms a Cherokee/Choctaw respondent’s definition of tradition: “tradition is what is 
passed on orally, and it tells you the way you are supposed to be. It has to give us 
good. It has to give us growth. It is the lessons that were taught us by the ancient ones 
and the elders to help [each of] us be a better person, and closer to the Creator. And 
we have to use it in the way it is intended…It’s spiritual.”15 This progress-oriented 
expression of traditional value urges the development of good relationships 
(righteousness, perhaps) with the Creator, with the self, and with the “us” of 
community, which encompasses the present community and also the past-in-present 
community of elders and “the ancient ones.” 
Garroutte’s identity theory recalls Jace Weaver’s in That the People Might 
Live, where he writes, “Natives define their identity in terms of community and relate 
to ultimate reality through that community.”16 In his argument, community “is, in fact, 
the highest value to Native peoples, and fidelity to it is a primary responsibility,”17 and 
he reiterates the religious foundation not just of social behavioral principles but also of 
a general, commonly-held difference in American Indian thinking or consciousness. 
He asserts, “Because of the failure of Native cultures to recognize any split between 
sacred and secular spheres, this worldview remains essentially religious, involving the 
                                                 
14 Garroutte 136. 
 
15 Garroutte 137. Emphasis and editorial comments in original. 
 
16 Jace Weaver, That the People Might Live (New York: Oxford UP, 1996) 32. 
 
17 Weaver 37. 
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Native’s deepest sense of self and undergirding tribal life, existence, and identity, just 
as the Creator undergirds all the created order.”18 Like Garroutte, he asserts the 
relevance of the religious principle of righteousness to community interaction, arguing 
that “being rightwised…involves right relation not only between the human self and 
human others but between self and place.”19 Combining the phenomenological, 
ontological, moral, and social centrality of community with a “proactive commitment” 
to it, that is, an agentive working for its survivance, to borrow Gerald Vizenor’s 
concept, Weaver coins the term “communitism” by fusing “community” and 
“activism” to describe what for him is “the single thing that most defines Indian 
literatures.”20 Literature, too, functions primarily to maintain community, but seeing in 
it no less diversity than in social communities, Weaver complicates any perceived 
homogeneity with his recognition that “today we exist in many different kinds of 
community—reservation, rural, urban, tribal, pan-Indian, traditional, Christian.”21 
Even as many agents participate in several of these communities, they belong to still 
others.  
Despite Weaver’s important qualification detailing the multiplicity of 
community, I am disinclined to fully accept the theorization of community 
preservation as the “single” most permanently descriptive essence of the variety of the 
Cherokee (much less the Indian) world, not because I reject the pervasive significance 
of community—indeed, I am here endorsing just that—but because it becomes too-
encompassing a term in Weaver’s and Garroutte’s constructions. Weaver broadens the 
Indian idea of community to include what he calls “the ‘wider community’ that 
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21 Weaver 45.  
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includes all the created order, which is also characterized in kinship terms. No sharp 
distinction is drawn between the human and nonhuman persons that make up the 
community.”22 Garroutte shares his general sense: “in tribal philosophies people take 
their place, or find their identity, within a kinship network that includes not only other 
humans but also animals, plants, minerals, geographic features, the earth itself, 
celestial bodies, and spirit beings.”23 Both here expand the argument, grounded in the 
evidence of traditional and contemporary oral histories extant in perhaps all tribes, that 
kinship relations extend beyond the human world and inform right relationships with 
those human, natural, and supernatural. In generalized theories, however, community 
becomes no less than everything. In a limit case, Native identities and literatures, then, 
are ostensibly to be distinguished from those of non-Natives by virtue of their 
positionality within, well, the cosmos—and how then are they unlike those of non-
Natives?—and find their essential nature in their support for the universe or any given 
part of it. Native or not, what way of being is not supportive of some part of existence? 
Even nihilism works for something. Knowing that Indian peoples are not committed to 
everything under the sun in identical ways, a sweepingly tautological definition of 
community does not say enough about distinctions—how they originate and function 
and to what purposes. 
A narrower critique reveals other problems with the descriptive power of 
casting community as the essence of Indian identity and literary expression, at least as 
an undelineated, umbrella principle. Weaver and Garroutte both stipulate that Indian 
communities may be urban and Christian, say, but dedication to the furtherance of 
such communities alone does not make them peculiarly Indian anymore than advocacy 
                                                 
22 Weaver 39, emphasis added. 
 
23 Garroutte 132.  
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for an Indian community makes the advocate Indian.24 Further, relationships between 
communities, whether or not affiliated in kinship terms, are not everywhere governed 
by identical principles or practices. Cherokee clan names come from human, animal, 
and plant communities, for instance, but we do not interact with each of these 
forebears equally: we might, for instance, eat deer and potatoes, but we do not eat 
humans. And while we use kinship terms to speak of some entities in the natural 
world, like the thunders and rivers, we do not speak of dirt, say, as a relative. Perhaps 
such details are trifling. But perhaps if we were to consider them on their own terms 
and explore the particular imaginative strengths they provide, we could understand 
how this culture’s theorization of place or land or its principled practices concerning 
living and moving and exploring in it enabled it to persevere and prosper in a 
transplanted locale.25 Theories that while admirably seeking to offer communities a 
broadly applicable means of strengthening their cultural or political sovereignty 
unfortunately obscure many unique, local ways of being and believing that generate 
enormous potential agency. 
Without understanding the specific nature of the relationships among 
communities predicated on traditional philosophies, our apprehension of the inductive 
principle of communities as kin is imperfect at best. The clarification of the diversity 
                                                 
24 Garroutte admittedly avoids these critiques through her additional requirements that belonging to a 
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25 The practice of “moving the fire” is one example of a method providing for the transplantation and 
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Keetoowah Society of the Cherokee Indians,” Master’s thesis, Northwestern State College, Alva, OK, 
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of Indian lives that Weaver begins is crucial not least because the plurality it affirms 
complicates and vivifies what might otherwise seem a simple inversion of the 
individual vs. society binary that fails to transcend binaristic thinking. That pluralism, 
however, is nearly undone by the monist insistence that community for community’s 
sake sufficiently describes the values by which every possible community might 
justify its differentiation, regardless of their own interpretations of their central values. 
If (often, when) generalizations come to be reified as expected features of Indian 
communities or representations, particularities that might not accord with them can be 
discounted as assimilationist, or worse, as preclusive of an Indian identity. Without 
carefully, narrowly describing the parameters of the communities Indian writers seek 
to maintain or develop, theorists may too easily lapse into quick and easy 
recapitulations of reified, externally produced characterizations (too often caricatures) 
of what makes an Indian community “Indian,” disregarding or disparaging any traits 
or boundaries that smack of too much assimilation, do not hearken far enough back, or 
seem to affirm the wrong kind of community. I fear that Weaver has done something 
like this in his analyses of Elias Boudinot, discussed in chapter four, perhaps as a 
result of his willingness to identify, if circumspectly, an abiding essentialism that he 
carries forward from earlier attempts by influential figures like Vine Deloria to 
identify a persistent Indian difference. 
Like Weaver, American Indian religious scholar George Tinker echoes 
Deloria’s generalizations about American Indian religious concepts as he posits a 
basic difference between Western thinking as fundamentally temporal and Indian 
thinking as spatial, a distinction that structures the association of community and land 
or place, which I worry is becoming critically fixed. To return for a moment to the 
value of harmony, when conceived spatially, it represents a static state of balance 
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achieved through restraint and respect for other lives and forms of life.26 Dodging this 
rigidity both temporal and spatial, the symbolism of the Cherokee White Path suggests 
rather a methodic dynamism operating in fluid circumstances, regulating change and 
mediating its impact in an ongoing process. As a “path,” a combination of the spatial 
and temporal—a site for moving, a moving site—it maps the way to righteous 
relations rather than marks off a boundary to a discrete or unalterable space. As 
explained by Crosslin Smith, the White Path not only represents the laws of peace and 
righteousness universally shared by all peoples, it also unites and connects them in 
processes that necessarily entail some modification. Again, this does not, however, 
mean that one thing changed means all things have changed. Cherokees have 
exercised unique dispositions to manage development socially, culturally, and 
religiously to ensure that changes are made in accordance with the bulk of tradition, 
that they accord with accepted notions of what is right, and that they meet with general 
consensus. The practice of gaining knowledge is one such principled practice. 
 
Gaining Knowledge: The Making of Transformation 
Gaining knowledge involves the investigation of a variety of potential, 
pertinent problem solutions, not necessarily for the sole sake of learning, but to 
address needs in accordance with values of philosophical and communal harmony. 
Appointed representatives are dispatched in some way to explore and report back on 
new knowledges or strategies that their communities believe might prove productive. 
At times such as Redbird Smith’s investigation into forgotten traditional practices, 
community outsiders were consulted to help address questions group members were 
having trouble answering on their own.27 Following this “fact-finding” mission, the 
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communities effectively vet proposed solutions, often through committees of one 
shape or another, to determine their compatibility with inherited beliefs together with 
their capacity to resolve deficiencies, resulting in only parsimonious alterations to 
tradition. Keetoowah traditions recount several instances of such communal 
interpretive management, from the earliest stories of the Cherokees’ coalescence as a 
people to the recovery of religious traditions during the stomp dance revival in the 
twentieth century.28 Keetoowah Society member Benny Smith describes his group’s 
general process and several component practices: 
 
In times of crises, the Keetoowahs have a unique way of asking 
guidance for the action that should be taken. A Keetoowah council 
composed of seven medicine men from each clan is called upon to 
examine the threatening situations. These medicine men in the olden 
days were known as the wise men or elders of the tribe. The duties of 
medicine men are to work for peace, to work for the sake of humanity, 
and to keep the favor of God; therefore, on all major decisions, these 
men are called to examine, through spiritual consideration, the best 
course of action to take. This spiritual consideration might consist of 
fasting, following certain rituals, offering solemn prayers, or meditating 
while seeking God-sent visions or revelations. This procedure is used in 
all important decisions and sometimes during illnesses.29 
The Keetoowah Society is not alone among Cherokees in regulating adaptation in this 
way, for there are several historical references to such counciled mediation. Calling it 
“a” way is perhaps a misnomer, however, for as Smith demonstrates, gaining 
knowledge as I have broadly conceived of it gathers together many other practices,30 
all in the service of yet another, the travelling of the White Path. In a relatively short 
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space, Smith here demonstrates what Bourdieu calls the habitus’s “infinite capacity” 
to constellate dispositions from across the entire field of available beliefs and 
practices. A single disposition like community vetting amalgamates forces social and 
familial (in the clan representatives and council formations), symbolic (in specifying 
that the council should be formed of elders), scientific (through the medicine men’s 
work); religious (more or less throughout); historical (invoked in the phrase “olden 
days,” which the elders will best remember); and philosophical (materially humanist 
in its attention to, well, “the sake of humanity” and illness)—and this interpretation is 
far from exhaustive. Smith’s late theorization notwithstanding, I imagine that gaining 
knowledge and community vetting were usually understood as a customary means of 
mediating debate. These largely untheorized practices perhaps also ferried goals not 
entirely their own, together with unintended consequences, some of which 
undoubtedly contributed to the erosion or erasure of some traditions. It is fair to say, 
however, that a primary function, conscious and unconscious at both individual and 
communal levels, of the pluralistic practices clustered together in gaining knowledge 
and deliberating in council is to edify the community spiritually and materially—to 
preserve by adaptation, to progress by conservation—in a still pluralistic set of 
potential responses. 
This developmental continuity recurs throughout the revolutions of Cherokee 
religion, which in its earliest traditional incarnations was led by what Rennard 
Strickland has called a “priestly class,”31 a phrase with connotations suggesting too 
sharp a separation from others in society and too hierarchical a system of power. It has 
some advantage over “medicine men,” which when not hackneyed yet fails to impart 
the religious connections to their healing work. Though religious leaders’ power once 
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permeated the Cherokee world and they advised everyone from clan elders, to war and 
peace chiefs, to individuals, it underwent a steady decline at least from the time of 
European contact—“at least,” because oral histories tell of the people’s tension with 
religious leaders some time before the Europeans arrived. Howard Tyner in his history 
of the Keetoowah Society records an account of an early group of medicine men’s 
widespread misuse of their knowledge, which led to the imposition of the death 
penalty on any medicine man who caused the death of another by conjuring.32 In other 
stories found in several sources, a group of priests/medicine men called the anikutani 
had begun to think of themselves as above common people and above the laws of 
righteous behavior, especially in regard to sexual mores. Their abuses of their station 
generated resentment and indignation that turned into disharmony and finally 
rebellion, when they were killed in great numbers.33 To what degree oral histories of 
the anikutani narrate an actual, widespread execution is unclear. It seems to me and 
other Cherokees with whom I have spoken to be largely allegorical, if perhaps based 
on historical events, an admonishment to rulers not to lose sight of their 
responsibilities and their accountability, but to be sure some interpret it more literally. 
Whatever its source, like the story Tyner recounts, it establishes an affirmative 
precedent that the general populace is empowered with the ability to alter religious 
institutions as it sees fit and to assert final control over them—even through violent 
upheaval—to bring them in line with social expectations. At the risk of stating the 
obvious, it is worth reiterating that the oral tradition here itself documents change—
and to religion, a fundamentally stabile sphere, and to religious authority that is 
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invested with dangerous supernatural power—as a means of positively effecting the 
continuance of the larger value of righteousness for the larger body of the people.  
In the written record, subsequent events chart the further decline of religious 
leaders’ power. Several historians cite medicine men’s inability to treat smallpox as a 
chief cause of their waning influence, which they argue suggested to Cherokees their 
disfavor with the Creator and/or the medicine men’s ineffectiveness. In his early 
history, James Adair claims that the cold-water purification rites they prescribed 
hastened rather than checked the disease’s course, leading them to an apostate despair 
in which “all the magi and prophetic tribe broke their old consecrated physic-pots, and 
threw away all the other pretended holy things they had for physical use, imagining 
they had lost their divine power by being polluted; and shared the common fate of 
their country.”34 According to anthropologist Raymond Fogelson, other potentially 
contributing factors included the Delawares’ theft of a sacred medicine bundle and the 
extinguishing of the sacred fires in the Cherokee homelands with the concomitant, 
gradual abandonment of consecrated places. He points out that some believe the fires 
were moved as lands were lost and ultimately conveyed along the Trail of Tears, with 
new places of worship sanctified upon arrival in the west. The foregoing explanations 
share a somewhat synecdochic or inductive interpretation of the decline of medicine 
men’s power, in that they extrapolate the whole of general development from specific 
moments or parts of the religious history, framing its changes in a narrative order that 
both attempts to make sense of their successive complexity and that also affirms the 
Cherokees’ volitional capacity to draw religious institutions into right relationships 
with social principles. 
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Other scholars have suggested more socially-oriented causes for the dissolution 
of the traditional religious complex. Rennard Strickland accuses the priestly class of 
complicity in the shift towards a money economy in medicine men’s acceptance of 
traders’ and government officials’ gifts and favors they received as the de facto leaders 
and negotiators for the tribe. Their participation in secular politics, he argues, resulted 
in a “close identification of the ancient priestly class with the new commercialism,” 
which contributed to their loss of spiritual authority, especially given the Cherokees’ 
progressive implication in an economy upon which they were becoming both 
dependent and disadvantageously positioned.35 Other developments may also have 
exerted unforeseen effects. Robert Thomas identifies literacy as an unexpected 
detriment to medicine men’s institutional stability insofar as the formerly intensive 
training was relaxed with the introduction of a means of recording sacred formulas and 
prayers in Sequoyah’s syllabary. He also suggests that the inscription of easily 
reproduced religious knowledge democratized and diffused it, further weakening the 
“priesthood.”36  
Largely eschewing such explanations, historian William McLoughlin argues, 
 
Often the greatest pressure for rapid cultural change came from that 
group of Cherokees who were of mixed ancestry, better-educated, 
wealthier, and who expected personal gains in power and prestige from 
new laws and institutions. Because they were capable of mastering 
rapidly the skills of the white missionary teachers, they worked hard to 
earn their praise; in accepting the ways of their conquerors, they 
overcame the insecurities of defeat. But by grasping at this new source 
of dignity and self-worth, they had to reject their identity with the 
values and customs of their own people. Unfortunately these ambitious 
mixed bloods were not always conscious of this. They thought they 
were proving themselves to be good Cherokees by becoming good 
whitemen and white women.37 
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Discussing here a relatively short span of time, McLoughlin centrally attributes 
definite cultural change, including religious leaders’ decline, to the catch-all ascension 
of the self-aggrandizing mixedblood elite, which has been demonized to account for 
the decline of almost every traditional practice. Although he admits that its members 
“were strongly committed to sustaining Cherokee control over their own affairs and 
skeptical about assimilation,”38 he nevertheless affirms that their best efforts to assert 
their sovereignty tended ironically to whittle it away as an effect of an internalized, 
colonialist inferiority complex. This argument holds only if we accept the implicit 
assumption that “the ways of their conquerors” (never minding the implicit 
assumptions of this naming)—e.g., practicing religion, education, diplomacy, et al.—
were the exclusive provinces of whites, that pre-contact societies did not worship, 
teach their children, negotiate with other tribes. There may have been marked 
differences in the ways Cherokees and whites understood and enacted such practices, 
but they were not so alien as to be categorically distinct. Alternatively, we would have 
to assume that if Cherokees had such dispositions, mixedbloods were able to excise 
and transplant them in toto, a nigh-impossible operation given the reticulation of 
dispositions. Replacing religion or any other meta-disposition in an individual, much 
less in a corporate body, would be less like transplanting an organ than like replacing 
the central nervous system. While acute ruptures may potentially transform the 
habitus, the continued, subtle presences of traditional practices evidence a slower and 
more measured evolution. 
To be sure, the sons and daughters of Cherokees and whites were more likely 
to be Christian and often aided missionaries in proselytizing, which was at times 
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aggressive and insidious. But the Cherokees’ democratic religious structure, the 
priests’ inability to cope with smallpox, their identification with market development, 
the unending colonialist assaults on land and culture, and other events like the Lenni 
Lenape’s medicine bundle theft (many others of which are undoubtedly absent from 
the historical record),39 among other conditions—like the conservative National 
Council’s petitions and invitations for missionaries to open schools—converged at the 
nexus of religious practice in the sequence of a protracted and still-ongoing process of 
change to and re-inscription of tradition. The changes that were made to such an 
important part of the society cannot be singularly attributed to a homogeneously-
imagined mixedblood class. Particularly missing from most analyses of Cherokee 
religious history is consideration of Cherokees’ own volition in the changes made, 
which if incorporated in scholarly perspectives might incline us to look more towards 
development rather than decline, which is the inevitable, defeatist narrative of Native 
disappearance authored by a perspective that fixes tradition in stasis.  
Availing itself of the evangelistic zeal of the Second Great Awakening, 
Congress as early as 1792 allocated funds to help solve “the Indian problem” through 
the civilizing, collaborative efforts of missionaries.40 During this time they could not 
unilaterally foray into Indian nations without threat of reprisal, which could still take 
on a violent aspect.41 Missionary work in Cherokeeia during the late eighteenth and 
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early nineteenth centuries entered in neither by missionary zealotry nor colonial 
ambition alone, which would have been interpreted—and responded to—as an act of 
unauthorized intrusion, but at the specific requests of the rapidly adapting Cherokee 
government and of local towns. In their desire for schools they deliberated the costs 
and benefits (those technological, economic, and political must surely have weighed 
heavily) and elected to extend several invitations to missionaries from Moravian, 
Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and Baptist denominations.42 The missionaries 
remained at the pleasure of the National Council, as the Moravians discovered when 
they were nearly expelled for failing to develop the educational program envisioned 
by the progressive conservatives. The opening of the Presbyterian school seems to 
have taken some of the heat off, allowing them to remain in operation.43 The powers 
converging at this historical moment created a peculiarly paradoxical triad: while the 
Cherokee were hardly a subjected people, they by necessity deferred to the military 
and consequently at times the political persuasion of the U.S. But at perhaps the 
greatest moment of religious influence in the country, Cherokee communities had 
more or less exclusive sovereignty over the spread of Christianity within their borders, 
even as religious groups held court over much of the government’s public policy, and 
perhaps even more over public opinion. What should be clear is that in the early stages 
of contact with Christianity—when Native invitations and permissions characterized 
their relations, not evangelical intrusions and prescriptions—traditional Cherokee 
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communities were hardly the passel of feckless dupes and scraping sycophants later 
scholarship has made them out to be.44 
Despite occasional checks, more than once U.S. military power and colonial 
policy superseded American public opinion, overwhelmed Cherokee defenses, and 
disorganized their social and political structures. Following a series of military defeats 
and problems with rogue treaty-making, dispersed Cherokee towns responded by 
coalescing into a formal, nationalized political body. Several changes attended this 
centralization (discussed in greater detail in chapter three), perhaps the most drastic 
and far-reaching of which officially codified and sanctioned a shift from matrilineal 
and matrifocal clan-based social structures towards patrilineal and patriarchal 
institutions. Theda Perdue has discussed the long-term effects of this shift on 
Cherokee society generally and women in particular at length in her history Cherokee 
Women. Men traditionally acted as leaders in the political world, so finding them 
continuing in those roles as the nation developed comes as no great surprise. It is 
worth noting, however, that prior to the shift, not only were their traditional powers 
dramatically circumscribed but also that the political realm itself actually governed 
very little in the old world, confined generally to questions of external relations. 
Internal matters were by and large administered by clan or priest leaders.45 As the 
national body became entrenched, however, it assumed ever-increasing dominion over 
internal affairs, and women found themselves at ever-greater remove from the 
constricted and constricting center of power.  
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Gendered Religious Development 
Despite the systematic attempts to redefine power as something held by men, 
women were not without a voice. They found occasion to protest formally and 
separately to the Cherokee National Council and to the US Congress against land 
cessions, and certainly they continued to influence political policy, albeit in less 
institutionalized and more nuanced ways than before the ratification of the 
Constitution, which was the culmination of the movement away traditional forms of 
governance. As Perdue notes,  
 
Women, like Native people more generally, may well have had less 
“power” or “status” if we define those words in political and economic 
terms. The deerskin trade did make Cherokee women less central to the 
new commercial economy and centralized political authority did 
exclude women from publicly participating in decisions of nation 
importance. Hunting and foreign affairs, however, had always been the 
domain of men, and even though European contact accentuated the 
activities of men, trade and warfare did not significantly alter the world 
of women. Women had their own arena of power over which they 
retained firm control. The growing involvement of men in the world 
beyond may, in fact, have enhanced the power of women within 
Cherokee society.46 
Confining herself to the period between 1700 and 1835, Perdue contends that “Even 
the ‘civilization’ program, the most direct assault on Cherokee conceptions of gender, 
failed to transform the relations between men and women in most Cherokee 
households.”47 Perdue is correct in her argument that Cherokee women grew stronger 
internally, not strictly in response to but rather in tandem with political centralization, 
I would add. In cutting her history short at 1835, however, she neglects still other 
significant ways (and the significant numbers of Cherokee women who became 
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Christian) in which they redefined the scope of their power in progressive-traditional 
consonance with an alternative cultural understanding of power itself. 
As traditional religious practices and male religious leaders’ authority waned, 
as Cherokee men led the assumption of clan powers by the polity, and as missionaries 
endeavored to spread Christianity, female leadership flowed into newly imagined 
religious spheres, primarily emergent Christian communities. While Christian and 
traditional religions clearly had points of difference—irreconcilable for some—they 
also shared several principled practices that others found easily blended. In many 
respects the spiritual leadership roles women assumed mirrored those they filled in 
traditional communities. In both traditional and Christian cases, men filled the head 
positions as “priest,” but women administered many of the requisite ceremonial 
practices, figured prominently in their symbology, and educated children in religious 
traditions. Most important, I imagine, was their general social leadership in a society 
long accustomed to matriliny and matriarchy.48  
Perhaps the contradictions between Cherokee religion and Christianity arising 
at this historical juncture seem too easy, the rupture too radical to indicate anything 
but a revolution in cultural continuity. Not every change, however, heralds an utter 
cultural revolution. Many major developments such as those involving social, 
religious, and gender roles clearly effected immediate and subsequent upheavals, but 
they were volitionally enacted in order to maintain the greater part of the Cherokee 
way of life, and when enacted often drew upon or refashioned already-familiar 
principled practices, at least to some of the women in Cherokee country.49 That most 
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scholars have failed to recognize the persistence of traditional principles and practices 
following so obvious a shift, however, recommends it as an obvious point to begin 
exploring the potential strength of cultural perseverance. Other differences, 
contradictions, and paradoxes—and, I imagine, similarities—lingering in more stabile 
times are undoubtedly apparent to those more familiar than I with Cherokee women’s 
communities, and future scholarship will surely do much to help us see more of their 
diversity. 
The suggestion that Cherokee women came to be the de facto leaders of the 
religious/spiritual sphere during the politically centralizing period of the colonial 
encounter might recall Partha Chatterjee’s subtle and sophisticated theorization of a 
similar change in East Indian history when nationalism constituted a similarly 
gendered sphere for women. This cultural space was defined against the scientific, 
technological, and political sphere wherein the West had proven its superiority, 
persuading the postcolonial nation to model itself after the western world’s successful 
strategies in these areas—this would be, literally, a man’s world. Chatterjee’s 
description of the corresponding woman’s world can help us think through the 
complexities of the interactions between politics, gender, and religion. He writes: 
 
The material is the domain of the “outside,” of the economy and of 
statecraft…The spiritual, on the other hand, is an “inner” domain 
bearing the “essential” marks of cultural identity. The greater one’s 
success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, 
the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual 
culture...but it is not as though this so-called spiritual domain is left 
unchanged. In fact, here nationalism launches its most powerful, 
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creative, and historically significant project: to fashion a “modern” 
national culture that is nevertheless not Western.50 
Forming a distinct culture, an insulated repository of what constitutes the people’s 
exclusivity, requires then the identification and elaboration of difference, separated 
from both western influence and the antiquated remnants of traditionalism that do not 
conform to the freshly imagined national culture. This domain, which would 
encompass religion, domesticity, and other aspects of culture, was constructed as “an 
inner domain of sovereignty, far removed from the arena of political contest with the 
colonial state.”51  
Perhaps Chatterjee is correct that in India “the hegemonic discourse which 
framed these writings [educated women’s autobiographies]—the discourse of anti-
colonial nationalism—was in its core a male discourse,”52 but this separation of 
official and unofficial discourses draws too hard and fast a line between the public and 
the private, at least insofar as it describes how we might approach the texts rather than 
how they are either bracketed or “marketed” from a nationalist perspective. Chatterjee 
keenly traces political nationalism’s cultural ideological program, but we might also 
look for the political program, or at least the political effects, of the culturalism 
operating apart from the nation-state. By following the reciprocity between the private 
and the public, we can see women not only asserting autonomy in the sphere 
ostensibly set aside for them by men as they assembled a Cherokee Christianity and 
shaped schools’ educational curriculum, for instance, but also affecting the course of 
politics in relatively direct ways through their given or withheld support for the state’s 
various enterprises that required their participation and more generally in the value 
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they placed on them.53 Not all positive statements, even those that articulate a 
difference, are always-already “trapped within [colonialism’s] framework of false 
essentialisms”54 but are often agentively determined goals and values to which people 
may aspire. I am not arguing they are unmediated by theoretical or historical 
construction, but their situatedness does not prove agency’s negation. If anything, a 
poststructuralist critique of subjectivity ought to find in the habitus’s project of 
preserving its constitutive conditions a tendency to a traditionalist or epistemic 
conservatism in a limited, diachronic historical moment. At such discrete points, 
statements of difference may be more or less effective, accurate, or good, but they are 
not automatically dismissible as “false essentialisms” in the service of a nationalist, 
ideological invention of traditionalism. 
In Cherokee history at least, nationalism was not so forceful a force as to effect 
an entirely new purpose for the spiritual domain or for people who thought of 
themselves as spiritual. Chatterjee celebrates Benedict Anderson’s reformulation of 
nationhood as existing in the imagination more than in a checklist of attributes, but 
points out his myopic focus on the Euro-American nation-state as a standard 
referent.55 Chatterjee in The Nation and Its Fragments finds innovative imaginations 
at work on questions of community and resistance by looking beyond the normatively-
constructed center of power to the periphery, but he too examines power primarily of 
the nation-state. By reimagining power and ways it may be exercised—with the 
authority of cultural tradition rather than of legitimized coercion, say—we may yet 
find it at still further remove from the normative national center. To be fair, Chatterjee 
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is not here writing a study of culturalism, but of nationalism and its interpolating 
strategies, one instance of which I will take up in chapters three and four.  
Before turning to the (masculine) polity’s troubled relationship with culture, 
however, I would like to suggest that agents—Cherokee women, precisely—launched 
their own creative projects that sought no less than the preservation and/or creation of 
their own versions of community through strategies alternative to the nation-state but 
not less political for their religious, social, gendered, and communal emphasis. These 
projects may at times have worked in conjunction with the nationalist project, but they 
often overtly and covertly opposed it, or at least certain directions it took. In terms of 
their flow into leadership roles in the religious sphere, where superintendence was 
desperately needed, they undertook responsibility for the dynamic administration of 
religion and tradition not because they were unwittingly indoctrinated with and 
determined by a masculine, nationalist ideology (neither Cherokee nor American) and 
cordoned off into a controllable, apolitical or powerless zone, but through an imagined 
sense of culturally preservative integrity volitionally practiced, powered, into being. 
Though early missionaries’ efforts concentrated on converting males, historian 
William McLoughlin claims that the majority of new Christians were women, among 
the Moravians before Removal and in dramatic numbers following, when women 
accounted for two-thirds of mission church members, and two-thirds of post-Removal 
converts were fullblood women.56 Whatever the official Christian/missionary policy 
on women’s leadership and despite the prominence of several male converts like Elias 
Boudinot and Jesse Bushyhead, women, too, took on conspicuous and influential roles 
as teachers and regents of community cohesion, and in many ways their centrality to 
and superintendence of Christian churches persists today, both in sheer number and 
                                                 




force. Even the early twentieth-century stomp dance religious societies, which in some 
ways inaugurate a re-masculinization of Cherokee religious leadership with their 
prominent, male-only chief and firekeeper positions, retain significant, regnant roles 
for women over the rejuvenated clans, other women’s societies, children’s education, 
ceremonial participation, the feeding of participants, and more.57 
Neither were Cherokee women subject to as forceful an isolationist historical 
imperative as Chatterjee identifies at work in India. Cherokees were more willing to 
consider changes to the scientific/political and religious/cultural spheres and others 
outside this subsumptive theoretical dichotomy so long as the bulk of Cherokee 
sovereignties—political, cultural, religious, economic, et al.—might remain intact and 
distinguishable as Cherokee. In terms of the religious change orchestrated by 
Christianizing women, some scholars have argued that traditional Cherokee religion 
and Christianity were radically incommensurable, their fundamental concepts requisite 
in one instance and absent in the other, or in outright opposition—and these scholars 
have included western academics, Cherokees (academic and otherwise), Christians, 
and traditionalists. The two religions share several important dispositions like prayer, 
fasting, and worship, some of which I will outline in the next chapter, that if studied in 
detail would offer strong support to a more robust theorization of religious consonance 
than I can offer here, but challenges to its possibilities coming from such wide and 
authoritative quarters merit consideration.  
 
Traditionalism Revisited 
Among the strongest assertions of Indian/western difference is Mary 
Churchill’s refutation of the dualism in Charles Hudson’s opposition of purity and 
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pollution as an interpretive concept borrowed from western philosophy that does not 
well translate or describe balance in Cherokee thinking, a view of oppositionality 
without antagonism shared by Daniel Justice. A related critique advanced by Jace 
Weaver and Eva Garroutte emphasizes the communal over the individualist focus of 
the Cherokee worldview. None of these theorists argue explicitly against the 
possibility of syncretism but rather each identifies a fundamental point at which they 
believe Cherokee and mainstream thinking to be farthest apart, a difference with 
extensive and sometimes exclusive ramifications. Besides their identification of 
tensioned points between Cherokee and western culture, they offer on their own terms 
well-developed descriptions of Cherokee philosophy and nuanced strategies of reading 
literature in a cultural framework, or at least in particular aspects of it. 
Churchill confronts Hudson’s examination of ideas of purity and pollution in 
his seminal Southeastern Indians, arguing that although he claims it is only one lens 
among many for looking at Cherokee religious beliefs and practices it in fact becomes 
the controlling paradigm of his study. She summarizes his position: 
 
In Hudson’s interpretive model, oppositional elements are separated 
from one another by means of boundaries. While these elements may 
merely differ from each other, conflict or antagonism can characterize 
their relationship as well. The central opposition that informs Hudson’s 
Southeastern Indians is the dichotomy between purity and pollution. 
For Hudson, purity is associated with order and the maintenance of 
boundaries between different categories, while pollution entails chaos 
and the mixing of categories or the crossing of categorical boundaries. 
Beyond these somewhat descriptive understandings of purity and 
pollution, however, there are value laden aspects of—and even moral 
dimensions to—these terms.58 
At the risk of stating the obvious, the moral dimension, then, favors purity to 
pollution, which seems reasonable enough. The problem, Churchill argues, is that both 
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concepts have been imported into Cherokee studies beginning with early and proto-
ethnologists like James Adair and William Bartram, with subsequent scholars 
replicating their western-derived encoding.59 Initially acquiescing Hudson’s position, 
she argues that Cherokees might have understood some concepts in a valuation of 
purity and pollution but concludes that he overextends the dichotomy, while using 
concepts that have their primary referents in Judeo-Christian traditions and are thus 
not careful enough translations of Cherokee ideas. Of greater concern to her than the 
inaccuracy of the descriptors, however, is the structure of Hudson’s analysis, their 
pairing in antagonistic opposition.60  
Drawing on Joseph Epes Brown, Joan Scott, Jacques Derrida, and others, 
Churchill interrogates how it is the elements of the binary are constructed, attempting 
to show in Hudson’s case the western genealogy that informs his understandings of 
purity and pollution that he then superimposes on his analysis of Cherokee religion. 
She finds in binary opposition and the related dialecticism two primary limitations: 
first, they posit an antagonism where none may in fact exist. The theoretically-
originated tension imparted to the terms of a binary further implies a normatively 
valued preference for the first, so that in common constructions like purity versus 
pollution, culture/nature, setter/native, separation/border-crossing, et al., the former 
accrue favor and are positioned to demonstrate their superiority. Second, she levels a 
poststructuralist critique that identifies the connections and interdependencies between 
the elements of the binary.61  
The nature of the interdependence she hypothesizes is less linguistically 
definitional than in most poststructuralist accounts—which might characterize 
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“purity” as “not polluted,” for instance—and is more concerned with an exploration of 
the distinct power inhering in particular categories, power that can be accessed by 
means of crossing into those spheres. Boundary-crossing thus becomes a mediating 
and harmonizing process that unites rather than opposes the elements. Pointing to the 
respected and positive power of menstruation and of the Uktena, the mythical serpent-
monster, examples Hudson used to demonstrate their “abominable” valuation because 
of their categorical ambiguity,62 Churchill rescues them from their classification as 
“polluted.” From this revaluation of their power, she inductively argues that they 
“point to the centrality of boundary-crossing and category-blurring to sacred 
endeavors. Instead of being opposed to the sacred, ‘anomalies’ were sources of access 
to it.”63 Cherokee religion, according to her, recognized “the reality that contact with 
‘abominations and anomalies’ was an unavoidable part of life and that for the well-
being of the community such contact was necessary and sought after for the spiritual 
power it could bring.”64 She extrapolates the concept of boundary crossing to interpret 
other common religious dispositions, such as ceremonial scratching and going to 
water, in addition to the major annual religious event, the Green Corn ceremony. 
Scratching, she argues, draws on the usually negatively-connoted power of blood in a 
possible reenactment of menstruation; going to water enacts a crossing from this world 
to that under us (the source of the waters), and Green Corn marks the threshold of the 
old and new years, with attendant rejuvenations in forgiveness, the sacred fire, and 
other relations and symbols.  
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Though Churchill does not discuss retrograde movement, border crossing 
cannot go on ad infinitum in the regular ceremonial system she describes, for there 
must be a movement back to the more or less discrete spheres in order for the 
boundary to be crossed at intervals. The act of crossing, however, for her enacts the 
unifying necessary for the maintenance of balance, the principle she puts at the heart 
of Cherokee religious traditions. She writes,  
 
In sum, it is balance and synthesis, opposition and unification, as 
simultaneous complementary processes that Cherokee traditions 
maintained, not purity, as Hudson’s interpretation suggests. Thus, 
Hudson’s approach can be understood as partially correct in the sense 
that opposition was part of the whole system, but not the only process. I 
differ with Hudson to a greater degree on the meaning of boundary 
crossing, however. While Hudson’s model is based on the elimination 
of crossed boundaries, mine incorporates liminality as an essential 
positive feature of Cherokee religious traditions.65 
With balance understood as a state of non-antagonistic opposition between equal and 
complementary forces, and synthesis as a moment of border-crossing between them, 
Churchill dismisses purity more or less entirely, supplanting it with the synthesis 
represented by boundary crossing (which presupposes oppositional spheres—usually 
two but occasionally four in sets of two, as with the cardinal directions—and some 
kind of boundaries separating them) as the purposive method/goal of Cherokee 
religion.  
This proposed system insufficiently describes the variety of Cherokee religion 
or traditionalism To begin, balance, like the harmony ethic critiqued above, is not only 
constituted by but is also dependent upon, connected with, and in the service of other 
principles: it requires equality to work; is affiliated with all sorts of social, political, 
religious, and other principles like power; and labors for the maintenance of 
righteousness. How are we to make sense of reticulation apart from oppositionality, 
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whether inclined toward dominance or not? Additionally, not all oppositions are 
fruitfully synthesized, not all boundaries are usefully crossed, if indeed there is such a 
thing as negativity—healthfulness does not seek out illness, for instance. Healing does 
not look uncritically to the power of harming: while inoculation can build resistance, a 
hatchet won’t cure a headache. Boundary crossing is not undertaken for its own sake 
alone, but as a method interwoven with a series of principles and practices whose 
efficacy and function we would do best to describe precisely, not in tangential but 
strictly metaphorical relationship to a theoretical construction of balance, harmony, or 
synthesis (or purity or righteousness, for that matter). 
Churchill’s Derridean insight that the components of a binary commonly 
thought to vie for dominance may in fact be interrelated or interdependent does not, 
however, seem to enable her theory to escape another trap against which Derrida 
warns, that the negatively-connoted term may simply be reconstructed and reconstrued 
as positive in an inversion of the binary that does not transcend the limiting 
methodology of dualist thinking. Churchill does not strictly celebrate the “positive 
implications of ‘pollutants,’”66 but she is much interested in rescuing many negatively-
connoted practices from such valuations and in deconstructing ideas of purity in 
Cherokee religion. Her reinterpretations of going to water, the Green Corn ceremony, 
menstruation, and others give the appearance of dismantling the purity/pollution 
dichotomy, but the oppositional categories themselves, however renamed, are more or 
less retained intact, for without them existing, boundaries between them could not be 
crossed. Moreover, the boundary crossing foundational to her theory of Cherokee 
religion looks much like the mediation Claude Lévi-Strauss finds temporally uniting 
binary elements, at least until the irreconcilable binary surfaces again, in the same 
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guise or in another pose. If we substitute “religion” for “myth,” Lévi-Strauss could be 
summarizing Churchill’s argument when he writes, “the purpose of myth is to provide 
a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction (an impossible achievement if, 
as it happens, the contradiction is real).”67 Shifting the theoretical emphasis from 
oppositionality toward mediation of opposition as a controlling principle of both 
individual and social religious reasoning—only a repositioning of a continued 
(structuralist?) monist focus still dedicated to describing the purpose or the method of 
a people’s thinking—does not go far enough toward describing the diversity of 
Cherokees’ agency or their religious principled practices. Among these, I cannot 
imagine that Cherokees conclusively could not or did not conceive of purity as a 
pertinent religious concern—the ideation of purity is not the sole province of 
Christianity, after all—yet Churchill in her attempt to displace purity with the 
affiliated concepts of balance and boundary crossing perpetrates many of the same 
abuses she condemns in Hudson.  
Early in her argument Churchill acquiesces that purity may be a feature of 
Cherokee religion: “Many American Indians do characterize some of the traditions as 
purificatory. Even some Cherokees do…I am not arguing that no Native American 
religious traditions value purification; instead, I am suggesting that a close 
examination of Cherokee traditions makes such a description of Cherokee sacred ways 
suspect.”68 But by the time she offers as an example the Keetoowah Society’s Seven 
Clan law, which explicitly states “Have a white, a pure and cleansed heart, they 
say,”69 her suspicion has become radical skepticism aimed at establishing boundary 
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crossing as foundational by disparaging purity as spurious. Describing the practices of 
sacrifice and touching medicine, Benny Smith, too, discusses purity and cleansing in 
relatively straightforward language: “the fire keepers make the burnt offering, often 
called feeding the fire. The burnt offering is usually a small game animal or a white 
chicken; each signifies purity”;70 “After dancing all night, the Keetoowahs use what 
the white man calls the ‘black drink’. The Indians call it medicine…The Keetoowahs 
drink and wash their hand[s] and faces with the black drink. This is an act of external 
and internal cleansing to help maintain purity.”71 Perhaps these practices are 
sequentially ordered, with purity serving sacrifice, and sacrifice maintaining harmony 
as the principal of principles. Or perhaps the connections among worshipping, 
cleansing, sacrificing, interacting with the human, natural, and supernatural worlds, et 
al., are not so hierarchical. 
Undaunted, Churchill writes, “Allusions to purity can nonetheless be found in 
statements by twentieth-century Cherokees, however. Why would this occur? Surely, 
Cherokees themselves would employ more accurate terms for discussing their beliefs 
and traditions, one would think.”72 One would think that Churchill, who elsewhere 
champions dialog with and respect for Cherokees’ own understandings of their 
traditions,73 would be more inclined to lend credence to their interpretations. Such 
pronouncements, however, might be seen as lending too-great support to Hudson’s 
position, the western-constructedness of which she has been at pains to establish. She 
helps clear up the Keetoowahs’ true import: 
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Despite the Christian meanings that are evident in statements by 
contemporary Cherokees…it is important to note the relevance of 
harmony to these beliefs. The Keetoowah Society Seven Clan Rule 
really addresses the means to promote and maintain harmony in the 
community…Relying on the ideas of the harmony ethic and white path, 
we can understand at least some statements about purity by twentieth-
century Cherokees as efforts to live by means of “balance and synthesis 
and the non-material nature of reality” that Kilpatrick has identified as 
foundational to the Cherokee thought world.74 
The remainder of statements about purity we can perhaps simply dismiss. With the 
authority of an objective academic, Churchill translates traditional religious 
practioners’ apparent miswording and dispels their characterizations of purity as a 
primary religious concern. If purity is significant, it is by its service to social harmony, 
itself a subset of the primary, controlling principle of balance, both of which are 
achieved through the synthesizing mediation of opposition.  
Against Hudson’s suggestion of purity and cleansing as central, Churchill 
proposes her model of balance and boundary crossing in their places, essentially 
replacing one set of terms in a recurring dialectic with another, without altering the 
totalizing structuralist synchrony that more problematically interprets Cherokee 
culture through its broad methodology than through its specific focal points. 
Describing Roland Barthes’ shift away from structuralism, Catherine Belsey 
succinctly cautions against structuralism’s sweeping claims, and against like totalizing 
paradigms: 
 
Apropos, apparently, of nothing in particular [Roland Barthes’] S/Z 
begins, “There are said to be certain Buddhists whose ascetic practices 
enable them to see a whole landscape in a bean.” This rumination then 
continues: “Precisely what the first analysts of narrative were 
attempting: to see all the world’s stories (and there have been ever so 
many) within a single structure: we shall, they thought, extract from 
each tale its model, then out of these models we shall make a great 
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narrative structure, which we shall reapply (for verification) to any one 
narrative: a task as exhausting…as it is ultimately undesirable, for the 
text thereby loses its difference.” Suddenly the grand claims of 
structuralism appear absurd. Once you have found the single 
determining structure, there is nothing to choose between the universe 
and a bean. The microcosm simply becomes an illustration of the 
general pattern, another instance of the same—thrilling for the system-
builders, but then what? What can further investigation discover? Only 
endless repetition. The big questions have been answered in advance.75 
By reducing to balance and boundary crossing such diversities as the story of Kanati 
and Selu, the practice of going to water, the Green Corn ceremony, beliefs about 
menstruation, the Uktena, death, gender differences, and more—in seeing one pattern 
in so many things—Churchill fails to venture far enough into the liminality she wants 
to celebrate: rather than dismantling the structuralist framework built up around 
Cherokee religion, she has simply rebuilt it on another site.  
Daniel Justice’s nationalist perspective on Cherokee literature in his Our Fire 
Survives the Storm fills out an alternative complementary dualism using Churchill’s 
structural framework, a theoretical debt he acknowledges. Like Churchill, he rejects a 
Hegelian dialectical narrative of progress but stops short of indicting binarism when 
constructed with a relationship characterized by balance rather than by antagonism, 
writing, “Whereas the progressivist interpretations of various Cherokee dualisms 
presume an inevitable eclipse or erasure of one of the pair, a more culturally rooted 
understanding looks to the relationship between them.”76 Accepting Weaver’s 
insistence that community is at the heart of Indian identity, and believing that 
“Nationhood…is the political extension of the social rights and responsibilities of 
peoplehood,”77 combined with Churchill’s defense of dualism, Justice turns his focus 
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to the Cherokee dual political structure that used a standing polity called the white 
government in times of peace and a red organization during war. From this 
governmental dualism he extrapolates what he calls a “Beloved Path” and a 
“Chickamauga consciousness,” paired Cherokee cultural and political attitudes that 
offer him a culturally specific methodology of contextualizing and interpreting 
Cherokee literary texts.78 His distilled thesis, presented with remarkable succinctness 
and clarity, is worth quoting at length: 
 
…what I call the red “Chickamauga consciousness,” [is] so named for 
the nationalist resistance movement of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries that was devoted to armed response to U.S. 
violence and expansion into ancestral territories. Chickamauga 
consciousness, an extension of the red/war governmental division, is 
centered in Cherokee intellectual and artistic separatism, in a rhetorical 
rejection of literary, historical, or philosophical accommodation. 
Coupled with the Chickamauga consciousness is a white “Beloved 
Path” reading that places peace and cultural continuity above 
potentially self-destructive rebellion. Neither exists independently; 
there is a necessary tension that brings the war and peace perspectives 
together in constant movement—again, the idea of nationhood as 
dynamic concept.79  
Guided by balance and complementarity, this relationship embraces the 
interdependence Churchill identifies in border crossing, but Justice is not as concerned 
with the crossing of one element into the other as with the principles embodied by 
each. That the red and white structures exist in regular, predictable actuality or 
potentiality sufficiently binds them together.  
The dualism in the political arena that Justice identifies differs conceptually 
from the structural synchrony Churchill theorizes, insofar as he sees metaphorical 
traces of the differing attitudes more than a recapitulation of a constant behavioral or 
systemic imperative. If I am reading him correctly, he argues, for instance, that John 
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Ross’s rhetoric we can understand as nationalistically defiant in the way that Dragging 
Canoe’s resistance asserted Cherokee sovereignty, but not that his writing or policies 
specifically played out the schema of a red war chief. Much like Rennard Strickland in 
his genealogy of Cherokee legality in Fire and the Spirits, by precisely situating the 
texts he reads in their historical contexts Justice demonstrates how agents in 
diachronic time may adapt traditional dispositions to address contemporary dilemmas 
without abandoning the character of those strategies. Such is the “dynamic 
nationhood” he reiterates throughout Our Fire Survives the Storm.80 
Though I believe his emphasis on agentive, historical flexibility differentiates 
his argument from the out-of-time, structuralist binarism I find in Churchill’s 
emphasis on balance and mediation (despite Justice’s professed debt to this model), 
his separation of political postures into the red/Chickamaugan/defiant and 
white/Beloved Path/accommodationist spheres smacks too much of the old 
traditionalist/progressive dichotomy, notwithstanding Justice’s claim that 
complementarity rather than antagonism renders the model inherited from Churchill 
and to some degree Hudson a creation of a wholly different cloth.81 He may be 
entirely correct in his claim that “the established body of Cherokee scholarship has 
generally focused on a limiting dualism that is rooted in Eurowestern progressivist 
ideas of savagism and civilization. Yet the dualistic structure itself isn’t inherently 
problematic, as various complementary pairings are deeply embedded in Cherokee 
culture and history, although not inevitably along the progressivist spectrum.”82 
Dualism we may have, but to it we are not bound. Justice and Churchill show that 
their models of a Nativist binarism can offer compelling readings and empowering 
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insights, especially in political structure and gender divisions; for that matter, Lévi-
Strauss demonstrates that western dialecticism can do the same thing. But like any 
good building contractor, we have many framing options. If we were to look more 
pluralistically at the traditional political world, for instance, we might find that besides 
the red and white governments, the political structure extended certain powers and 
influence to clans, priests, women’s councils, towns, and even outsiders (how many is 
that?), among other agents. These are not accurately enough described by a 
subsuming, dualist bifurcation. By theorizing the roles such actors have played, we 
might discover the ever-widening benefits of pluralism.  
Though Justice begins his argument from others with which I have critiqued—
I disagree with Weaver and Garroutte that dedication to community especially when 
too-expansively defined constitutes the essence of Indian identity, with Churchill that 
balance sufficiently widens the scope of binarist constructions, and with Justice that 
peoplehood and nationhood are naturally coextensive—I gladly embrace his 
thoughtful development of the Chickamauga spirit of resolve and the Beloved Path 
dedication to peace and the lucid readings they inspire in Cherokees’ political 
representations. Yet these are but two among innumerable postures whose complexity 
it does not hurt to describe in detail. While politics are clearly central to the lives of 
many Cherokees, a point Justice’s astute readings of the Cherokee Constitution, John 
Ross’s rhetoric, and the Treaty of New Echota among many other texts firmly 
establishes, it is worth remembering that when compared with the traditional social 
power of the clan, that of the polity was markedly lesser at certain points in the life of 
the nation-people. The extent and implication of this diffuse political-social dynamic I 
take up in greater detail in chapters three and four. Justice asserts that “Nationhood is, 
fundamentally, the political expression of a people’s understanding of themselves as a 
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people,”83 and he elects to situate himself as an expressly political reader of Cherokee 
literature, believing that “the exercise of nationhood continues to be a dominant social 
ethic among Cherokees…It is in relationship with the tribal nation that the individual 
Cherokee is defined.”84 As Craig Womack has argued, most existing criticism of 
American Indian literature has been conspicuously apolitical, with a tendency to 
ignore contemporary issues, to focus on benign cultural differences, and effectively to 
write tribal nations out of power. In this regard his and Justice’s development of a 
nationalist criticism represents an important exercise of politically creative intellectual 
sovereignty, to borrow Robert Warrior’s phrase. But if indeed the social and political 
are not fully coextensive, if the latter does at times attempt to assert its dominance 
over the former, a nationalism not fully disposed to suspect the nation-state of abuse 
might too readily throw its support behind the polity, which is too often the 
impediment to peoples’ free exercise of agency. This, too, is a political criticism, but 
one that aligns itself more stringently with people in local communities, the primary 
source of cultural agency, the governors of the government. 
Perhaps balance, boundary crossing, harmony, righteousness, and purity are 
among the more salient concepts of Cherokee religion, along with community 
responsibility (Weaver’s “communitism” or Garroutte’s “responsibility to 
reciprocity”). Future scholars will theorize yet more prominent features—but still we 
have failed to think through “more a way of living with variety than of subduing it,” as 
Wayne Booth so eloquently stated,85 and have only “sailed the coast” in our attempts 
to discover the values in variety itself. Not least among these is the combinatory and 
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generative capacity to script infinitely innovative responses that incorporate the 
conservative, accommodate the new, and open pathways rather than incessantly stage 
a fundamentally unchanging balancing act.86 We can see such agency in the fusions of 
traditional and Christian dispositions narrated by Catharine Brown in the early 
nineteenth century to Sequoyah Guess in the early twenty-first. Perhaps these 
assemblies, too, represent mediations, but they are not everywhere predetermined by 
binaristic or oppositional relationships, nor any one great structure, but rather by 
relationships that also move through, with, around, over, under each other, in pluralist, 
reticulated portages perhaps better understood as navigations charted among prolific 
potential interconnections in constantly changing waters.
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“Gaining Knowledge” and Gathering Strength: Syncretism 
in Catharine Brown’s Memoir and Sequoyah Guess’s Kholvn 
 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the missionary zeal of the Second Great 
Awakening had failed to open many roads into Cherokee country. Although Cherokee 
lands had been drastically reduced by treaty and war over the course of interactions 
with the British, French, and Americans, the Cherokee nevertheless represented a 
powerful military and political force impervious to unwelcome overtures from 
evangelistic missionaries, however enthusiastic.1 By the close of the nineteenth 
century, though, missionaries’ inroads were well established, and thousands of 
Cherokees had converted to Christianity. Among the earliest and most influential of 
converts was Catharine Brown, the daughter of a relatively affluent family from an 
Alabama town and an early attendant of the Brainerd mission school, established in 
eastern Tennessee in 1817 under the direction of the predominantly Congregationalist 
American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM). On her arrival the 
missionaries were doubtful that the proud and beautiful Cherokee woman could 
acclimate to their strict lifestyle, but she soon became a favored student whose 
enthusiasm led many of her family and other Cherokees to the new religion. Less than 
two years after her conversion, she was sent to take charge of a school at the town of 
Creek Path. Only three years later, in 1823, she died of tuberculosis at the approximate 
age of twenty-three. Her story was widely spread as an exemplum among the 
Cherokees, earning her an almost saintly reputation. After her death Rufus Anderson, 
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corresponding secretary for the ABCFM, began a biographical article on her, but he 
found the subject matter compelling enough to warrant a separate edition, which he 
compiled from Brown’s letters, journal, and others’ recollections and documents.2 Her 
memoirs, though heavily edited and assiduously framed by Anderson’s ready hand, 
offer a rare opportunity to consider the progressively traditional strategies imagined 
early in the imperial encounter, although most critical treatments of Brown have done 
little but dismiss her and her writing as uncomplicatedly assimilated. 
To help illustrate the deficiencies of reckoning identity according to the tired 
traditionalist/progressive or fullblood/mixedblood dichotomies, the second half of this 
chapter compares Brown’s Memoir with the modern fiction of Sequoyah Guess, a 
traditionalist and citizen of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, who has 
authored and self-published several works that offer clear depictions of traditionally 
progressive Cherokee dispositions that defy binaristic logic, especially those related to 
worship and religion. Like the Memoir, Guess’s representations of the complexities of 
Cherokee life, especially in his first novel Kholvn, demonstrate that they cannot 
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accurately nor usefully be described with such narrow options. Pertinent practices 
achieving some consonance in the Memoir and Kholvn include praying and smoking, 
dreaming and listening for the Holy Spirit, and going to water and baptizing. Similarly 
harmonized principles of worship, love, charity, faith, and righteousness resist easy 
categorization in reductive “white” or “Indian” columns. These are in addition to 
cultural dispositions like the communal vetting affiliated with gaining knowledge, 
political and material inflections of usefulness, and the mediation of meaning through 
the Cherokee language. Assembled together, these several principled practices (though 
a paltry sample in comparison to the multitude contained within the habitus) operating 
among several intra-Cherokee communities begin to suggest that the very diversity of 
dispositions is itself a strength, and indeed, though it is not overtly theorized in either 
Kholvn or the Memoir, a pluralism of effective problem-solving tactics emerges as a 
traditional meta-strategy of long and privileged standing. Some of these may promote 
change, others reject it; some may recall traditions long unused or nearly forgotten, 
and still others might improve both traditional and progressive ways of thinking by 




The few critics such as Theda Perdue, Carolyn Ross Johnston, and Arnold 
Krupat who have written about the young Cherokee Catharine Brown suggest that her 
conversion to Christianity and her approximate six years spent with the missionaries at 
Brainerd eradicated any connections to Cherokee culture. A careful, tribalist reading 
of her memoirs and of the archival documents uncovered by Joel Martin, however, 
demonstrates the need for a theoretical model of interaction attuned to the complexity 
of multiple layers of experience, for by placing them within a cultural context, we find 
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that Brown’s “Cherokeeness” becomes a more salient feature than has previously been 
visible. Martin astutely notes several principled practices that evidence the strength of 
Brown’s cultural ties, including her outdoor worship and her reliance on dreaming as a 
spiritual hermeneutic. Her retention of such dispositions taken together with her 
practice of Christianity substantiate the simultaneous presence of what Martin calls the 
“religious creativity and spiritual resiliency” of Native peoples in general and Brown 
in particular.3  That her agency exercised from within a Cherokee cultural paradigm 
has led to her critical depiction as assimilated suggests that the descriptors 
“traditional” and “progressive,” separately and together, may camouflage more 
options than ordinarily supposed. It is tempting to cast the meeting between American 
Indian people and missionaries who brought the congressionally-mandated doctrine of 
civilization in a Hegelian dialectic, pitting opposite if unequal opponents in a fight to 
the assimilationist death.4 Most scholars who have written of Brown point to her as a 
signpost at the outset of the Cherokees’ road to civilization, as did the missionaries 
who were her contemporaries. According to Anderson, Brown was indeed the first 
Cherokee baptized at the Brainerd mission school, but this fact reveals very little about 
the confluence of multiple forces that her conversion represents, forces such as 
intertown tension in Cherokee country, the spiritual revival of the nineteenth century, 
the erosion of matrilineal power in Cherokee society, the American nationalist land-
grab, anxiety among Cherokees over white belligerence, the growing threat of 
removal, and deepening immersion in Euro-American economic structures.5 The 
                                                 
3 Joel Martin, The Land Looks after Us: A History of Native American Religion (New York: Oxford UP, 
2001) 28. 
 
4 James Treat, “Introduction: Native Christian Narrative Discourse”; James West, “Indian Spirituality: 
Another Vision,” Native and Christian: Indigenous Voices on Religious Identity in the United States 
and Canada, ed. James Treat (New York: Routledge, 1996) 6-13, 34-36. 
 
5 Laura Donaldson, American Sampson: Haunting the Native-Christian Encounter (Chapel Hill: U of 
North Carolina P, forthcoming); Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-
1835, rev. ed. (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1999) 3-11; Brown, Memoir 25; Phillips and Phillips 91. 
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Brainerd school could never have been established had not the National and town 
councils, influenced by earlier Cherokee converts like Assistant Chief Charles Hicks 
(later Principal Chief), invited missionaries to open schools in Cherokee lands.6 
Perhaps this same complexity has discouraged theoretical discussion of an 
earlier Cherokee converted by Moravian missionaries, described by the ethnologist 
James Mooney: “Later they established missions among the Delawares in Ohio, where 
their first Cherokee convert was received in 1773, being one who had been captured 
by the Delawares when a boy and had grown up and married in the tribe.”7 Where to 
begin the categorizations, from which oppositions? Is he Cherokee, Lenni Lenape 
(Delaware), male, Christian, pagan, displaced, adopted, civilized, Indian? Once one 
dialectic is synthesized, how much of the defeated or reincorporated antithesis persists, 
especially in critical discussions that barely admit of traces or alterations of the 
antithesis to the thesis in even the language used to name the resultant synthesis, much 
less in actual analysis? Questions of identity, confronted from a structuralist paradigm 
by a sequential series of dialectics, are better addressed by admitting the possibilities 
for multiple, lateral comparisons, which we can begin by disassembling the 
vocabularies of synthesis. For example, if we work backward from the solutions 
“adoptee” = “Cherokee” vs. (>?) “Delaware” and “convert” = “Christian” vs. 
“Indian,” we could reexamine how interactions with the Delaware altered Cherokee 
society itself, how Christianity was changed by Indian converts, or how a converted 
Delaware-Cherokee adoptee fused his particular traditions with Christianity, rather 
                                                 
6 William McLoughlin, Cherokees and Missionaries, 1789-1839, New Haven: Yale UP, 1984, reprint 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1994) 35-45, 110. 
 
7 James Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee, 19th Annual Report, Part 1, 1897-98, Smithsonian Institution, 
Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900, reprinted in 
Myths of the Cherokee and Sacred Formulas of the Cherokees (Nashville: Charles and Randy Elder, 
and Cherokee, NC: Cherokee Heritage Books, 1982) 83. 
 83 
than how one affiliation dominated another, then another and another. The urge to set 
up elements in conflict may come readily, for as Wendy Doniger writes in her 
foreword to a collection of lectures by Claude Lévi-Strauss, “language itself 
predisposes us to understand ourselves and our world by superimposing dialectics, 
dichotomies, or dualistic grids upon data that may in fact be entirely integrated. And 
underneath language lies the binary nature of the brain itself…The simplest and most 
efficient way to process experience seems to be by dividing it in half, and then to 
divide the halves in half, reformulating every question so that there are only two 
possible answers to it, yes or no.”8 Lévi-Strauss, whose structural anthropology 
depends on binary theory, applauds another of its wonders: “It is only the present state 
of scientific thought that gives us the ability to understand what is in this myth [and 
mythical thinking in general], to which we remained completely blind before the idea 
of binary operations become familiar to us,” seeing in mythical thinking an early 
manifestation of the structure of all thinking, including the scientific, which with its 
practical empiricism synthesizes and supersedes the mythic, rendering it knowable for 
the first time.9 
The binary model has its utilities, but its flow-chart-strict interpretive 
capacities become clumsy when more than two pertinent elements enter a junction— a 
limitation Doniger implicitly admits in passing swiftly over the “data that may in fact 
be entirely integrated.” Further, the “us” to which both Lévi-Strauss and Doniger refer 
universalizes a Euro-American, pseudoscientific theory premised upon antagonism.10 
                                                 
8 Wendy Doniger, Foreword, Myth and Meaning: Cracking the Code of Culture, Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
rev. ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1995) viii-ix. 
 
9 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning: Cracking the Code of Culture, rev. ed. (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1995) 23.  
 
10 Mary Churchill might mount such a critique, and though in chapter one I critique her argument 
concerning balance without dominance, I do so not based on the premise that such an arrangement does 
not exist, but that it does not everywhere exist, just as conflict does not everywhere control. 
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Apart from Fredric Jameson’s critique of structuralism’s synchrony, its out-of-time 
logic,11 there are several other analytical troubles with binary thinking: first, its 
insistence on absolute and exclusive value. If there are tensions between the Cherokee 
and Lenni Lenape aspects of the man Mooney discusses, a binary limits him either to 
Cherokee or Lenni Lenape identity, for according to the logic of the dialectic he 
cannot finally be both, either through mediation, which enacts a temporary bridging, 
or through synthesis, which is a new creation, an evolutionary hybrid. We cannot 
know how this man thought of himself, but as Anne McClintock astutely notes, “race, 
gender and class are not distinct realms of experience, existing in splendid isolation 
from each other; nor can they be simply yoked together…Rather, they come into 
existence in and through each other—if in contradictory and conflictual ways,”12 
suggesting that the ripples of influence, if diminishing, are nevertheless ongoing. We 
may usefully take a snapshot of a pooling moment we then title an identity—and that 
representation may even be faithful for a great long while—but it is no more eternal 
than it is the moment itself, and we may never see the other currents pushing or 
pulling our subject into frame. McClintock’s emphasis on experiential reticulation is 
well taken, yet she, too, narrowly defines the spheres of identity in Eurocentric terms, 
privileging currently acceptable neo-Marxist categories. In the midst of the Second 
Great Awakening in Cherokee country, religion, age, clan, town, and more, theorized 
and not, swirl in other relevant eddies of experience. 
Second, attempting to work out tensions through a dialectic model can lead to 
the construction of faulty pairings, such as setting Cherokee identity against gendered 
or religious identity in an antagonism that does not at a majority of points or perhaps 
                                                 
11 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972): 5-22. 
 
12 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New 
York: Routledge, 1995) 5. 
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even at all prevail. Some argue that there are fundamentally opposed precepts of 
Christian and tribal identity, a position undoubtedly shaped by the many disgraces in 
the history of Christian and Indian interactions, but significant numbers of Christian 
Indians like Brown and Guess have discerned fundamental tenets of traditional 
religion and Christianity and found them not preclusive but rather supplementary, a 
relationship ill-described by an aggressive, conflictual precept of dialectical enmity. 
Still another Jamesian problem extends from the first two, in that a binary 
construction’s inability to account for degree of power (and thus perseverance) and its 
inattention to historical circumstance lends itself to arbitrarily limiting, normative 
definitions. Initial forces (overcome in a Hegelian dialectic; essentialist in a 
structuralist binary) become generalized or ossified, unchanging components against 
which all future interactions are measured: the Cherokee in 1800 must be the same 
Cherokee of 1900, 2000, 2100, with no regard for developments that negotiate 
apparent inconsistencies and strategize communal survival. As Jameson argues, a 
binary model obfuscates its synchronic styling of history,13 which in American Indian 
literary theory appears when deviation from the assumed, historically fixed essence is 
interpreted as cultural deficiency, once again, “not really Indian.” 
In her book Cherokee Women, historian Theda Perdue mentions Brown in 
passing and finds none of the all-important harmony but only conflict between 
Christian and Indian: 
 
Few women in the Cherokee Nation could equal Catharine Brown or, at 
least, her memory. Most did not seem to want to. They preferred their 
traditional religion, which did not distinguish between the physical and 
spiritual worlds, which emphasized harmony and balance, and which 
placed the needs of the community above those of any individual. 
Those Cherokees who converted to Christianity became part of a 
hierarchical religion that promised little control over the physical world 
(that is, illness and weather), defined relationships to the natural world 
                                                 
13 Jameson 96-98. 
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and other human beings in terms of dominion and submission, and 
placed responsibility for salvation, behavior, and success squarely on 
the individual.14 
Despite Perdue’s outstanding work on Cherokee women’s agentive perseverance, she 
does not fully interrogate ways in which Brown might have reconciled apparent 
contradictions in her life. Discourse dedicated to division gives rise to the tired trope 
of “walking in two worlds,”a cliché that when describing American Indians usually 
gets embellished with the aesthetic of a greeting card: Indians “walk with one foot in a 
moccasin and one in a wingtip” or “have a foot in two canoes.” These metaphors offer 
little toward understanding the complexity of identity and agency. Power comes from 
multiple sources, multiple energies that work in conjunction, not in segregation from 
broader operations, be they historic, communal, or otherwise. Traditional Cherokee 
stories, such as those involving powerful supernatural threats, teach a similar lesson, in 
which communities of all sorts must come together to defeat such beings. In the story 
of Untsaiyi a group of men imprison an evil gambler who wagers for lives; women’s 
collective power defeats Nunyunuwi, the Stone Man; Utlunta, the Spearfinger, would 
not have been killed without the aid of the animal community—Tsikilili, the 
chickadee, indicated the monster’s vulnerability. These and other traditional stories 
emphasize survival through the harmonious union of diverse communities’ powers 
(among many other messages), much as Catharine Brown incorporated strength across 
gender, religion, and culture and in so doing imparted that strength to inner 
communities struggling with political and social changes.  
In stressing the communal dimensions of identity here, I hardly mean to 
suggest the death of the individual subject; indeed, the proliferate critical emphasis on 
community in American Indian identity theory might not speak empoweringly enough 
to how individuals can volitionally act with or without the support of communities, 
                                                 
14 Perdue, Cherokee Women 170-71. 
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which even as they offer primary means of support and even perhaps of a distinctive 
consciousness itself are not ubiquitously and unerringly doing all they might to protect 
and cultivate what is best for their members or themselves. Against exaggerated and 
prevalent Euro-American constructions of the individual as untethered and wholly 
autonomous, however, a swing towards the communal is warranted. I only mean to 
suggest that for some Cherokees an alternative construction of personal identity 
wherein responsibility to the communities of which they are members is of greater 
concern than we might find among groups for whom individualism, fluidity of group 
affiliation, or cosmopolitanism is more highly valued. Just as we find communities—
of innumerable shapes, dedicated to various causes, organized in myriad histories—
working in conjunction with each other, so too may we see individuals living 
economic, religious, spiritual, social, familial, cultural, psychological, and all sorts of 
lives in association with other like-living agents. In short, the lives of communities and 
individuals are heterogeneous and complex. In terms of identity, we are not 
inescapably destined to mosey around bipedally in a moccasin and a wingtip. (I like to 
think of us more like millipedes. But I can see how not everyone would find the 
metaphor ambulatory.) No theory can accommodate all of our possibilities, but surely 
we’re ready to consider more than two at a time. 
Space for diversity opens by conceptualizing the habitus as a reconstituting 
web of dispositions wherein practices matter most in the instance of their practicing, 
beliefs the moments they are believed, both for consideration of the specific 
circumstances surrounding their expression—that is, to see what it is that effects them 
and how—and for observation of what practical difference the theoretical framing of 
community affiliation makes—that is, to see what dispositions’ effects are and where 
they’re felt. Like a farmer planning a field’s irrigation, identities in their reticulation 
can chart numberless paths through the web’s structural conglomeration of 
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connections, supports, tributaries, branches, spirals, etc., that hang together, reinforce, 
influence, intersect with, or even oppose each other, directly or indirectly, as they trace 
courses for the accomplishment of some purpose. Crucial to my understanding of 
identity as pathways assembled from an array of options is that movement through 
them reinforces and affects both the courses themselves and the proximate others that 
contour the field, effecting sometimes dramatic changes to both their structural 
character and purpose, locally and across the entire system, relative to some measure 
of the power of the movement. I understand agency as deployment of power or energy 
along an identity pathway, wherein the action and its path are integrated elements. 
Identity, then, is as much that which is done as that which is had. I have tried to 
emphasize, however, that personal identity and agency do not exist in isolation but 
through and across that exercised by other agents. This complementarity, mindful of a 
scale of power, can strike a balance between the fictions of univocal individuality and 
utter negations of personal agency.  
The convergence of courses is not always easily accomplished but is aided by 
conscious planning and the unconscious vetting by the habitus. These strategies of 
coping with change play out in Catherine Brown’s memoirs, seen in the agency she 
exerts in connection with missionaries near and far, her family, and other Cherokee 
people engaged in similar interactions, such as female peers or her students. Just as 
town bodies of Cherokee people cut paths for the educational benefits missionaries 
offered by extend invitations to open schools, Brown found that many of the courses 
of her life could similarly converge despite expectations to the contrary. Her blending 
of Christian and Cherokee traditions evokes the verb-based foundations of the 
Cherokee language, which prioritizes doing in constructing meaning rather than the 
“thingness” of a phenomenon. To demonstrate: ᏧᏂᎳᏫᏍצ, the word for church, 
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means “where they gather to study,” ᎧᏃᎮᏓ is “Gospel,” meaning “spoken outward,”15 
and the word for God, ᎤᏁᏝᏅᎯ, is “Creator,”16 or more literally something like “He 
provides” or “apportions.” A review of the syntactical structure, suffixes, prefixes, and 
affixes of Cherokee verbs, which conjugate for time, direction, texture, duration, 
number, causality, and animation among other factors, would also emphasize the 
primacy of process in Cherokee epistemology, in contrast to the noun-based structure 
of English.17 From a Cherokee perspective, we might see in Brown’s life less a 
concatenation of discrete events in displacing series than a sophisticated portaging 
among pathways. 
Perhaps seeing Brown as an Indian who then became a Christian, Theda 
Perdue and Carolyn Ross Johnston are among those who suggest that there are 
diametrically opposed fundamentals of Indianness and Christianity, at least as it was 
practiced by nineteenth-century missionaries, much in the same way that missionaries 
and many members of Congress argued that Indian culture and Christianity were 
mutually exclusive.18 Contemporary Christian missionaries, even those as 
conservative as the Southern Baptist denomination, have largely abandoned this 
position and now encourage missionaries to respect indigenous cultures and to develop 
cooperative models of Christianity and indigenous customs and values. This paradigm 
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shift depends on a surprising kind of strategic essentialism, wherein indigenous 
thinkers and others forced evangelists to reexamine missionaries’ complicitous roles in 
the genocide of the Americas and to scrutinize the foundational elements of their 
doctrine. For Mark Custalow, former National Native American Missionary of the 
North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, the immutable 
doctrine concerns the sufficiency of God’s grace for salvation; so long as teachings do 
not contradict this tenet, the Mission Board’s official line seems to encourage respect 
for cultural practices such as sweat lodges or other cleansing ceremonies.19 The 
evangelical work of early Native Christians like Brown, Hicks, Boudinot, and many 
more, and the leadership roles assumed by American Indians in modern Christian 
churches demonstrate the changes that may eventually be wrought by integrative 
enterprise. For example, in 2008 the Oklahoma General Convention and the national 
Southern Baptist Convention elected as presidents Emerson Falls, a Sac and Fox and 
Choctaw, and Johnny Hunt, a Lumbee, respectively.20 This is worth pausing to 
consider: the major fundamentalist Christian denomination in America and Oklahoma 
is headed by self-identifying Christian Indians—to them, white Baptist church leaders 
look for spiritual guidance and direction, perhaps conscious that their church’s history 
of racial relations is less than spotless and that they might not be able to generate 
among themselves satisfactory answers to ongoing race-related problems. Such 
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changes do not excuse the immorality of imperialism, but they do offer examples of 
what can come of Indian agency, in contrast to the proliferate narratives of 
victimization. In fact, the present coming together of Christian and Indian religious 
beliefs and practices bears a striking resemblance to that accomplished much earlier 
by Brown and others. 
One of the most intriguing convergences in Catharine Brown’s case concerns 
her understanding of Christianity through her Cherokee cultural framework. An 
account of a dream in which Brown meets a “little boy” was not included by Anderson 
in her memoirs, but it survives in the letters of the ABCFM. Joel Martin reproduces it 
in The Land Looks after Us: 
 
In my sleep I tho’t I was traveling and came to a hill that was almost 
perpendicular. I was much troubled about it, for I had to go to its top. I 
knew not how to get up. She said she saw the steps which others had 
gone and tried to put her feet in their steps, but found she could not 
ascend in this way, because her feet slipped. Having made several 
unsuccessful attempts to ascend, she became very weary, but although 
she succeeded in getting near the top, but felt in great danger of falling. 
While in this distress in doubt whether to try to go forward or return, 
she saw a bush just above her of which she tho’t, if she could get hold it 
she could get up, and as she reached out her hand to the bush, she saw a 
little boy standing at the top, who reached out his hand; She grasped his 
thumb, and at this moment she was on the top and someone told her it 
was the Saviour.21  
This account offers glimpses of textual dimensionality invisible to binary logic, 
despite the unsettling shift in point of view revealing its overt mediation. The little boy 
is likely one of the Yunwi Tsunsdi, who Mooney describes as “‘Little People,’ who 
live in rock caves on the mountain side; they are little fellows, hardly reaching up to a 
man’s knee...They are great wonder workers...They are helpful and kind-hearted, and 
often when people have been lost in the mountains, especially children who have 
strayed away from their parents, the Yûñwí Tsunsdi' have found them and taken care 
                                                 
21 Martin 71. 
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of them.”22 For many Cherokee people, the Yunwi Tsunsdi represent a powerful 
spiritual force in the world,23 and Brown likely believed an extraordinary being 
communicated with her through her dream. Dreams were a powerful source of 
knowledge about matters both uncommon and everyday in Cherokee culture,24 and, as 
Martin forcefully argues, through her dream knowledge she found guidance through a 
new path, divergent though dependent upon the steps others had taken before her.25 
This path was not available to Catharine Brown the individual outside of history and 
community, but was opened by—was the consequence of—the spaces opened when 
Euro-American political and religious expansionists encountered Cherokee people 
who respected their traditional values and adapted to a rapidly changing world. 
Just as Cherokee if less dramatic is Brown’s concern for “her people.” For 
Brown, as for many Cherokees, a fundamental compassion and concern for others 
extends from an idea of identity intimately connected with community. This priority 
finds expression in Brown’s preoccupation that she with other Cherokee converts like 
her brother David be prepared “for usefulness among my people”26 given “their awful 
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situation while out of Christ.”27 She repeats this sentiment in some form a dozen times 
throughout her brief memoirs, reiterating the centrality of praxis and community to her 
moral vision, which did not escape the attention of Anderson and other contributors to 
the Memoir.28 In a later, more comprehensive biographical essay on Brown than the 
sketch in Cherokee Women, Perdue revises her assessment of Brown (that few women 
wanted to equal her in her Christian devotion) and attends to her melding of the 
personal and the communal, rightfully foregrounding the value of community:  
 
The missionaries interpreted her behavior as evangelical, the ardent 
desire of believers to spread the gospel, but Catharine’s concern may 
have stemmed from the Cherokee concern for community. Unlike 
Christianity, which concentrated on the salvation of individual souls, 
Cherokee religion focused on community well-being. Convinced of the 
correctness of Christianity, Catharine agonized not over her own soul, 
but over the collective soul of her people…Her baptism seems to have 
opened the door for other Cherokees. Soon over a hundred adults 
joined her in Christian fellowship…29  
This concern for the well being of the community calls to mind Eva Garroutte’s 
“responsibility to reciprocity” and Jace Weaver’s communitism,” discussed in the 
preceding chapter, and the Keetoowah belief in God’s law to love one another.30 At 
the risk of redundancy, it may be worth reiterating that for all its importance, 
“community” is not fully coextensive with the entire network of relations and ways of 
relating in a given world—unless community names the web itself, in which case it 
still pays more to discuss its particulars than to float inevitably imprecise 
generalizations. And besides, a number of Native and Cherokee people are in fact 
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selfish and define their identities according to very individualistic agendas—and they 
are still Native people, who perhaps even deserve scholarly attention.  
Several critics have seen a corollary between a purportedly formerly unknown 
individualism together with a decline of women’s political power to Christianity’s 
introduction, assuming a doctrinal emphasis on personal conversion and a political 
complicity with the goals of the US civilization program, which included ideational 
roles for women in the private, domestic sphere and specifically not in the public, 
political sphere. In an influential article, Barbara Welter explores nineteenth-century 
ideas of femininity that coalesce in what she has dubbed the “the cult of true 
womanhood,” whose attributes “could be divided into four cardinal virtues—piety, 
purity, submissiveness and domesticity.”31 Perdue joins Welter’s concept of true 
womanhood with her narrative of conflict between white and Christian against 
Cherokee and traditional, writing, “Cherokees learned to be true women primarily 
through the work of Protestant missionaries,” who inculcated in the “elite” an 
expectation that Cherokee women “conform to the ideals of the cult of true 
womanhood, that is, to be sexually pure, submissive to fathers and husbands, 
concerned primarily with spiritual and domestic matters, and excluded from politics 
and economics outside the home.”32 Like the conflict between whites and Indians 
more generally, the outcome of this gendered tension appears foregone, and women 
found that “domesticity brought influence, not power. Similarly, purity and piety 
seemed almost anachronistic in a culture and age that tended to value the material 
above the spiritual.”33 While Wilma Dunaway argues that most Cherokee women 
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resisted the imposition of foreign gender roles at least until Removal, she too sees in 
missionary history white culture attempting to steamroll Native culture, and in the so-
called cult of true womanhood a locus for acculturation, albeit among a minority.34  
Common to such binaristic histories of the heteronomy of gender roles is the 
tendency to see assimilation or resistance as the only options available, the ossifying 
tendencies of which I have already discussed. They are further complicated by what 
Shirley Samuels has called “the double logic of power and powerlessness,” which 
simultaneously affirms the historical separation of women from spheres of power and 
indicts them for failing to exercise the political power they purportedly did not 
possess.35 As Samuels argues, closer examination reveals far greater overlap between 
the public and the private than theories of discrete spheres allows. Despite the 
suggestions that a woman like Brown was simply playing out a stock, assimilated 
(become domesticated) character’s role scripted for her by an alien culture, I argue 
that not only did she speak to the immediate social and political concerns of Cherokee 
people, but she also offered her own philosophy of usefulness to the missionaries. The 
piety of true womanhood for her entailed concrete engagement with national politics, 
which offered missionaries chances to put their Hopkinsian theology into practice. 
Martin alludes to Brown’s social consciousness when he writes, “for Catharine Brown, 
conversion to Christianity often seemed an effective way to gain respectability, 
recognition from powerful whites, and a good education. Like Catharine Brown, 
converts were able to use their enhanced access to the dominant culture to better 
promote the causes of their people.”36 The imminent causes of the Cherokee were 
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rights to life and land, and while it is mostly tacit, in the assembly of the Memoir 
anyway, many missionaries following her lead took her materialist concern on these 
matters to heart, politically advocating for the Cherokees despite the opposition of 
their governing authorities.  
Leonard Sweet in his history of the female seminary movement argues that for 
Protestant women “the principal sphere of usefulness was the home,”37 but he clarifies 
that, theoretically at least, usefulness as a concept was more closely concerned with 
evangelism, with both linked to the pressing millenarianism of the nineteenth century. 
He writes, “Usefulness, while it included the component of the home and family, was 
defined primarily in terms of building the kingdom of God on earth.”38 Others echo 
this explanation of usefulness as an enactment of proselytizing.39 Brown, too, seems to 
share this sense, seen in her connection of “doing good” or “being useful” with her 
sorrow “for my Cherokee brothers and sisters, when I consider their awful situation 
while out of Christ.”40 The belief that the Second Coming was imminent assuredly lent 
some of the immediacy to Brown’s conversion efforts, just as it did to the 
missionaries’, many of whom believed their labors uniting the nations under Christ 
could hasten the longed-for day. The prospect of deliverance must have been attractive 
to many Cherokees like Brown, beset with political troubles and plagued by recurrent 
epidemics of smallpox, measles, and other diseases. During the years she was alive, 
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tuberculosis especially imperiled the Cherokee—no less than three of the Browns died 
of it, including Catharine. Elias Boudinot wondered if the “Cherokee Nation is 
destined to fall by this Instrument of Death.”41 Brown also might well have been 
motivated by the religious vacuum emerging from the medicine men’s loss of spiritual 
authority, pushing her and other women to become spiritually useful. In addition, the 
Cherokees’ worsening political conditions as they attempted to protect their borders 
against illegally encroaching white settlers and the US’s attempts to remove them west 
no doubt added a social dimension to her idea of utility. When Brown’s memoirs were 
published in 1824, the year after her death, the Cherokees had only just escaped the 
second removal crisis of 1819 at the cost of some four million acres—more than a 
quarter of their remaining land—when they were confronted by still more requests for 
cessions by President Adams’ administration, whose term-long machinations set the 
stage for the final theft carried out under Jackson.42 The perennial demands for land, 
the attacks on persons, and the designs on cultural and political cohesion that Brown 
had directly experienced—such conditions induced her father to join the Old Settler 
emigrants to Arkansas before the Trail of Tears—help contextualize the desperate 
urgency in her oft-expressed desires that she and her family “do good” and “be useful” 
to their people. 
Conversion to Christianity in this intricate and perilous historical context not 
only provided a metaphysical satisfaction in working for the sake of others’ souls and 
Christ’s earthly kingdom; it also supplied evidence for a practical political and ethical 
argument that would testify to the civilizability and civility of the Cherokee. Much as 
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immigration apologists must take pains to prove the banalities that Mexican people do 
work and Muslim people by and large are not suicide bombers, Cherokees felt 
compelled to counter their stereotypical, “scientific” categorization as savage or 
barbarian, below and therefore without the rights of civilized people, the force of 
which sanctioned a trove of predations. The acceptance of Christianity, the pursuit of 
education, and the adoption of “civilized,” i.e., Euro-American ways of life, labor, and 
society, were to warrant against accusations of savagery deployed to denounce Indian 
interest in the land as an imperfect right of occupancy only—removing a group of 
savages could be justified as benevolent protection, but removing a civilized people 
could only be seen as robbery. While conversion might indeed be the result of 
epiphanic shifts in spiritual beliefs, it also here emerges as a strategy by which women 
both create communities of novel shapes and also enter those communties’ often 
gendered and social critiques into the political and legal discourses from which state-
centric forces were at pains to remove them. 
Despite Brown’s social focus, Perdue sees in Brown’s conversion a causal 
disconnect between her need for integration with the community and the community’s 
willingness to extend it: “At the same time she sought and found community in her 
new faith, conversion drove a wedge between her and the vast majority of 
Cherokees…Instead of uniting her people through Christianity, Catharine found 
herself estranged from many of them because of her faith.”43 Although Perdue in this 
essay suggests that Brown’s conversion to Christianity did not effect total erasure of 
Cherokee culture, her insistence on structuring the juncture of Christianity and 
Cherokee culture as antagonistic elides a great deal of the complexity of Brown’s and 
other converts’ experiences. A number of Cherokees opposed to increased contact 
with Euro-Americans generally and the missionary project specifically would no 
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doubt have ostracized her, but many others in fact welcomed her. Anderson records, 
“Catharine and David were employing themselves diligently at Brainerd. Once, in 
particular…these two young Cherokees, aided by a pious Indian woman of great age, 
collected a little group of their people, who had come to spend the Sabbath there, and 
held a religious conference, with prayer and praise, all in the Cherokee language.”44 
Not long before her death, Brown spoke to Laura Potter, wife of missionary William, 
of her work with local Cherokee women: “I have no desire to live in this world, but to 
do good. But God can carry on his work without me. I hope you will continue the 
meetings of females. You must not be discouraged. I thought when I should get to the 
Arkansas, I would form a society among the females, like ours. But I shall never live 
to get there.”45 Perhaps Brown in her hope that meetings of women specifically would 
carry on foresaw that they would soon be in the best position to provide for 
Cherokees’ religious and spiritual needs. Her transversal of Christian and Cherokee 
communities through her organization of gendered religious societies set a precedent 
for female superintendence of religion that would in short time become the dominant 
pattern in Cherokee society, a pattern that in many ways perseveres in Cherokee 
Christian groups today, where women are the backbone of the communities that 
provide religious “usefulness” to the greatest number of Cherokees, through spiritual 
support, material assistance, cultural continuity, and more. Like the majority of 
women who would follow her in conversion, Brown was also committed to the 
survivance of her people and their ways of life, whether they be in their eastern 
homelands or in the west. Though she desperately sought to stay with the missionaries 
at Brainerd and not to go to the Arkansas territory with her family, she implicitly 
belies the assumption—because she has first-hand knowledge to the contrary—that 
                                                 
44 Anderson, in Brown 40. 
 
45 Brown 93. 
 100 
removal was tantamount to death. Though circumstances away from home were 
difficult and dangerous and countless reasons discouraged leaving, Cherokees if 
compelled could live—were living—in far-off places and were still Cherokees there.  
Perdue’s suggestion that Brown’s evangelism was a relative failure expects a 
great deal of a woman who died at twenty-three, in the earliest stages of proselytizing 
in Cherokee country. Considering the prominence of Christianity among Cherokee 
people today, Brown’s evangelical work could easily be reframed as part of a larger 
traditionalist circuit, in which she appears more an innovator than an anomaly, 
especially given her age in a community that generally looks to elders for spiritual 
guidance. Perdue also normalizes both Cherokee and Christian religion, which for her 
“stood at odds…on fundamental issues. Cherokee religion promoted cosmic balance, 
not sacred hierarchy, and community welfare, not individual salvation.”46 Cherokee 
religion was incorporated in the daily lives of individuals and was therefore largely an 
individual or local experience, guided by certain commonly held tenets.47 Central 
among these was, as Perdue and others note, the well-being of the group. But were the 
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missionaries such as Samuel Worcester, Daniel Butrick, and others with whom Brown 
lived and studied indeed preaching sacred hierarchy and abandonment of the 
community? Brown certainly did not take from them such a message. She writes, “O 
may I be enabled to follow the example of my teachers, to live near the Saviour, and to 
do much good. I wish very much to be a missionary among my people. If I had an 
education—but perhaps I ought not to think of it. I am not worthy to be a 
missionary.”48 The good she sought to do, which she saw in lived out in the 
missionaries’ work, fell not in some imagined impassable gulf between communal 
welfare and individual salvation, but neither was it simply a matter of mediating a 
binary so conceived. The good she so desperately wanted to do as a Cherokee 
missionary to Cherokees was for their sake—and their most pressing needs surrounded 
the political and social removal crisis, which she and her family would well have 
understood, several of them already having joined the Old Settlers in Arkansas. 
Such political and social concerns are barely overtly addressed in the letters 
and diary entries that Anderson assembled in the Memoir of Catharine Brown, but 
they so haunt the collection that in many ways it is itself an expression of political 
solidarity with Cherokee people and a defense of righteous treatment for them. The 
rhetorical figure of ellipsis, or the omission of grammatical or conceptual elements, 
characterizes Brown’s anxiety, as in her lamentation, “Frequently do I weep for my 
Cherokee brothers and sisters, when I consider their awful situation while out of 
Christ.”49 The conventional consequence of being “out of Christ” or “wander[ing] in 
darkness,” another ambiguous phase she commonly employs, is of course damnation, 
but she seldom arrives at such forceful language (although she does at one point 
articulate a fear of “eternal destruction” for her “poor Cherokee brethren and sisters, 
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who do not know the blessed Jesus”).50 Her use of ellipsis, however, leaves open other 
possibilities of not being Christian. These, I argue, include this-world fallout 
authorized by the logic that the US need not recognize the rights to life, limb, or 
property of savages—an appellation coextensive with “heathen” or non-Christian. 
Being useful thus entailed laboring for the Cherokees’ good not just in the next world 
but also in this one. Her letters not only advocate the political expediency of 
conversion, but they also reprove, albeit with similar rhetorical subtlety, the nation 
afflicting the neophyte Cherokee attempting to grow in the faith.  
Brown levels such a political critique in her allusive invocation of Isaac Watt’s 
hymn “The Song of Moses and the Lamb: Or, Babylon Falling” in her closing of a 
letter to a missionary’s wife: “And now, my dear sister, may we both be faithful to our 
Lord, and do much in the world. And when time with us shall be no more, may we be 
permitted to meet in that world, where Christians will be collected to sing through 
eternity the song of Moses and the Lamb.”51 Brown leaves unspoken two of the 
hymn’s stanzas proclaiming the sinfulness of nations and their impending punishment: 
 
Who dares refuse to fear thy name, 
Or worship at thy throne! 
Thy judgments speak thy holiness 
Thro’ all the nations known. 
 
Great Babylon, that rules the earth, 
Drunk with the martyr’s blood, 
Her crimes shall speedily awake 
The fury of our God.52 
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While the Cherokee nation if it dared refuse to proclaim itself Christian would surely 
suffer God’s fury, no less would the US, whose crimes were with every added convert 
committed against Christian Indians, now become martyrs, and the Americans, 
persecutors of the faith. To be sure, by the early nineteenth century it was no longer 
the Cherokees who were spilling the most blood. Brown thus appropriates Christianity 
and claims the moral high ground for the Cherokee. Similar rhetorical tactics can be 
found in many other religious writers like Elias Boudinot, William Appess, Samson 
Occom, and more. Such examples provide a deeper historical context to Andrea 
Smith’s provocative theorizations of alliances among contemporary Indian female 
activists and Christian fundamentalists in her recent Native Americans and the 
Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances.53 Though there is some 
almost-but-not-quite mimicry in Brown’s missionary-taught language, she speaks here 
not with a difference of deficiency, but rather with a tacit assertion of superiority, 
saying in effect that those saving souls and laboring for others’ social and material 
needs, and patently not those preying upon others, are the true Christians. In the 
comparison to Babylon, on the other hand, the Americans invite their own destruction 
and damnation through their wanton viciousness.  
Perhaps she was more forthright in her indictments of US policy in other 
instances not included in the Memoir. Anderson might have thought such direct 
political critique coming from an Indian woman impolitic or inexpedient and muffled 
Brown’s voice, but in his gloss he does articulate in two instances an explicitly 
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polemical position in an harmonious counterpoint to Brown’s voice uncommon to 
such mediated, double-voiced narratives. In the first case he recalls an eastern lecture 
series given in 1824 by David Brown, who was studying at the Andover seminary: 
“The addresses, which he delivered in many of our principal towns and cities, on the 
wrongs and claims and prospects of the American Indians, will not soon be forgotten 
by those who listened to them.”54 The second, delivered in the closing commentary, 
urges conversion as the most direct means of righting those wrongs and allaying the 
troubles besetting not just the Cherokees but Indians in general:  
 
Various unpropitious causes press heavily upon the poor Indians; and it 
is believed, that nothing will save them from extinction, as a people, 
but the general prevalence of true religion. All things else will be vain 
without this…Bring this religion to act strongly upon the Indians. Give 
them the full enjoyment of Christian ordinances. Then their “winter 
will be past, the rain will be over and gone.” Agriculture, art, science, 
legislation, and literature, the germs of which already appear, will grow 
in rich luxuriance, and the Indian character will be respected by the 
nations of the earth.55  
Conversion here is thematized as both a sacred and secular means of salvation, the 
former undiluted by the latter; that evangelism entails positive political effects is 
rather indicative of its rightness. Just as striking as this politicization of conservative 
religion for a progressive cause is that Christianization is urged not as means of 
unadulterated assimilation but as a strategy by which Indians might retain their 
sovereignty and distinctness as a people, their “Indian character.” Undoubtedly the 
missionaries would have advocated Euro-American cultural and political ways as 
nearly universally superior, but they left more room for difference than they are 
generally given credit for.56  
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One reason for the dearth of clear denunciation of US Indian policy in the 
Memoir was surely that that critique was to some extent understood by the audience. 
Despite its ostensibly apolitical official position, the ABCFM like other 
denominations’ mission boards made it clear by its actions, interests in Cherokee 
education and civilization, opposition to removal, and in its general purpose that it 
would break with government policy and stand with American Indians when it 
believed that policy contrary to its work or the tribes’ best interests as it understood 
them. During the removal crisis of 1819, ABCFM representatives even assisted the 
Cherokees during treaty negotiations in Washington as they fended off expulsion.57 
The ongoing depredations by encroaching white settlers experienced by Cherokees 
living near the national borders, like Brown and her family, are referenced in the 
Memoir. Anderson recounts her father’s motive for moving his family to Arkansas: 
“The old grey-headed man, with tears in his eyes, said he must go over the 
Mississippi. The white people would not suffer him to live here. They had stolen his 
cattle, horses, and hogs, until he had very little left.”58 Brown’s willingness to 
distinguish between the whites at Brainerd and those stealing her family’s property 
and safety is remarkable. 
Because much of their funding came from federal sources, mission boards had 
to be careful in appearances, but individual missionaries like the Congregationalists 
Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, and Baptists Evan and John Jones often risked a 
great deal in their support for Cherokee political and social issues. Opposing 
Jacksonian Removal, several ABCFM missionaries together with Evan Jones and two 
others from the United Brethren signed a joint resolution published in The Cherokee 
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Phoenix that proclaimed, “Resolved, that we view the Indian Question, at present so 
much agitated in the United States, as being not merely of a political, but of a moral 
nature—inasmuch as it involves the maintenance or the violation of the faith of our 
country…Resolved, therefore, that we view the removal of this people to the West of 
the Mississippi as an event to be most earnestly deprecated,” in a statement that further 
implicates the political with the religious, the religious with the political.59 Later in the 
crisis the ABCFM left the decision to sign Georgia’s oath pledging allegiance to the 
state up to individual missionaries but imparted it would financially and legally back 
any missionary willing to challenge the edict, and by extension, Georgia’s jurisdiction 
over Cherokee territory. Taking up the cause, Worcester and Butler spent more than a 
year at hard labor in a Georgia prison waiting for the Supreme Court to render its 
unenforced decision in Worcester v. Georgia  before the board and then they gave up 
the cause.60 Though it was initially supportive of Jacksonian removal, the Baptist 
mission board came to side with Jones, who did all he knew how to do in opposition, 
authoring petitions and anonymous tracts as well as speaking at Cherokee councils, in 
Cherokee.61 He went so far as abetting if not leading a vote among his congregation 
that condemned the signing of the New Echota treaty and excluded the signers from 
fellowship. Of this move, also taken by ABCFM missionary Daniel Butrick, 
McLoughlin writes, “Nothing marks more clearly the politicization of religion in this 
crisis. It also indicates how closely missionaries such as Butrick and Jones had come 
to view politics from the Cherokees’ perspective.”62 Neither would Removal spell the 
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end of missionaries’ involvement in Cherokee politics. As an abolitionist Jones would 
go on to play a role in the organization of the Keetoowah Society, which was 
simultaneously social, cultural, and political in its factional traditionalism, and his son 
John, also a missionary, advocated for the Cherokee as federal agent and spoke out 
against allotment.63 
 Such missionaries were not simply acting out of character for nineteenth-
century Calvinists. According to church historian Samuel Pearson, abolition would 
become the pivotal social point around which Congregationalists gathered as an 
official denomination from a coalition of like-minded Protestants,64 but their history 
stretches somewhat further back to the early excursions into Indian territory taken by 
David Brainerd, Jonathan Edwards, and Samuel Hopkins, who all worked with Native 
populations and developed significant theological writings out of their experiences 
among Indian people65—among whom they would have come across much of 
community harmony, personal restraint and sacrifice, and perseverance under 
oppression, whether or not they were able to cognitively see what they physically saw. 
Perhaps the Indian communities living with these prominent figures in American 
religion informed their ideas of social justice and modeled for them tactful politicism 
much as Catharine Brown illustrated the immediate importance of turning the concept 
of usefulness to projects that Cherokees could actually use. Jonathan Edwards did 
indeed tend towards an authoritative paternalism that he legitimized by attributing 
                                                 
63 McLoughlin, Cherokees and Christianity 117-26. 
 
64 Samuel Pearson, “From Church to Denomination: American Congregationalism in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Church History 38.1 (1969): 82. 
 
65 While Brainerd and Edwards pastored churches for Indian people, Hopkins did not, though he did 
frequently visit Edwards at the Stockbridge “praying town” and made brief use of that material in his 
biography of Edwards. His Historical Memoirs contains more of Hopkins’s opinions on successful 
proselytizing among Indians. Historical Memoirs, Relating to the Housatunnuk Indians, Boston, S. 
Kneeland, 1753, online, Google Books, accessed 6 June 2009, <http://books.google.com/books?id= 
Hr0OAAAAQAAJ&printsec= frontcover&dq=hopkins+historical+memoirs+relating+indians>. 
 108 
missionaries’ success in converting the heathen to divine influence rather than to 
social activism.66 Other prominent religious leaders, however, encouraged a 
surprisingly culturally sensitive and socially engaged evangelism that provided a 
theological basis for pro-Native, Christian activism. David Brainerd, an early 
missionary to northeastern tribes and a friend of Edwards, epitomized missionary 
sacrifice and service, and while Edwards recorded his life story in his Life of David 
Brainerd, Missionary to the Indians, which was especially influential among 
Congregationalist missionaries,67 he failed in his commentary to attach much 
importance to the cultural sensitivity and awareness that Brainerd exhibits in his 
reproduced diary. Edwards does admire Brainerd’s dedication to learning the local 
language so he could preach without an interpreter. He also records Brainerd’s 
commitment to providing for the Indians’ education, to collecting money and goods 
for their material well-being, and to helping them secure property of their own. 
Edwards’ focus, however, is less on encouraging works than on depicting proper 
religious attitudes or comportment.68  
Identifying in Edwards a philosophical and practical shortcoming in his other-
worldly lack of concern with life’s realities, his student and friend Samuel Hopkins 
promoted a theological principle of disinterested benevolence that expected greater 
secular impact and engagement as evidence of authentic Christian belief. Joseph 
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Conforti summarizes Hopkins’s developments: “Love of God and neighbor, and not 
the saving of one’s soul, became the core of Hopkinsianism. The true Christian must 
lose himself in a cause higher than his own salvation—namely the temporal and 
eternal well-being of others. Thus the most peculiar tenet of Hopkinsianism, and the 
one most offensive to the rational mind, reinforced the social activism” that his 
theological developments encouraged.69 In his history of the relationship between the 
New Divinity school of theological thought and the foundation of the ABCFM, David 
Kling argues, “What Edwards proposed was an aesthetic, beatific vision that Hopkins 
found incomplete and in need of ‘improvement.’ In a very real way, Hopkins brought 
Edwards back to earth by locating true virtue in social behavior, in an ethic, not an 
aesthetic, of disinterested benevolence. Whereas Edwards saw true virtue culminating 
in a holy consciousness, Hopkins viewed it as culminating in holy action.”70 
Missionary work offered ample opportunity for such holy action, and it took on 
political inflection through the very nature of its enterprise, that is, by placing 
converted peoples on an moral par with whites, with equal claims to and expectations 
of Christian treatment (i.e., with fairness, charity, equity, kindness, etc.). In time 
Hopkinsianism more and more informed the prevalent New Divinity theology, and for 
Conforti “The movement increasingly captured the allegiance of aspirants to the 
Congregational ministry, especially in the years leading up to and following the 
founding of the predominantly Hopkinsian Andover Seminary in 1808.”71 Samuel 
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Worcester graduated from Andover in 182372—what might he have learned there that 
prepared him for the type of service he would render the Cherokee a decade later? 
 Broadly speaking, Hopkinsianism emphasized social harmony, justice and 
equity, kindness and generosity, and equality.73 In contradistinction to facile 
caricatures of Christianity as individualist and materialist, Hopkins, presumably like 
his followers, “was disquieted by the conflict between traditional social values and the 
behavior of New Englanders in a time of critical change. Like other evangelicals, he 
inherited a social ethic that stressed corporate obligation, personal restraint, and 
communal harmony and simplicity. But the economic and demographic expansion of 
New England during his lifetime promoted acquisitive, egocentric patterns of behavior 
at odds with those norms.”74 Like Brown, he also urged a distinctly humanist 
usefulness. In his account of missionary John Sargeant’s life, Historical Memoirs 
Relating to the Housatunnuk Indians, Hopkins prods his readers:  
 
Should we not be mov’d to such charitable Endeavors from the 
Consideration of the wretched and forlorn Circumstances, in which the 
poor Natives appear before our Eyes. We often behold those piteous 
Objects, appearing half naked and almost starv’d; which is the Effect of 
their vicious Way of Living. We see them also in the Depths of 
Ignorance & Barbarity…And yet the Powers, both of Body & Mind are 
not inferiour to our own. Were they brought to Civility & Industry, they 
might stand upon equal Ground with us…and were they instructed in 
divine Things…they might stand as fair for the Kingdom of Heaven as 
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we do. Should not our Eyes therefore affect our hearts, when we behold 
them in such miserable Circumstances? And should we not exert 
ourselves in all proper ways for their help. Did the Wounds of the poor 
Man half dead, who fell among Thieves, plead with so much Eloquence 
for human Compassion, as the unhappy State of the poor Natives does 
for Christian Charity?...The noble Example of some generous & pious 
Persons, at Home, may well excite us to liberal Contributions for the 
Benefit of the poor Heathen.75 
Despite the passage’s overtly racist vocabulary of savagism, barbarism, and 
civilization, Hopkins here gathers together many of the principles undergirding his 
social emphasis, and in advocating compassionate contribution for Indians’ material 
needs articulates an uncommonly relativist position that argues that Indians are in fact 
spiritually and intellectually equal to whites, at least in capacity. He checks too 
superior an attitude in his readers with a quick reminder that “A few Generations back 
we were in a State of Heathenism, as they now are: Aliens from the common Wealth of 
Israel—and without God in the World.”76 Hopkins encourages his Christian followers 
to follow Christ’s example by feeding the hungry, clothing the cold, and offering other 
acts of charity as they are able. (With notable political acumen, he also suggests that 
kind and fair dealing would win the friendship of powerful tribes and ally them with 
the English rather than with Catholic France, at lower financial cost to the colonists. 
Hopkins is nothing if not practical.77) Though his language of degradation points up 
his implicit, perhaps unconscious, acceptance of the paradigm of Indian inferiority, 
Hopkins seems to be consciously attempting to move himself beyond it, turning 
customary speak of powerlessness, poverty, and ignorance to progressive discussion 
of education, charity, and sovereignty (albeit dimly conceived). Whereas Edwards 
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only gestured in such directions in The Life of David Brainerd, Hopkins advocates the 
goals not as ancillary, temporal effects of a holy consciousness, but rather as effective, 
practical—again, useful—approaches to successful missionary work.  
For Baptist and ABCFM missionaries, pragmatic missions work was most 
productive in gaining converts when it was in consonance with the Cherokees’ own 
goals and methods of attaining them. While it should not need repeating that advocacy 
for and the actual identification of Cherokees’ educational, material, political, and 
cultural goals originated not with missionaries but with Cherokees themselves, the 
importance of such sectional volition cannot be overemphasized. Though some critics 
have broadly painted the missionaries’ goals and methods as oppositional to Cherokee 
culture—arguing like Bethany Schneider “That going to that holy place,” i.e., 
converting to Christianity, “entails the renunciation of culture, language, nation, and 
life itself”78—exception upon exception calls the rule into question. Several 
missionaries’ interest in oral traditions, the communal atmosphere of camp meetings 
and the group labor employed at them, the eventual acceptance of medicine men into 
Christian fellowship, and the parallels between the Cherokee purification going to 
water ceremony and Christian baptism have all been seen as intersections between 
Cherokee and Christian pathways that later enabled enduring convergences.79 
Language figures prominently in two others that historian William McLoughlin argues 
worked most forcefully to make Christianity a viable option for Cherokees: the 
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training and subsequent efforts of Native ministers who preached in Cherokee, and the 
translation of the Bible into Cherokee.80  
 Keeping with the question of language, I would like to consider its role in 
education more closely. The Cherokees’ desire for and the steps they took to establish 
schools, discussed in the last chapter, represent another consonant interest for 
Cherokees and Christians that also touches on the question of language. Missionary 
schools in their instructional methods more often employed Cherokee than has been 
admitted. Given the affinity between language and cultural ways of knowing, the 
unexplored irregularity of missionaries’ indulgence of the Cherokee language bears 
closer investigation. While McLoughlin writes of the ABCFM schools, “Their 
missionaries made little effort to learn Cherokee…none of the teachers thought it 
necessary to employ interpreters or try bilingual education,”81 the translation and 
publication of the Bible and other material represented just the latter, while if not in a 
classroom setting certainly in wider society. Both Daniel Butrick and Samuel 
Worcester, who wrote several articles on the language for the Cherokee Phoenix, 
showed great interest in learning Cherokee, even if neither never mastered it.82 And as 
Rufus Anderson notes, Cherokees like Catharine Brown, David Brown, and John Arch 
provided translation services and conducted prayer and study in Cherokee.83 In light of 
Anderson’s approving (if patronizing) tone discussing the Browns’ leadership of “a 
little group of their people” who were praying and praising “all in the Cherokee 
language,”84 and David’s statement that he would “sometimes preach myself in the 
                                                 
80 McLoughlin, Cherokees and Christianity 205, 207.  
 
81 McLoughlin, Cherokees and Christianity 66. 
 
82 Worcester 5-9, 41-42, 59-69; Anderson, in Brown 46. 
 
83 Anderson, in Brown 39-40, 42; Phillips and Phillips 114-15. 
 
84 Anderson, in Brown 40; also see Phillips and Phillips 158. 
 114 
sweet language of Tsallakee,”85 it seems likely that she would have taught more than a 
little in Cherokee when she headed the school at Creek Path and also that the ABCFM 
missionaries approved of her doing so. Most explicitly, the Brainerd mission school’s 
journal contains an entry recommending Catharine for the teaching job at Creek Path: 
“I think it would be well for her to come as she can talk & there will be no good 
interpreter.”86 
 The exception to culturally-destructive missionary education presented in 
Baptist Evan Jones’s case is even more complicated. McLoughlin writes:  
 
Although the Joneses were committed to bilingual education, the 
Cherokee council ruled that its public school system (adopted in 1841), 
supported by Cherokee funds and taught by Cherokee teachers (all 
mixed-bloods), must be taught in English. Not until after John Ross’s 
death in 1866 were the Joneses able to persuade the council to try their 
plan. In 1866, the council adopted a series of bilingual textbooks in 
arithmetic, geography, and history that were to be written by John 
Jones and published on the Baptist printing press…Unfortunately, the 
Cherokee Nation lacked the funds to implement this plan fully. It was 
strongly opposed by the wealthier English-speaking parents who 
wanted nothing to do with the old language.87 
Mixedbloods, it appears, can be held responsible for any evil. Even though he was 
purportedly the champion of the fullbloods and headed the government that included 
the National Council, which was controlled by fullbloods as late as 1861,88 John Ross 
opposed teaching Cherokee youth how to communicate in their language—is this a 
traditionalist value?—while the representatives of assimilation like Elias Boudinot 
editorialized in Cherokee, Samuel Worcester disseminated the Sequoyah syllabary, 
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Catharine Brown taught usefulness, and Evan Jones preached the Gospel in Cherokee. 
Ross, however, was surely more than a simple opponent of Cherokee language, as is 
evidenced by his use of translators for national addresses, for example. He and the 
council leaders undoubtedly sought to offer future leaders the best academic 
preparation they could get, perhaps thinking they could pick up Cherokee after class. 
My point is not to tarnish traditionalists’ reputations, and certainly not to claim that 
traditionalism has never existed, but that each of these Cherokee people and Cherokee 
allies worked as best as they were able for the people’s survivance in complex 
situations with competing demands. They might have been more or less effective, and 
in some places destructive, true. Scholarship is not just at liberty to analyze and 
critique what worked better and what worse; that discernment is incumbent upon it. 
But we should understand that this pattern of criticizing mixedbloods or assimilation 
advocates for all sorts of ills—really, for being mixedbloods—like the binaristic 
opposition of Christian and Indian says as much about contemporary scholarship’s 
own situated, invested attitudes as it does about history, culture, or literature. And 
what it says is that many are prepossessed with simplistic, circumscribed, and 
defeating notions of what Indians may do for themselves, often pulling up short at 
changes in education, exploration, worship, or anything that appears to drift too far 
from a contained idea of the past.  
Such a limited historical focus, not only bookended by signpost events like 
Removal or the turn of a century but also served by the ability to set aside the changes 
occasioned by displacement or, say, the industrial revolution, problematizes Perdue’s 
normative definition of Cherokee community in the early 1800s. This isolation and 
segmentation of the population marginalizes what was an important and growing 
component of Cherokee society, both in the east and among the Old Settlers in 
Arkansas. Though Catharine Brown dreaded the prospect of going to Arkansas, 
 116 
concern for the welfare of the Cherokees there motivated her to help organize a 
women’s charitable society that contributed to its mission station.89 Of Brown’s 
impending move to run the new Cherokee school in Alabama, Anderson writes, 
“When it was known at Creek-Path, that she was to take charge of the school, the most 
enthusiastic joy was occasioned among the people. They seemed to feel that the 
preparations could not be made too soon. Not less than fifty Cherokee men, besides 
negroes and boys, assembled immediately to build a house, which, in two days, was 
nearly completed according to their stipulation.”90 Whatever “wedge” lodged between 
Brown and the Cherokee communities of her time—local communities primarily in 
charge of their affairs—they seem to have worked around it. Brown, like other 
missionary educators, would have served at the pleasure of the community; that she 
stayed at Creek Path for nine months speaks as much of communal agency as 
missionary zealotry. Her tenure at the school resembles the community vetting of new 
knowledge discussed in chapter one. Having gone out to gain knowledge from the 
missionaries at the Brainerd school, Brown returns to Cherokee people to demonstrate 
what she has learned and to offer them the opportunity to accept, reject, or modify it as 
they see fit. A similar process is acted out more locally among Brown and her 
immediate family members. That Anderson’s or the missionaries’ (or Perdue’s) 
political agenda results in selective information must be kept in mind, however, for 
they might exaggerate the response to the school or equivocate the greater enthusiasm 
for education than for Christianization. Anderson might also have occluded Brown’s 
continuing ties to community or traditional practices, either by choosing to omit 
materials such as the story of her dream or by simply not being able to understand that 
which was before him. 
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He would not have been alone in having such a problem. Treasurer of the 
ABCFM and later an outspoken advocate and editorialist for Cherokee rights, 
Jeremiah Evarts once met with Catharine and of her wrote,  
 
Her prayers are distinguished by great simplicity as to thought and 
language, and seem to be the filial aspirations of the devout child. 
Before Mrs. Chamberlain took charge of the girls Catharine had, of her 
own accord, commenced evening prayer with them, just as they were 
retiring to rest. Sometime after this practice had been begun, it was 
discovered by one of the missionaries, who, happening to pass by the 
cabin where the girls lodge, overheard her pouring forth her desires in 
very affecting and appropriate language. On being inquired of 
respecting it, she simply observed, that she had prayed with the girls, 
because she thought it was her duty.91  
Unaccustomed to eloquence and intelligence from Cherokee women, missionaries like 
Evarts assumed they must have neither. Besides seeing only what they expected to see, 
some also neglected to question their narrow, culturally determined definitions of what 
constituted intelligence or spirituality. Brown retained and practiced a great deal of 
traditional Cherokee spirituality, such as when she periodically left the mission to pray 
alone. Anderson records the narrative of Laura Potter, “In the warm season of the year, 
the adjacent woods was the place of her retirement. She not unfrequently spent whole 
days in fasting and prayer. One fine summer’s day, she had been absent nearly all the 
forenoon in the woods, and…I felt anxious for her safety…She returned, expressing 
much concern that she had caused me so much anxiety, and added, that she was sorry 
she had not told me of her intention to pass that day in the mountain.”92 Perdue does 
see Brown’s retention of Cherokee tradition in her reclusion in nature and her 
uncharacteristically frequent fasting: “even in her biography, written primarily to 
convince potential contributors of the efficacy of Indian missions, evidence emerges 
that calls into question the missionaries’ success in the complete eradication of Native 
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culture…there are no clear examples of apostasy. Instead, we have ambiguous 
practices that probably represent a blending of Cherokee and Christian beliefs.”93 Ross 
Johnston concurs: “Although she was a Christian convert, she also continued 
traditional Cherokee practices such as fasting, and she participated in women’s prayer 
groups, often in the forests and mountains. Brown and her parents continued to enlist 
the help of traditional healers. Thus, she may have retained more of her Cherokee 
beliefs and been less acculturated than the missionaries’ account claimed.”94 
Describing the preferred sites for Keetoowahs’ deliberative meetings, modern 
Keetoowah leader Benny Smith affirms the traditionalist propensity to go to “high 
mountains seeking revelation from heaven…usually in the woods and preferably on a 
mountain. The main requisite was for it to be a still, quiet place away from 
interrupting activities.”95 Martin, too, argues that Brown seems to have shared this 
traditionalist proclivity to worship in the mountains.96 These are but a few of the 
traditionalist dispositions Brown enacted. Though there may be a threshold beyond 
which adaptation becomes not blending but assimilation, it is neither clear given such 
examples of retained traditional practices that Brown crossed it, nor by whose past or 
present authority it was established.  
Like the missionaries, contemporary scholars may see only what is familiar to 
them. In the anthology Native American Autobiography, Arnold Krupat writes of 
Catharine Brown, “We will not learn of Cherokee lifeways in the early nineteenth 
century from Catharine Brown. But hers, too, is a Native American life, one that needs 
to be taken into account in any generalizations we would make about Native people in 
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the Americas.”97 The implicit assumption here is that Brown’s Christian conversion 
renders her not-Cherokee, although she can still be “Native American” in some 
esoteric way. What besides Cherokee lifeways do Brown’s unexhausting concern for 
community, especially women, her outdoor worship, her fasting, her interpretation of 
Christian precepts through Cherokee cultural symbols, and her worship in the 
Cherokee language teach us? Craig Womack rejoins, “When an Indian converts to 
Christianity, not all of him gets converted, no matter how thorough his newfound 
convictions.”98 That part remaining—which for some might well be the entire web of 
principled practices, in addition to new additions—is best understood from a cultural 
perspective as familiar as possible with tribal epistemologies and prepared to see in 
educational dispositions like gaining knowledge programs of development, not 
displacement. 
Brown’s work as a teacher incorporated power from many paths; pertinent here 
again are community, gender, and religion, both traditional and Christian. In gathering 
together the groups of girls at the Brainerd school for prayer meetings and in her 
teaching at the girls’ school at Creek Path, Brown negotiated a merging among several 
groups’ agendas that could have cataclysmically collided in less careful hands. 
Communal agency is central to this interaction: the school at Creek Path would not 
have existed had the surrounding communities not elected to invite the 
Congregationalist missionaries of Brainerd to Cherokee country,99 and the Brainerd 
missionaries, too, served at the pleasure of the communities. Clearly, if Brown hoped 
to keep her post, she needed to attend carefully to the expectations of the Cherokee 
families with students at the school and to those of the Cherokee political leaders. The 
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administrators of the Brainerd school no doubt had expectations of Brown and the 
school occasionally at odds with those of the community, and the expectations of the 
Cherokee girls and mothers must have contrasted sharply at times with those of the 
white women at Brainerd—that Cherokees and missionaries sometimes crossed paths 
does not mean, however, that they were unable to find common ground.100 
Gender, race, and religion move in conjunction in Brown’s dream of 
evangelizing to Cherokee women living west of the Mississippi, if she were bound to 
go there. For her, a community of women—Cherokee, Christian, Women—was of 
abiding importance as a source of much-needed spiritual and physical strength in 
desperate and dangerous times for Cherokee people, during which their traditional 
religion was for a multitude of reasons providing less support to increasingly fewer 
people. This erosion was not, however, ubiquitous, insofar as traditional—i.e., 
religiously-inflected—principles and practices in direct and tangential connections 
continued to inform politics, attitudes toward community, Christianity itself, and 
especially gender roles, among other elements. Stories of the first woman, Selu, 
reinforce the traditional legitimacy of woman’s power. Selu is the Corn Mother, 
without whose gift of corn, the Cherokee would not be.101 As Perdue notes, Cherokee 
women exerted substantial agency and power in traditional communities, which were 
both matrilineal and matrilocal, and women also played a role in governance and 
warfare. They were responsible for a great deal of labor and retained control of 
property and children during marriage and in the event of divorce, which they could 
initiate; men not wishing to be divorced had little recourse. Women also retained 
control over sexual and reproductive matters.102 In short, Cherokee women were well 
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accustomed to power over affairs we might synchronically understand as political and 
outside of female social jurisdiction. They formed strong communal ties among 
themselves in extended kinship and political networks, often stronger than those they 
formed with men. As their example demonstrates, a multitude of socio-political 
powers can well be administered in forms alternative to the nation-state. Catharine 
Brown’s religious and educational work with Cherokee girls and her dream of 
continuing it are coextensive and inseparable from her immersion in the patterns of 
Cherokee gender. Christianity offered her a means of strengthening Cherokee 
communities, especially the women with whom she was closest, and helping them in 
their efforts to maintain their fellowship, powers, lands, and identities.103  
 
Sequoyah Guess 
 Such an array of affiliations also characterizes the work of self-publishing 
author Sequoyah Guess, whose biography in Kholvn offers a succinct, pertinent 
biography: 
 
Sequoyah Guess is a full blood Keetoowah/Cherokee and a Traditional 
Storyteller. He has served as Chairman for the Historical Preservation 
Committee and senior Cultural Site Investigator for the United 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma. He still serves as a 
consultant to the Historical Preservation Office of the UKB. He’s a 
member of the Seven Clans of the Fire Cultural Camp committee and 
the infamous Turtle Island Liars Club. Kholvn is his first novel. He also 
produced, directed and wrote the script for the made-for-video movie 
version of this book in 1993-1994. It was the first movie to ever be 
produced entirely by Native Americans.104 
While he might not have a lucrative book contract, Guess is certainly possessed of a 
great deal of cultural capital. He is frequently called upon by both the Cherokee 
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Nation and the UKB (of which he is a citizen) to tell stories at national affairs, by local 
universities to lecture on Cherokee traditions, by film festivals, museums, and so forth. 
He has been nominated as a Living Treasure by the Cherokee Nation and the affiliated 
museum, not least for the artistic and cultural services he has rendered, including his 
instruction in the Cherokee language, his seven novels, a practical Cherokee language 
book, and a collection of traditional stories passed on to him by his grandmother. 105 
Also a sixth-generation descendent of Sequoyah, he is, in common parlance, a 
traditionalist. 
 His first novel Kholvn, published in 1992, is named for the monstrosity of 
Cherokee tradition, the ravenmocker, a cannibalistic and frighteningly powerful witch 
that prolongs its own life by shortening those of its victims. The narrative begins with 
its ordinary-people protagonists scattered across the United States: the major 
characters include Cody Clearwater, a Cherokee Baptist preacher living in New 
Mexico with Navajo people; Ira Jammer, a Cherokee tribal policeman working in 
South Dakota with Lakota folks; Morgan Booker, a white woman and former love 
interest of Clearwater in Tennessee, and Summer Moccasin, a young Keetoowah 
traditionalist together with her grandfather George Autumn of Cherokee Oklahoma.106 
After all have dreams or visions prompting them to return to their fictional hometown 
of Herald in northeastern Oklahoma—Cherokee country—they assemble and are 
confronted with Henry Longbush. In the backstory Longbush is a medicine man come 
unhinged by the arson-caused deaths of his wife and children. Though he has lost his 
sanity, he has gained the powers of the ravenmocker. Blaming the people of Herald for 
his family’s deaths, he is rapidly consuming townsfolks’ livers, the means by which he 
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steals their remaining days, and it falls to the collected heroes to defeat the evil that 
even other witches fear. 
The historical circumstances prefiguring Guess’s writing concern the revival of 
traditionalist practices and beliefs that attended the rejuvenation of the Keetoowah 
Society and the stomp dance in Cherokee country near the turn of the twentieth 
century. According to oral history, the Keetoowah Society dates back to the earliest of 
times, with the word “Keetoowah” sometimes used synonymously to refer to 
Cherokee people. Mooney writes, “A strong band of comradeship, if not a regular 
society organization, appears to have existed among the warriors and leading men of 
the various settlements of the Kituhwa district from a remote period.”107 Leading up to 
the Civil War, the abolitionist missionaries Evan and John Jones played some role in 
reorganizing the society, which then was composed primarily of conservativist 
fullbloods (again, to whatever extent those descriptors can describe) who opposed too-
rapid acculturation, especially manifested in slavery and alliance with the 
Confederacy. The Society seems to have waned somewhat in the years following the 
Civil War, but in the 1890s, Cherokee traditionalists found great cause for concern as 
they were confronted with the federal government’s allotment policy, and they again 
reformulated the Keetoowah Society as a cultural, political, and religious collective 
brought together not least to oppose the breakup of the tribe’s government and lands. 
To confront America’s ongoing “Indian problem”—a euphemism that referred to the 
widespread social ills of Indians’ lack of opportunity, lack of representation, lack of 
resources, and America’s lack of Indian land—many paternalistic sympathizers such 
as the Friends of the Indian resurrected the Jeffersonian assimilation policy with a 
vengeance and lobbied for the termination of tribal governments, the breaking up of 
reservations, the dissolution of common title to lands, and their dispersal in individual 
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allotments, with surplus lands going to white settlers. The Dawes Act, the legislation 
authorizing such measures, passed Congress in 1887, and the Dawes Commission 
arrived in Cherokee country in 1894 to begin negotiating for what threatened to be the 
end of tribal life, later aided by the Curtis Act of 1898. According to Robert Thomas 
in his history of the Keetoowah Society, Cherokee traditionalists blamed themselves 
for the negative changes heading their way, believing they had failed to uphold God’s 
laws. They therefore took steps to bring themselves and their followers religiously and 
culturally back into favor by recovering “what the Ketoowahs had lost.”108 As 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, they set about this project according to established 
dispositions of gaining knowledge and community vetting. Thomas describes several 
instances in which changes were not implemented until a committee of elders came to 
a collective consensus about the meaning of a vision or idea and an agreement that it 
accorded with what the group understood to be distinctively Cherokee ways of 
thinking, doing, and being. 
As early as 1889, several traditionalists including Bluford Sixkiller, Ned 
Bullfrog, “Old Man” Chewey, and George Benge, together with Redbird Smith, met 
as such a body to reconsider the purpose of the Keetoowah Society. They reasserted 
that it was primarily religious, perhaps in an attempt to distance the organization from 
political troubles that had plagued it in the past. Despite their efforts, politics would 
continue to beleaguer the organization, and sometime around 1898 a split over how 
best to confront allotment would splinter it into the Keetoowah Society, the political 
forerunner of the UKB; and the Nighthawk Keetoowah Society, the religious, stomp 
dance group.109 For his prominent leadership role, Redbird Smith is so closely 
associated with the Nighthawk revitalization movement that many historians have 
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given it his name, but as Thomas has emphasized, several people before Smith’s time 
played a role in bringing about the conditions under which his work prospered, and not 
all of them were Cherokee. Redbird Smith’s father Pig Smith prepared his son for 
superintendence of Cherokee traditions by sending him to live and study with a man 
known as Creek Sam, who Thomas reports was part Cherokee but was primarily 
identified as a Natchez Indian. The Natchez in general and Creek Sam in particular 
were recognized as keepers of the southeastern Indians’ cultural traditions. Smith and 
the other committee members also drew on the Creeks’ knowledge of old customs and 
beliefs, both their own and the Cherokees’.110  
This scenario invites a cosmopolitanist interpretation of the hybridity of 
identities, even those purportedly the most traditional or removed from out-group 
contamination. Given the fact that Cherokees were never not interacting with non-
Cherokee people, the idea of unadulterated cultural purity is fictional or at least 
rhetorical, not just for the Keetoowah Society, but also for Cherokee society as far 
back as it can be traced in both the historical records of the western written and the 
Cherokee oral traditions. Ancient migration stories, the linguistic connection of 
Cherokee and Iroquois languages, the adoption of members of other peoples, the 
commerce with them, and more testify to the fluidity and dynamism of culture, even 
from its imagined inception.111 But there are pragmatic, observable differences among 
peoples, and those by and large more durable distinctions matter more to peoples’ 
ideas of themselves than the comparatively fewer and more discrete moments of 
                                                 
110 Thomas 112-13. 
 
111 Howard Meredith and Virginia Milan, eds., A Cherokee Vision of Eloh’, trans. Wesley Proctor 
(Muskogee, OK: Indian University P, 1981); Floyd Lounsbury, “Iroquois-Cherokee Linguistic 
Relations,” Symposium on Cherokee and Iroquois Culture, ed. William Fenton and John Gulick, 
Bulletin 180, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1961) 9-18; William McGoun, “Adoption of Whites by 18th Century 
Cherokees,” Journal of Cherokee Studies 9.1 (1984): 37-41. 
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departure from established ways of being. That Cherokee, Iroquois, Natchez, Creek, 
American, and British peoples interacted with and influenced each other does not 
render them identical in their hybridity—why else would they continue to differentiate 
and call themselves Cherokee, Iroquois, and so forth? Principled practices like gaining 
knowledge and community vetting demonstrate the habitus tempering and utilizing the 
effects of external interaction, and also governing change proposed from within. 
Above all, theories of hybridity prone to an all-or-nothing concept of mixing—an idea 
of homogeneous heterogeneity resulting from a binary insisting that between purity 
and adulteration only the latter is possible112—desperately require attention to the 
other options attending cultural junctions, where communities and individuals may 
select, reject, alter, preserve, innovate. The failure to discuss agency together with 
hybridity veils a deterministic sleight of hand that portrays assimilation as natural and 
inevitable—not too far a cry from an apologia for colonialism—and out of the hands 
of its proponents, resisters, or more interestingly, those imagining innovative ways of 
fulfilling yet-unrealized human potential. While any course may be pursued 
volitionally, it is doubtless still subject to both the vagaries of force and to 
                                                 
112 Such is the problem, I think, with Elvira Pulitano’s assumptions that “Those familiar with something 
called Native American literature are fully aware that such literature is, in the end, the product of 
conjunctural cultural practices, the Euramerican and Native American, and that whatever our 
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Native epistemologies…” (8). For her, “…Native American literature itself is a product of a 
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introduction, the cosmopolitanist goals of undifferentiated group boundaries and a new humanism 
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foregone conclusions. Elvira Pulitano, Toward a Native American Critical Theory (Lincoln: U of 
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separatism at length in his  “The Integrity of American Indian Claims (Or, How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love My Hybridity,” American Indian Literary Nationalism, by Jace Weaver, Craig 
Womack, and Robert Warrior (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 2006) 91-177. 
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unconscious mediation through the habitus, which even though it may have 
diminished in overt theorization of tradition nevertheless also replicates its 
unconscious historical dispositions and structuring conditions.  
 One attempt that the Nighthawk Keetoowah Society revitalization made at 
regulating religious change was in its constitution’s early codified exclusion of 
Christian worshippers. The section read: “We shall not have two kinds of religion, 
only Keetoowah religion, which we worship God, and we shall all be loyal to that. If 
any person shall join any other religious denomination, he shall forfeit his membership 
to our Keetoowah Society.” A member’s application was also to indicate that “he is 
not a member of any religious denomination. After his acceptance, the secretary shall 
write his name, if he has any children or just a wife; he shall enroll them giving their 
age, their clan, showing they were not members of any other religious 
denomination.”113 Finding this exclusion untenable for whatever reason, perhaps 
because of the increasing number of Christian converts desiring admittance, already 
covertly practicing both the Keetoowah and Cherokee religions, or the prominence of 
the Baptist church especially, the Society elected to admit Christians to membership, 
amending the Constitution with a remarkable piece of theological fusion:  
Concerning the Adoption of Christ, September 16, 1934, Buffalo Town 
 
Today, Keetoowah Society of the several towns, seven clan council 
assembled, hereby amend its constitution so that from now on it shall 
be this way: thereas, since we find Jesus Christ was born here on earth, 
the son of God, He shall be accepted by the Keetoowahs. But he shall 
not be accepted completely according to the Bible. But whereas John 
the Baptist, has said when he was baptizing some of his followers, “It’s 
                                                 
113 “Keetoowah Constitution and Bylaws,” Appendix B, in Howard Tyner, “The Keetoowah Society in 
Cherokee History,” Master’s thesis, Tulsa U, 1949, 123, 124. The date of the exclusion is uncertain. 
Tyner indicates that the original document is in Cherokee and that John Smith, Redbird Smith’s son, 
authored this draft in English. The preamble of sorts refers to the Keetoowah Society’s constitution of 
1859, the English version of which does not include such a prohibition, and also says it was amended in 
1889, but what the amendments included or even if the two constitutions are at all related is ambiguous 
(100, 121).  
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true I’m going to baptize you with water now. There’s one coming after 
me who is mightier than I am. I’m not even worthy to bear his shoes. 
When he comes, he will baptize you with the Holy Ghost and the 
FIRE.” We see furthermore, when Christ came, when he went into 
Solomon’s temple, he found the money exchangers there inside the 
temple and he drove them out. They had several kinds of animals and 
birds there for sale, to be used for sacrifice in the fire. He told them, 
“This is not for to make money. It’s for the Lord’s work.” Also he told 
them, “I didn’t come here to destroy the law. I come here to fulfill it.” 
Therefore, we, the Indians (Keetoowahs) have the FIRE, and the Holy 
Ghost was given us, and we can see that the taking in of our new 
members and the escorting of them around the FIRE seven times 
represents the FIRE Baptism. (Since Christ baptized by fire, he was 
therefore essentially a Keetoowah, and so he should be accepted in 
Keetoowah religion.)114 
 There are several relevant implications in this astonishingly rich passage, 
which again demonstrates the importance of community vetting, and in this case 
theorization, of cultural change. To begin, there are some particular religious 
meanings attached to the prominently featured elements of fire and water that deserve 
some explication. Of fire Charles Hudson writes, “The most important Cherokee spirit 
was the Sun, who was thought to be a woman. They called her ‘grandparent’. She was 
the source of all warmth and Sacred fire was her representative on earth.”115 Mooney 
does not draw as direct a link between the sun and the fire, but he certainly links the 
two as the most powerful of deities, together with water. He writes, “The sun is called 
Une´‘lanûhĭ, ‘the apportioner’…Missionaries have naturally, but incorrectly, assumed 
this apportioner of all things to be the suppositional ‘Great Spirit’ of the Cherokees, 
and hence the word is used in the Bible translation as synonymous with God…The sun 
is invoked chiefly by the ball-player, while the hunter prays to the fire; but every 
                                                 
114 “Keetoowah Constitution” 131-32. Tyner reprints the Constitution and of it writes, “Appendix B is 
the constitution of the Nighthawk Keetoowahs and was written by John Smith, son of Redbird Smith 
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115 Charles Hudson, Elements of Southeastern Indian Religion (Netherlands: Brill Academic, 1984) 13. 
Note the female gendering of the principal deity—perhaps such a minute difference makes no 
difference. Perhaps it is not so minute. 
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important ceremony—whether connected with medicine, love, hunting, or the ball 
play—contains a prayer to the ‘Long Person,’ the formulistic name for water, or, more 
strictly speaking, for the river.”116 Whether the missionaries and their translators 
misunderstood or deliberately appropriated the Cherokees’ closest deific parallel 
seems more of an open question than Mooney allows. The invocation of the elemental 
deities re-translates the adoption of Christianity back into a primarily Cherokee 
religious vocabulary (even in English), so that the plain-language (though Cheokee-
inflected) summaries of the Gospel message are put into the service of a precisely 
situated and material Cherokee discourse. 
While the elements of Christianity discussed in the amendment may be 
familiar to western audiences, their abruptness and seemingly arbitrary sequence 
(Jesus is God’s son, his arrival was foretold by John the Baptist, Christ will baptize 
with fire, the cleansing of the temple, the fulfillment of the law, the operation of the 
Holy Ghost) on closer examination reveal a skillful and subtle statement on the 
possibility and potential of mixing Christian and Keetoowah religions, along with an 
application of Christianity to immediate Cherokee concerns as a kind of illustrative 
test case for the utility of such combination. The argument leads off by finding Jesus 
“here on earth,” that is, not aloof or abstract, but interested and connected to human 
interests. Recounting his coming through reference to the prophecy of John the 
Baptist, the authors of the amendment offer Cherokee readers a relatable figure. The 
Cherokee religious would likely have witnessed some prophesying at the ceremonial 
grounds, and John’s baptizing in its resemblance to the going to water ceremony 
would also have been familiar to them. If they knew more of Biblical teaching, as 
many of them undoubtedly did, some might also have found John’s bare subsistence 
on locusts and wild honey while living in the wilderness resonant with their own lives, 
                                                 
116 Mooney, Sacred Formulas 340-41.  
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meager in comparison to more affluent Cherokees and whites. His preaching of 
repentance and his rebuke of the Pharisees’ legalism and the Sadducees’ politicism 
might too have seemed apropos to the challenges they faced in resisting allotment, 
which more than a few Cherokees advocated, if only as an unstoppable expediency. 
Besides the connection between Jesus and fire that helps to establish his deity, the 
subsequent baptism by fire brought by Christ represents an eschatological judgment 
that must have seemed long overdue—and it is the idea of judgment that reveals the 
passage’s hidden logic. For the Cherokees drawing closer to the Creator by walking 
the White Path,117 which included the Keetoowah fire baptism, judgment would bring 
justification; for others unpurified, something less desirable. 
And who are these? The amendment (again, dated 1934) jumps from 
discussion of fire baptism to the story of Jesus’ expulsion of moneychangers and 
sellers of sacrificial animals in the temple, exploiting those who came to leave 
offerings and desecrating the place of worship. Their simony closely resembles a 
problem the Nighthawk Keetoowah faced in the years after allotment had been 
accomplished. Keetoowah elder Benny Smith describes the trouble that arose some 
time after the Nighthawk split: “the Keetoowahs have been approached a number of 
times to give up the old cultural ways of worship. Some members, seeing the 
possibilities of great financial gain, attempted to convert the ceremonials into a paying 
attraction.”118 By showing Christianity’s anti-materialist philosophy established by 
Jesus’ willingness to confront the financially powerful hypocrites, the amendment 
affirms the non-fungibility of things sacred, which included ceremonies, traditions, 
and undoubtedly for many, land. Indignation over what the Nighthawk Keetoowahs 
                                                 
117 Thomas 122. Thomas here narrates an interpretation of one of the several sacred wampum belts, 
many of which concern the White Path. 
 
118 B. Smith 27. Smith also describes the Keetoowah practice of sacrifice, which some surely thought 
incompatible with Christianity (15). The amendment, however, references a Biblical counterpart. 
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following Redbird Smith saw as an unlawful and wrongful theft of their lands—their 
farms, their worship grounds, their schools, their graveyards—barely sixty years after 
the Trail of Tears, when the nation gave its solemn promise it would protect and 
secure the Cherokees’ rights, also implicated those whites and complicit Cherokees in 
the den of thieves who would one day be called to account. 
The appropriation of Indian lands, however, was again given the appearance of 
lawfulness and benevolence as a means of dissolving the cultural attachments that 
discouraged the individualism American society ostensibly rewarded. The 
amendment’s next segue, to Jesus’ assurance that he came not for the destruction but 
for the fulfillment of the law via a reorientation to its principles rather than its forms, 
such as the Pharisees manipulated, again speaks to the specific concerns of Keetoowah 
people. They felt that the Curtis Act’s mandated dissolution of the tribal government 
without its consent ran contrary to the spirit of the law, if not to its letter. Moreover, 
well after the allotment of land in severalty, unscrupulous whites were “legally” 
divesting Cherokees of their holdings by all sorts of devices. Jesus’ confirmation of 
the value of the old law could easily be understood as an acceptance on principal that 
Indian traditions and laws need not pass away, as assimilation advocates urged, but 
instead find or even provide Christianity and the colonialist nation that imagined itself 
as Christian with full complemence, as Crosslin Smith has it.  
The amendment’s assertion that the Keetoowah people are possessed of the fire 
and the Holy Ghost also claims for them a proper and superior understanding of the 
spirit of the law. The ambivalence of the phrase “But he shall not be accepted 
completely according to the Bible,” however, betrays a lingering anxiety over the 
fusion of Cherokee and Christian religions. Though the amendment asks for no 
theological contributions from Christianity, enough members were apparently not 
getting all they needed at home spiritually to prompt the authorization of Christian 
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membership. While the very act of revisiting the constitution implicitly admits the 
need for modification or supplementation, the amendment provides only for a limited 
degree of change. Furthermore, the indictment of Pharisaic duplicity and the 
appropriative claim to the Holy Ghost as sacred fire go beyond limiting alteration of 
Keetoowah society to proposing a reciprocal complementarity: that the Biblical script 
cannot be “completely” accepted means Christianity itself stands in need of a 
supplemental interpretation, an interpretation more complete and better because more 
aware of the spirit of the law than others that penetrate no deeper than the outward 
forms. The amendment’s intriguing last sentence establishing the Keetoowahness of 
Christ through the practice of baptism by fire—Cherokee by doing—admits no 
Keetoowah inferiority to Christianity but instead declares the religion as fit to sit in 
judgment as Jesus. The Keetoowah theorization of syncretism offers this righteous 
discernment to Christianity in exchange for the right to admit and retain Christian 
members.  
The recognition of incompleteness internally and externally—the admission of 
a ubiquitous inchoateness in religion and culture—and the simultaneous 
acknowledgement of different cultures’ discretely held, preferable understandings 
(because more complete, descriptive, effective, etc.) of, say, spirituality or technology 
on specific points, inform the deliberate pluralism that itself performs a central 
dispositional strategy for Cherokee culture’s maintenance and development. This 
pluralism as practice is at work in Guess’s Kholvn, the Keetoowah constitutional 
amendment, and Brown’s Memoir. Such “outsourcing” might recall Partha 
Chatterjee’s identification of nationalism’s gendered bifurcation between the 
masculine technological/material and the feminine spiritual/cultural worlds, but 
besides the historical re-masculinization of religious leadership seen in the Nighthawk 
revival, there prevails in Cherokee history a greater, across-the-board conversative 
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tendency toward less severe separation. While certain beliefs or practices might be 
inviolable, all that might be considered religious or cultural is not and has not been 
off-limits, but rather in charge of its own perpetuation and development. Throughout 
religious, cultural, economic, technological—perhaps throughout all nameable 
spheres—Cherokees kept up what traditionally worked and supplemented it with 
select beliefs practices that worked better, all the while engaged in internal 
development with internally generated purposes and methods. Long affiliated with a 
stomp dance societies, Guess is undoubtedly familiar with their traditional means of 
handling change, and his texts often incorporate the theme of pluralism within and 
without cultural groups as a means of resolving conflict.  
 Especially in Kholvn, disparate groups’ coming together against common 
problems, recognizing their strengths and weaknesses, and admitting their 
commonality in their mutual worship of a single God emerge as recurrent elements of 
a moderated pluralism. Almost exactly midway through the novel, Baptist preacher 
Cody Clearwater and Nighthawk Keetoowah George Autumn, the most forceful 
spiritual personalities in the narrative, meet for the first time, dramatizing an intra-
Cherokee cultural convergence of religious outlooks long in tension. Autumn’s 
granddaughter Summer Moccasin facilitates the meeting of the four major protagonist 
groups (in the passage with the most Cherokee language): 
   
 “We were all meant to be here,” Summer said and turned to her 
Grandfather as he spoke again. 
 “Yowa, our Father in Heaven, has brought each of us to this 
point,” the young woman said. 
Cody held up a hand. 
“Hold on a second,” he said. “Hisvnoyis?” 
The old man nodded. 
 “Jantas Jisa jistawidido gesv?” Cody said asking if the old man 
knew he was a follower of Jesus. 
 “Agwantada,” George said telling the younger man that he did 
know all about him. “Hatljadohvsgi. Advsqu. Ejula Edoda Galvdihe 
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gininvsido. Yowa jiyoseho, nihihv Jisa hiyoseho. Asesgina, ejula 
Edoda enoseho. Uwasvda uwanda doust doyu gesv. Yowa yi-ga. Ale 
Jisa yiga. Asesgina nigada egidoda.” 
 Summer translated for the rest what the two men had said. 
“Are you Nighthawk? 
“Do you know that I follow Jesus?” 
 “Yes, I know you are a preacher. I am also a preacher. We’ve 
both been sent by the Creator. I call Him Yowa. You call Him Jesus but 
we both call Him Father. Only He knows which is truly right. Whether 
it is Yowa or Jesus. But He’s the Father of us all.” 
 “I know the Nighthawks love our Father in Heaven. We 
Christians do too, “ Cody said. “I know that both our people believe in 
the Spirit of God, that He lives in His children. But I also know that the 
Nighthawks don’t believe in Jesus, the Son of God. Maybe someday 
they will.” 
 George Autumn smiled and said in Cherokee, “Perhaps. But 
don’t the Christians say their God is three in one?” 
 “Maybe you’re closer than most folks think,” Cody said 
returning the older man’s smile. 
“Maybe closer than Christians,” Summer said.119 
The Nighthawk theological position on the acceptance of Christ remains murky in this 
passage (and throughout Kholvn), and despite Clearwater’s affirmation that they 
acknowledge God and the Holy Spirit—and his two-out-of-three-ain’t-bad 
optimism—Autumn suggests that acceptance of one is sufficient and that the mystery 
of the trinity, which has escaped most Christians’ full understanding, recommends an 
intellectual and spiritual humility.120 Moccasin’s closing jab, like the Keetoowah 
constitution’s claiming of the Holy Ghost, presumably with the insights it imparts, 
goes one step farther in proposing the possibility of Nighthawk spiritual superiority. 
Perhaps her reaction voices Guess’s distaste for the judgmental and racialist attitudes 
of some Christians toward the stomp dance, the experience of which he describes in an 
interview with Cherokee literary scholar Chris Teuton:  
 
                                                 
119 Guess 109-10. 
 
120 It may also be the case that the society or grounds to which Guess belongs has not codified its 
relationship to Christianity the way the Keetoowah Society has. 
 135 
…it was up to us, which way we wanted to go, the way of Christianity 
or the old ways. I really never had a preference all my life. I’d go to 
church with them [his parents], and sometimes I’d go to a stomp dance. 
And there are a lot of people like that now. In this day, they’ll go to 
both. But the thing was the Christian communities looked down on the 
stomp dance. There’s not so much of that now, but there’s still a little 
bit of it. But the stomp dance people never had a bad word to say about 
Christianity, which was always kind of funny to me…It doesn’t matter 
to me which one I go to. They’re both places of worship, and I know 
who I’m worshipping. Being acquainted with both worlds, I was able to 
translate it into Kholvn.121 
 The translation to which Guess refers turns up in several ways. That Guess 
narrates Autumn and Clearwater’s exchange first in Cherokee and subsequently 
translates it more or less verbatim into English enunciates language itself as an 
important marker of cultural identity and as a middle ground. While Clearwater 
importantly speaks Cherokee, all the other Cherokee protagonists but Moccasin do so 
haltingly if at all, and the two of them thus fulfill important roles as linguistic as well 
as cultural mediators. Guess himself linguistically translates in multiple ways, both 
through the narrator and in his choice of writing in transliterated Cherokee instead of 
the Sequoyan syllabary, opening the Cherokee passages to audiences who cannot read 
Cherokee. On one hand, Guess is thus able achieve one of his “underlying goals” of 
helping “people to be learning something without really realizing they’re learning 
something…I put in words or traditions or history hoping that it will stay with the 
reader, whatever it is that they pick up.”122 On the other, he does something quite 
significant despite its obviousness: he composes fiction in Cherokee. This is no small 
thing, to offer Cherokee passages of creative writing, however brief, to Cherokee-
reading audiences, helping to inaugurate a people’s literature in their language. 
Though Cherokee readers are perhaps the primary intended audience of such sections, 
Guess is quick to let other readers in on the story with distinctly democratic 
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accessibility. In my experience, most contemporary Cherokee speakers are similarly 
accommodating to non-speakers, offering quick summaries, explanations, and 
vocabulary lessons as they carry on conversations. They by and large want to teach the 
language and want others, Cherokee and non-, to learn it if they are willing. Their 
amicability, like Guess’s linguistic openness, stands at odds with the stereotypical 
view of fullbloods or traditionalists as standoffish and private.  
 Much of Guess’s humor comes from linguistic tricks with a bathetic 
Cherokee/English language creolization or with the difficulties non-speakers can have 
with Cherokee, such as when the characters first learn about the ravenmocker from 
Eric and Tom Trueblood’s father: “‘He said he had a dream about a ball of fire but he 
called it a…,’ [Eric] thought a second. ‘A Colon.’ Cody shook his head and laughed. 
‘Colon?’ Tom asked. ‘That’s some kinda mark when you’re writing, ain’t it?’ ‘It’s got 
something to do with your insides,’ Ira offered…‘What’s a Colon?’ Eeya asked. 
‘Actually, it’s Kholvn,’ Cody corrected giving the word [its] proper pronunciation. 
‘Legend stuff. A story to scare kids with when they won’t go to bed or come in after 
dark.”123 Such peculiar linguistic false friends provide endless opportunities for joking 
about linguistic differences. 
 Sharing Clearwater’s skepticism of oral traditions, most of the Cherokee 
characters except Autumn, Moccasin, and Longbush are at some distance from both 
the Cherokee language and Keetoowah traditions. Though he announces himself a 
Baptist preacher, in the story itself, Clearwater functions more as an intermediary than 
as an exhorter, and in fact his doubts about Christianity rival the conflict with 
Longbush’s black magic for centrality. Guess has said Clearwater’s seeking paralleled 
his own: “Cody was modeled after me and at the time I was kind of battling which 
way of life was right, the old ways or Christianity. I finally realized, like Cody did, 
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that it’s not about Christianity or the old ways; it’s not whether Keetoowah beliefs are 
right or whether the Christian world was right. It’s faith. Faith in what we believe, 
that’s the ultimate reality, that’s the ultimate truth.”124 When at the end of Kholvn the 
assembled protagonists struggle to defeat the original demon-ravenmocker Nicotani, 
Clearwater has an epiphany: “‘It’s not about the differences between the Nighthawk 
Keetoowah religion and the Christian religion,’ Cody said…‘It’s not about religion at 
all…’ Behind the preacher, the prayers of the three drifted up. Ira and Morgan spoke 
English while Summer chanted ancient Keetoowah words in a soft, lilting tone. 
Around them a soft, pure white light began to radiate. ‘It’s all about faith, Cody said. 
‘Faith in the Creator! In Yihowa! In Jesus! In God!!’”125 Revisiting the question raised 
in the meeting between Autumn and Clearwater of how to address God, this section 
similarly names many names, apparently verifying the medicine man’s claim that only 
God himself has knowledge of which is proper, but also suggesting that many may 
work. This admission of the limits of language, the boundaries of the knowable, is a 
paradoxical strength of a pluralistic approach to knowledge, insofar as it is loathe to 
closing the door on new interpretations or applications of traditions, practices, or 
beliefs, not seeing in them a once-and-for-all “answer” to what they might mean. The 
faith that Clearwater/Guess translates here is an admittedly monist solution. I do not 
mean in translating “their” statements in Kholvn in turn to assert that they are “really” 
saying something else, or that faith is less important than the text makes it, but the text 
itself does certainly do other things—and the very communication of the idea of a 
faith available to disparate communities is not least among them.  
 The theme of a uniting faith is represented in Kholvn through the symbology of 
the White Path, discussed in the preceding chapter, which is represented as a white 
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cross connecting people from the four quarters of the Earth. In the novel, the main sets 
of protagonists converge on Cherokee country (which Cherokees have traditionally 
understood as occupying the movable center of the universe) from each of the four 
directions. The novel does not mention the White Path by name, but the imagery it 
evokes leaves little doubt as to the cultural allusion invoked by the description of 
George Autumn’s vision calling him to help against the kholvn:  
 
 In the last vision, he saw the people. They were coming from 
the four points of the compass. And that, he thought, was as it should 
be. Two, probably a man and his wife, came from the north. They were 
Indians. The man was Tsalagi. The woman was Ayvwiya, what kind, 
he wasn’t sure. Perhaps Lakota. The man hid behind a shield which 
was both good and bad. If a person was hidden by a shield he was safe 
but that person wasn’t able to see. 
 A woman, filled with tears, came from the east. She was 
bringing a friend. This was strange. They were both Aniyonega. White 
folk. The woman would overflow with the tears she so desperately held 
back. 
 From the west came a sad man. He was tired beyond his years. 
At his side was his son…Though the sad man was drained of strength, 
he was a man of the Father In Heaven and knew where he could receive 
more. He came reluctantly. The man of the Father was Tsalagi. His son 
was half. 
 The old man saw himself coming from the south. He was 
hurrying, trying to meet the others before something happened.126 
Keetoowah leader Crosslin Smith further explains that early oral histories held that 
“you must have medicine from the east, and you must have medicine from the west, 
then you must have medicine from the north, and you must have medicine from the 
south” in maintaining the laws governing the proper loving and connected 
relationships among various peoples and with the Creator. Smith represents this 
system with four colors of people (red, white, black, and yellow) positioned in a circle 
quartered by a white cross, symbolizing the “white righteous road,” “the first cross of 
extreme deep religious meaning” tying people together that they might remember each 
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other.127 According to James Mooney, each direction is associated with specific 
symbolic meaning: the East with power or war, the South with peace, the West with 
death, and the North with defeat.128  
 Through his characters’ spatial affiliations, Guess demonstrates that other 
symbolic associations are possible in the traditional framework and that the 
ethnological account of Cherokee cosmology is neither definitive nor exhaustive.129 
Autumn’s traditionalism matches up conventionally with southern peaceful 
associations, but the police officer Ira Jammer’s northern connection is less clear. 
Jammer does experience loss through the death of his Lakota wife Angela (called 
Eeya, or “Pumpkin” in Cherokee), but her dying may not be especially telling—Guess 
has stated that he decided which characters would die by pulling their names out of a 
can.130 Jammer’s character is the most empiricist in the novel, perhaps associating him 
with a pragmatic secularism that like his badge, “shields” him from problems too 
esoteric. The sorrow connected with the white woman Morgan Booker coming from 
the East also expands on the customary interpretation of war or power as a positive 
site of aggressive assertion. Having fled her hometown after a romantic falling apart 
with Clearwater and the death of her parents, Booker’s sadness is the product of a lack 
of meaningful connections with other people, particularly with Clearwater. The 
strangeness that Autumn feels extends from the linkage of the East with “white folk” 
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come not to conquer but to ally and perhaps unite with the Cherokee. Clearwater, too, 
complicates the pat joining of the West with death. He is plagued less by death itself 
than by doubt, about whether he serves a benevolent God, whether he is worthy of 
loving or being loved, and other problems. Death, Clearwater’s stand-in for the 
problem of evil, may dwell in the West, but so does the preacher, led there by God’s 
calling and possessed of strengths of importance to others.  
 In the symbolic structure of the White Path, each component requires the 
others, not only in a binary pairing, but in a reticulated plurality. In the penultimate 
graveyard battle, the united group defeats Longbush by sculpting a representation of 
the White Path cross. Searching for a way to defeat the ravenmocker, “Summer 
walked to a wreath of lilies. A wooden cross was suspended with wire in the middle of 
the circle. She studied it carefully. There was something…Summer tore the cross from 
the wreath and threw it on the ground then proceeded to stomp [dance?] on it. Morgan 
noticed the Nighthawk Keetoowah girl desecrating the religious object and screamed 
for her to stop…‘I’m not after the cross,’ Summer said holding it up. ‘I want the 
wood…Cedar!!...Help me,’ she cried…‘I need three more.’”131 The heroes position 
the planks at corners, using the pieces of the Christian cross to shape a physically and 
metaphorically larger one. In short, they trick Longbush into impaling himself with 
them. In his defeat, sacred medicinal properties of the cedar in Cherokee traditions 
converge with the Biblical symbolism of the lily,132 and the cross of Christ merges 
with the cross of the White Path. Summer Moccasin’s declaration that she needs 
“three more” refers not so much to her need for three other planks of cedar as to that 
for the integration of the powers represented by the crosses. Morgan Booker, however, 
does not aid the others in dismantling and reconstructing the crosses (also in wreaths, 
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i.e., encompassed in a natural circle) and only “watche[s] broodingly,”133 perhaps 
suggesting that the brunt of the work of coming to the table in religious understanding 
is borne by the Indians, but she is at least present during the conflict and does later 
join the others against the demon ravenmocker. The elements of the entire structure 
are thus united, not one element coupled with second, but each to every other: the 
Cherokee and the white, the Christian and the Keetoowah, the sacred and the secular, 
the fullblood and the mixedblood, the pragmatic and the idealist, the aggressive and 
the peaceful, the progressive and the traditional—each is connected not just to a 
dichotomous counterpart but to every part of the whole.  
 Guess encodes other traditional principled practices in Kholvn without 
parading their distinctiveness; he indeed intentionally obscures some. Like the 
language, many traditions are in the public domain in a sense, but others are kept more 
private. Guess warns his readers at the outset, “I have deliberately omitted songs from 
the Keetoowah Nighthawk religion in keeping respect for the ‘old ways.’ But their 
teachings, I believe, are held intact within the words of this book along with the 
teachings of Christianity.”134 He also admits to self-censuring his work in his 
interview with Teuton, claiming, “it’s a fine line on what I want to expound upon and 
something that I just want to mention and not go into much detail about. And, of 
course, it’s mostly when I’m talking about the medicine or some beliefs that I have to 
watch how much I do let go of. It’s kind of fun sometimes, trying to see how far I can 
go without really actually letting the cat out of the bag.”135 Much of the reticence 
about certain beliefs and practices assuredly comes from the spotty history of relations 
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between traditionalists and academic-types—first ethnologists, then anthropologists, 
now literary critics—who often had little regard for their subjects’ privacy or anything 
but their own agendas in their interactions, failings I hope to avoid, needless to say. 
 Despite his elisions, several of Guess’s references to traditional dispositions, 
like purification ceremonies and dream interpretation, are apparent to those literate in 
Cherokee culture. Alluding to a going to water ceremony, for instance, Guess cursorily 
writes, “George and Summer attended the medicine council where they walked 
through the cleansing cedar smoke and were taken to a nearby stream where they were 
prayed over as they washed the evil away.”136 He explains this section further to 
Teuton: “What I do when I’m writing is, like in Kholvn, I went back through and read 
it, and I had to delete quite a bit of stuff. For example, the good medicine man and his 
granddaughter go to water, and I describe the ceremony. Later on, I thought, ‘That’s 
not good. I better take that out.’ And so I kind of edited it down to where they said 
they went to water and splashed, and that’s all I kept on that.”137 The lack of detail on 
the actual practices or prayers involved in going to water helps maintain the 
ceremony’s integrity to the extent that while some readers or researchers might 
recognize some splashing for the religious ceremony it represents, they could not hope 
to replicate it substantively, discouraging cultural appropriation or at least obviating 
the forgery of any such pretensions. As Teuton observes in his questioning, Guess’s 
withholding clear explication of such cultural practices excludes many readers or at 
least keeps them from as full an appreciation of his novels as they might have.138 His 
choice of an audience narrowed by his works’ expectations of familiarity with the 
subject matter and even the physical availability of the books themselves parallels the 
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progressive traditionalism of the narrative insofar as both it and Guess’s act of writing 
to an audience conversant in tradition demonstrate a conservatism that manages 
community change through community involvement. 
 Guess references this community vetting in several places in Kholvn, such as 
when George and Summer consult with group of Keetoowah leaders: “they talked 
with the Council of Elders of the Stomp Grounds they attended. The old man and his 
granddaughter told the group of the night before [fighting the ravenmocker] and the 
fact that George didn’t think the work was over. He told them of the vision that wasn’t 
complete yet. The Council agreed with them. Before the two left, the Council sang a 
prayer of protection over them and those who would soon work with them. And when 
they finished, the Elders felt that victory was at hand.”139 This scenario closely follows 
the method of solving problems described by Benny Smith in the preceding chapter 
and also testifies to anthropologist Robert Thomas’ observation that “vision seeking 
among the Cherokees…is controlled and channeled by the group.”140 While we do not 
learn whether the council elders experienced a vision like Autumn’s, every member of 
the novel’s major collective—the progressive, conservative, moderate, Keetoowah, 
Cherokee, Christian, and agnostic Indians and non-Indians assembled to fight the 
cannibal—was visited by a dream that imparted some sense of the trouble to come and 
the roles they would together play in confronting it. Such supernaturality may be 
conventional in horror or fantastical genres, but in the case of Kholvn it takes on an 
apparent culturally traditional dimension even in its pluralistic application.  
 Cody Clearwater’s calling is especially intriguing in light of what we have so 
far seen of dreams in Cherokee literature. In his dream, “He stood on a high bluff 
beside someone. There was no need to turn to see who it was. He could feel the love 
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and peace radiating from the person. Below them at the bottom of the bluff, a 
picturesque, whitewashed, slat-board church building stood.”141 The parallels with 
Catharine Brown’s dream are striking—the personal contact with a deity presumably 
Jesus, but who is unnamed; the ascendance on a high bluff; the experience of God in 
nature, and of course in a dream. In terms of genre, Kholvn and the Memoir could 
hardly compare, and even in these pointed passages the similarities between the two 
are not so close as to suggest that Guess was borrowing from or even referencing 
Brown—which makes the cultural continuities across almost two hundred years that 
much more surprising. Other traditional principles and practices connected to, say, 
names, clans, other stories from oral histories, land, and more coruscate throughout 
Kholvn and Guess’s other works, but I’ll need to set aside their discussion for now. 
 Again like Brown, Guess is concerned with the spiritual and cultural well-
being of Cherokee people, and Kholvn is manifestly conscious of contemporary social 
and material problems, although they require a different set of considerations than 
Brown faced. Chief among the issues Guess takes up are problems stemming from 
American racism, like economic disadvantage, unemployment, and anxiety over 
mixed-race romantic relationships. Other social concerns he addresses include 
problems like substance abuse and discrimination based on blood quantum, that while 
preconditioned by American racism might be alleviated by Cherokees’ own agency. 
This social consciousness that subtly figures throughout the novel helps explain the 
seemingly incongruous project Clearwater proposes in the denouement.  
 More or less out of the blue, Clearwater announces that he intends to take the 
lessons he has learned fighting the ravenmocker with group support to the political 
arena. The passage reads, “‘You know?’ Cody said thoughtfully. ‘The Cherokees have 
always been divided by something or other. They’ve never been truly at peace with 
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one another. But I found out that if we would only try to get along…we can do it. And 
that’s what I’m gonna tell the councils..on both sides. We CAN get along. I[n] fact, we 
must get along if we’re gonna survive.’”142 The councils he refers to here are not those 
of the elders at the stomp grounds, but the Cherokee Nation’s and United Keetoowah 
Band’s political councils (monsters for a sequel?), that have been at odds over policy, 
land, resources, power, control, etc., for as long as anyone can remember. These 
conflicts continue today, with the Cherokee Nation claiming authority over lands the 
UKB calls theirs and at multiple turns opposing the UKB’s efforts to exercise 
sovereignty by moving land into trust, administering housing funds, and claiming 
jurisdiction, for instance. The official position from the Cherokee Nation claims the 
UKB government is little more than an upstart that has no claims to jurisdiction, treaty 
rights, or successor status to the Cherokee nation’s claims on the United States, 
although the Cherokee heritage of UKB members is undisputed.143 The rhetoric 
against their right of self-governance, however, appears increasingly anxious over 
claims to land within its borders and the confusion that would result from an imperium 
in imperio, applying without irony the same logic that opposed Cherokee nationhood 
in the east in the early nineteenth century. For its part, the UKB has attempted to 
establish its legitimate governance on a platform of superior authenticity by making 
disingenuous historical claims attempting to establish an uninterrupted history of 
Keetoowah leadership steeped in traditionalism and bloodedness from the time before 
European contact, and by simultaneously challenging the legal and cultural legitimacy 
of the Cherokee Nation.144 Several times the two sovereignties have without apparent 
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irony looked to federal courts to settle questions over who is entitled to what rights of 
independence. 
 Again standing in for Guess, Clearwater references such divisions that hinder 
Cherokee unity and that have direct effects on the daily lives of Cherokee citizens. For 
Guess, “getting along” or being “at peace” with each other does not entail the 
eradication of differences among Cherokees, for even the four survivors of the 
encounter with the kholvn after their victory “went their own separate ways to collect 
themselves and see which way their lives would go.”145 Clearwater does not advocate 
a single way of believing or a single set of practices in helping Cherokees survive as a 
coherent people. There is not even mention of a single government. The focus is on 
working for survivance, not just by looking past difference to commonality, but rather 
by marshalling the resources represented in difference. Guess, like Brown and other 
women who took up leadership roles in religious communities, extends recognition 
and respect for others’ power; he does not look to drain it off nor eradicate it—such is 
not the strategy everywhere, as the next chapter will show. 
 There must indeed be space for difference, and there must be room for 
differing, that is, practices of diverging, disagreeing, dissenting. While the “councils 
on both sides” have become skilled at disagreeing with each other, the opportunities 
even for discussion have narrowed considerably within the tribes, as the political 
leaders take ever-stronger measures to fortify their positions, such the UKB’s 
disallowance of dual tribal citizenship. Again with distinct social consciousness, 
Guess early in the novel presents a similar state of affairs when people traded 
authority for security but wound up with coercion and fear. The prologue to Kholvn 
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relates the oral history of the anikutani, the mythical caste of priests whose tyrannical 
rule finally became so egregious that the Cherokees rose against and executed them. 
Imagining a lone survivor of the massacre, Guess invents the origin of the kholvn. At 
the novel’s outset, this is the story Clearwater hears from his grandfather: “It was a 
horrible and bloody lesson that needed to be passed down. And maybe, if the 
Complete People were lucky, they would never have to learn it again.”146 This story 
and the story that remains to be told of how the councils might resolve, accommodate, 
or perhaps even synthesize their differences bookend the novel’s cultural and religious 
messages in a politically and socially engaged framework that characterizes much of 
Cherokee literature, from Brown to Boudinot to Guess. Encouraging the Cherokee and 
UKB councils with a message of peace may not seem revolutionary or dangerous, but 
if a culture gives itself over to control, to a for-or-against politics, alternative courses 
can invite remarkable overreaction—disavowal, disenfranchisement, and worse. As 
the next section on the traditional dispositions of dissent demonstrates, there are 
indeed bloody lessons to be learned. 
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The last section discussed gendered religious developments in Cherokee 
culture with an embedded critique of how politicism both partially structured the 
direction of those historical changes and was itself partially restructured by women’s 
exercise of agency. This section will offer a complementary reading of a centralizing 
trend in Cherokee political development together with an embedded critique of how 
gender and culture were simultaneously implicated in and suffered from a turn away 
from more democratic, traditional principled practices, with an eye towards exploring 
the reticulated resonances observable along but two channels in the intricate braid of 
the habitus. In this section’s combined chapters I undertake a reading of the political 
rhetoric of two key figures in the Removal crisis of the 1830s, Elias Boudinot and 
John Ross, both of them intellectual and political leaders who helped shape the 
modern Cherokee Nation at a pivotal moment but found themselves on opposite sides 
of the debate over the fraudulent New Echota treaty, which provided for the final 
cession of all eastern lands and authorized removal to the west. Boudinot helped found 
the Cherokee Phoenix (soon renamed the Cherokee Phoenix and Indian Advocate), the 
first American Indian newspaper, which was written in both Cherokee and English and 
served as its editor for better than four years. His initial opposition to and subsequent 
support of Removal in his Cherokee Phoenix editorials and his pamphlet Letters and 
Other Papers Relating to Cherokee Affairs: Being a Reply to Sundry Publications 
Authorized by John Ross, respectively, inaugurate a complex body of Cherokee 
political literature that demonstrates both the alarming potential for factionalism in 
plurality and the equally alarming cleavages engendered by the suppression of dissent 
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that accompanied centralization of governance, a shift from consensus-based rule with 
causes reaching back to the earliest interactions with white colonists.  
Against the clandestine formulations of policy that attend centralized 
government, in his late writing Boudinot publically aired his views on the 
impossibility of remaining in the east. He was not attempting an overthrow of Ross’s 
government, nor the installation of self-serving rule by the mixedblood class of which 
he was a member (as was Ross); even few of his detractors would deny he worked 
with the best of intentions for the material, political, and spiritual interests of Cherokee 
people. He believed the Phoenix a proper space for publically explaining the difficult 
realities of their situation and debating the merits of their Pyrrhic options but ran into 
utter refusal on the part of the government to allow such open deliberation. Against 
what his critics have called Boudinot’s assimilationist program, they have attempted to 
identify definitive characteristics of Cherokee identity, and many have found in John 
Ross a figure invested with cultural authority, having served as chief for more than 
thirty years. They have themselves endowed Ross’s resistant position with an 
ethnological permanence that he purposefully deflected, using rhetoric surprisingly 
similar to Boudinot’s, and calculated to persuade similar, non-Indian audiences. These 
persuasive arguments critics have unfortunately come to regard as authentic and 
abiding declarations of Cherokee philosophical fundamentals. Seldom has such de-
historicized credulity been extended to political rhetoric as has been to Ross’s.  
Twin failures to situate historically and politically the orature and literature 
narrating resistance to Removal and to consider its primarily persuasive purpose has 
led to an objectification of and implicit trust in nationalist rhetoric, and a simultaneous 
equation of “assimilationist” positions with subjectivity, situatedness, and 
contamination—indeed with “mixedbloodedness” itself. Concomitantly, all resistance 
to and resisters of removal are gathered together under the antonymous (and besides 
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Ross, nearly anonymous) “fullblood” category, in a continuation of the antagonistic 
assimilated/ traditional dichotomy with the addition of the pernicious language of 
eugenics. By examining the practices and rhetoric of Ross and Boudinot, the unwitting 
figureheads of the fullblood and mixedblood camps, I will attempt to unsettle these 
categories that undergird so much of the history and critical treatment of Indian 
America. I am not attempting to prove that the mixedblood class is pure invention, nor 
that its loosely defined members were nowhere involved in schemes to appropriate 
power in ways that undermined fundamental features of Cherokee society. I argue 
instead that advocacy of Removal and mixedbloodedness are far from synonymous 
and conversely that resistance to Removal equates neither with fullbloodedness nor 
traditionalism; in short, the presence of one disposition, belief, or practice does not 
necessarily indicate acquiescence to a full range of bi-categorized others but rather 
points up the heterogeneity of agency. In the complexity of Cherokees’ diverse social 
and historical circumstances, individuals, families, and communities employed an 
array of strategies designed to protect their ways of life broadly considered as they 
best saw fit. For many commonly thought fullbloods, this meant backing progressive 
changes to governance structure in the development of a centralized state; for many 
mixedbloods, it meant utilizing and developing traditional models of dissent in nascent 
political spaces like the pages of the Phoenix. I argue against the tendencies to uncover 
traditional roots for practices of which critics approve and to dismiss as assimilationist 
those they condemn, and advocate instead for a perspective that observes the continual 
interplay of tradition and change and that evaluates the practices linking them not by a 
synchronic politics of identity but by a broad measure of the practices’ efficacy. 
Over and against binaristic dialecticism, the debates between Ross and 
Boudinot are more productively considered within the (de)structure of the 
centralization of power, which vacated the discursive spaces where dissent and debate 
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forged consensus. Considering the Removal crisis in the context of Cherokee 
governance’s central gravitation, Boudinot’s public disagreement ironically emerges 
as more traditional than Ross’s unilaterality as he struggled to accommodate the needs 
for decisive and authoritative rule of the nascent nation within the traditional political 
structure. Ultimately, Boudinot and other treaty party members believed themselves 
effectively disempowered and censored from arguing their points either to Cherokee 
people or to the government. When Jackson’s administration contrived a scenario 
whereby they could at last exercise agency, rightly or wrongly, they usurped the right 
to speak on the nation’s behalf in a final betrayal of the principles of open debate and 
voluntary consent to which they formerly expressed allegiance. The next chapter will 
offer a summary of cultural practices, beliefs, and structures connected with 
deliberation and governance, the changes they underwent, and an overview of the 
historical context in which Boudinot and Ross faced the dangers of the US 
government’s Removal policy; the subsequent chapter will undertake a close reading 
of their writings and speeches in relief against this dispositional framework.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Town and Country:  
Contexts and Principled Practices of Deliberation 
 
 The traditional Cherokee political milieu was anchored in the town (and the 
social in the clan), of which there were around forty at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, down from more than sixty in the eighteenth. Towns ruled themselves 
through an interrelated system of governance that incorporated power structures 
political, religious, and social in an integration that ensured—even mandated—a far-
ranging diversity of opinion on public questions from several groups by no means 
regimentally like-minded. A prevailing principle of egalitarianism encouraged 
widespread participation from a town’s people at internal town councils and in inter-
town, proto-national meetings. A remarkable feature of Cherokee political philosophy 
was its nigh-total lack of enforcement mechanisms at the local and national levels, 
features now considered requisite not just for the polity’s operation but for its very 
definition. In the absence of coercive governmental bodies and even legitimating 
principles of such institutionalized coercion, leaders coordinated consensus through 
the exercise of persuasive influence, good judgment, respect for others’ autonomy, and 
representative solicitation. The US’s perennial demands for land cessions challenged 
these methods of achieving harmonious relations and seemed to require a more 
deliberate and consolidated political apparatus to be headed by those acculturatively 
skilled. A developing class of wealthy mixedbloods like John Ross and Elias Boudinot 
emerged in the Removal crisis of the early nineteenth century to preserve the nation, if 
not in the towns then at least in the country. Set against the backdrop of the traditional 
political world, their stories of permutation, progress, and perseverance unmask the 
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contradictions, complexities, and continuations of the habitus’s infinite generative 
capacity crudely disguised by superficial dichotomous veneers.  
Towns were autonomous population centers that shared a council house and 
ceremonial grounds and were linked by kinship, language, and other indices of self-
identification. The towns were the centers of political and religious life. The average 
town of some three hundred people and three hundred acres also shared food, land, 
and community resources.1 In cultivating common fields and orchards, they practiced 
gadugi, a principle and practice of economic and labor cooperation that required input 
from all able members of the collective. Raymond Fogelson and Paul Kutsche note the 
linguistic similarity between gadugi and the word for town, skadugi, suggesting 
etymologically the relationships between the philosophies and practices of being and 
working together in a place.2 The drop in the number of towns reflects the shift from 
the tribalist agrarian economy before the eighteenth century toward the market 
economy of the fur trade that accompanied the Cherokees’ increasing reliance on trade 
goods, together with their adoption of Euroamerican agricultural principles. These 
entailed several changes to crop diversification, gendered labor practices, and more, 
but most importantly in terms of settlement demographics, emphasized individual over 
communal labor. The United States’ Indian civilization program also promoted 
individual land ownership—when Cherokees participated in such programs that 
brought plows, spinning wheels, looms, and missionaries, they abandoned urban 
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centers, such as they were, for more isolated family farms. By no means did all 
Cherokees live in towns prior to the shrinking nuclearity of the nineteenth century, 
however. In her demographic study, Betty Anderson Smith suggests that many of the 
160 geographic names she finds in the eighteenth-century historical record likely 
denote “semipermanent hamlets” that “were probably smaller villages occupied for a 
while, then abandoned as natural resources were depleted.”3 I pause to note this rural 
diversity to suggest that even as I attempt to unsettle the nationalist emphasis on the 
history of the centrist government by shifting focus to the political structure of the 
towns, the histories of significant parts of the tribe remain untold. 
 The general structure of executive leadership persisted through settlements’ 
dispersal well into the nineteenth century. During times of peace, the executive 
position was filled by a white chief who oversaw internal matters, organized 
agricultural labor, and administered the town council; during times of war a red chief 
took over leadership. There is some evidence that red chiefs acted as representatives in 
towns’ external commerce, although white chiefs were also involved in international 
negotiations. Both in times of peace and war, the chiefs led by example and 
persuasion, having next to no coercive powers. A council of medicine men or priests 
advised both red and white chiefs—in addition to the rest of the populace—on the 
religious implications of problems big and small. Even after their deposition in pre-
contact history for overstepping the authority granted them by the people,4 their input 
remained requisite on policy and conduct both private and public. In addition to the 
priests, deputy chiefs, and assistants, town chiefs were aided in their offices by two 
male advisory councils made up of clan representatives and elders in general called 
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Beloved Men. These in turn were advised by the female council and the female heads 
of the clans, who generally did not publically speak during council meetings but 
advised privately, both before meetings and during private caucuses while town 
councils were in session.5  
A woman who had earned renown in war was known as Ghighau or Beloved 
Woman. As heads of female councils, such women could publically affect policy, and 
at times such as deciding the fate of prisoners, whose release or punishment entailed 
serious international political ramifications, even determine it. Historian Theda Perdue 
implies that women’s councils may not have been standing bodies but also suggests 
that women may have regularly caucused together during town councils. Whatever the 
duration of the women’s councils, it seems clear that they were readily convened. My 
focus on the town council, where most women were not allowed a voice, might seem 
to suggest that women exercised little political power, but theorists of Cherokee 
traditionalism like Perdue, Rennard Strickland, and Laura Donaldson dispel such an 
illusion. They demonstrate that a great many institutions generally assumed to be the 
domain of the political state apparatus in fact came under the purview of the social 
clan structure, and the seven clans in the Cherokee matrilineal system came under the 
leadership of the clan women. The administration of justice in the case of homicide, 
for instance, was invested in clans through application of the retaliatory “blood law,” 
which required the life of the killer or a stand-in from his clan.6 
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 The clan figured prominently into the shape of the traditional polity through its 
ubiquitous presence throughout the habitus. Although Duane Champagne argues that 
high structural differentiation among social, religious, and political systems in broadly 
considered Cherokee society facilitated rapid centralization, particularly at the national 
inter-town level, he also explores the degree of integration of these spheres both 
nationally and locally, identifying limited ways through which clan and religious 
structures facilitated the development of a national political identity.7 Strickland 
argues, “The clan was, without doubt, the major institution exercising legal powers,” 
over, for instance, marriage, property, inheritance, religious ceremonial duties, 
murder, sexuality, parenting, witchcraft, and other domains, in contradistinction to 
political power.8 Although clans were not given discrete positions in town or national 
council meetings, they did have a representative voice in both, given the influential 
role of the clan elders council in addition to their pervasive powers in internal affairs. 
National councils were practically non-existent for most of the eighteenth century, but 
the presence of clan members in all towns large enough to have a council house and 
ceremonial grounds united Cherokees in a national-social structure.9  
Further, religious ceremonies provided opportunities for towns to interact 
under formal circumstances and lent a widespread spiritual dimension to political 
processes, going beyond the priests’ influence on political leaders. Fred Gearing points 
out the strategic fortuity of scheduling national councils to correspond with major 
                                                                                                                                            
Raymond Fogelson, “Cherokee Notions of Power,” The Anthropology of Power: Ethnographic Studies 
from Asia, Oceania, and the New World, ed. Raymond Fogelson and Richard Adams (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977) 192-93.  
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9 R. Strickland 25-26; Persico 95; Perdue, Cherokee Women 46; Champagne, “Institutional Order” 11-
12; Fogelson and Kutsche 90-91; McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence 11. 
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harvesting, planting, and other ceremonies to foster a sense of communal well being 
and reciprocal relationships.10 Not only were medicine men or priests invested with 
permanent advisory roles to the chiefs, they also presided over ceremonies and acted 
as the principal interpreters and keepers of the sacred laws governing belief and 
behavior, all in a culture for which spirituality was warp and woof, informing perhaps 
every conceivable practice, from hunting to farming to marriage. In essence, medicine 
men represented and maintained the cultural repository.11 A practice as common as 
making a hunting bow, for instance, requires adherence to spiritually and scientifically 
informed methods, such as knowing when the tree should be harvested, and which 
sides should be used or discarded based on directional energies. We can only speculate 
on the vast religious considerations of international politics. Although Champagne 
argues that medicine men primarily exercised power locally because of the limited 
scope of national consolidation, their influence was indeed considerable given the 
importance of the medicine men to social life and to the structure of the town as the 
fundamental civic unit. In one instance retold by Champagne, a priest’s counsel 
weighed enough to prevent a group of Cherokees from joining their insistent British 
allies in a war party because his divination from a crystal told him the time wasn’t 
right for military action.12  
Neither priest, chief, nor clan elder levied much coercive power, especially in 
regard to political action, but in the absence of institutionalized cohesive power, 
                                                 
10 Gearing 4-5; also see R. Strickland 56; Fogelson and Kutsche 93. 
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Cherokee towns nevertheless maintained affiliations among each other, practiced a 
distinctive tribal identity, and leveraged a national political presence. Such 
connections persevered not on the basis of negative threats of retribution from a 
central authority, nor even from potential ostracization by other towns, but on a 
reciprocal respect for autonomy in harmonious relations. This ethical precept, which 
also guided interpersonal relationships—rooted in religion, incorporated in the clan, 
branching throughout the milieu—was the foundational principle organizing the non-
binding, confederated form of Cherokee governance.13 Under such rule, towns’ 
decisions and actions were independent of others’, and while they could and did unite 
for particular purposes, during times of war, for instance, such partnerships were 
temporary and end-based, dissolving upon resolution of the crises occasioning their 
formation. Refusal to join with another town brought no reprisal,14 and similarly, 
individuals could not be compelled to enter into agreements to which they did not 
consent. Intrinsic recognition of and respect for the autonomy of towns and actors to 
associate and disassociate freely were encoded in the practices of coalition.15  
For the sake of harmonious relations among autonomous agents, delegated 
leaders worked under the auspices of principled practices that ensured correspondence 
between their constituencies’ desires and the representations leaders made for them. In 
the event leaders did not act in accordance with consensus opinion, they could be 
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deposed,16 but such measures were generally kept unnecessary through the chief 
mechanism for arriving at consensus: repeated and regular consultation with the 
elective communities. This habitual returning to represented bodies—to check in, to 
inform, for approval, for veto—kept them informed and regulated against 
misrepresentation. Gearing describes the series of deliberation, negotiation, and 
reporting through which consensus evolved: 
 
...each clan attempted to reach a corporate opinion. The older men from 
the seven clans (the beloved men) then joined the village priestly 
officials and became for the moment the body of elders. They talked 
over the sentiments of the various clans. Then these beloved men talked 
again with their representative clans, reporting opinions of the other 
clans, then gathered again as elders, and so on. Probably both sets of 
discussions included public speeches; a general council probably gave 
the outward appearance of a New England town meeting, with un-New 
England-like caucuses going on intermittently. Councils continued in 
this loose manner for days or, with interruptions, for weeks.17 
This “caucusing” recalls the communal vetting associated with the practice of gaining 
knowledge discussed in the first section. It survives in traditional communities in the 
shape of committees called to offer guidance on matters of debate, and it helped shape 
the Keetoowah Society’s revival of the stomp dance in the early 1900s.18 This 
communicative cycle ensured leaders’ accountability and the politic body’s active 
participation, and as a component disposition of the political habitus, was both integral 
to and representative of the practices generating and perpetuating the consensus-based 
model of local rule, premised upon harmonious living among autonomous agents. 
Most researchers have tended to emphasize the negative or injunctive aspects 
of Cherokee dispositions. The harmony ethic, for instance, has been described by its 
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discouragement of open conflict, but its positive injunction to give of resources 
generously bears closer examination. Similarly, we might reimagine the general sense 
of harmony not as a stasis we should avoid upsetting but as a protean practice itself—
as “harmonizing”—requiring constant adjustment and fine-tuning, given the eternal 
flux of the habitus in which it operates. Most critics have similarly seen the sharp 
curtailment of leadership abilities, even in times of war, as a negative lack of coercive 
power or executive weakness.19 I understand the absence of centralized power rather 
as a positive power, but one retained by the people, through which they themselves 
formed the truly executive branch. Harmonizing into consensus required work, not 
aloofness, and in any event was not synonymous with unanimity but rather meant that 
a compromise that dissenters could abide had been reached until a better solution 
could be worked out. Missing from discussions of consensus and the harmony ethic is 
the sense of these as on-going, dynamic processes that had to be actively forged and 
re-forged in time, which as Gearing points out might take weeks. Other researchers 
reiterate the great deal of time required in consensus decision-making.20 A prevailing 
egalitarianism mandated that all males could speak during council meetings, not only 
those elected to leadership roles, meaning the expressions of diverse viewpoints and 
points of contention were many. The harmony ethic discouraged overt aggression and 
individualistic assertiveness, but that hardly means there was no disagreement, only 
that it required tactful and respectful expression—deliberations over matters on which 
there is no disagreement or conflict do not take weeks to resolve.21  
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discouraged undue quibbling and unhelpful or inappropriate input (37-42). While women were 
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The principled practices intersecting with, happening concurrently, or enacting 
consensus governance in the traditional Cherokee world no doubt helped prolong such 
occasions, but they also facilitated their operation insofar as they reinforced the 
importance of communal, harmonious agreement to the entirety of the culture. Such 
dispositions included caucusing according to clan, age, and gender; and religious 
practices like preaching, dancing, praying, smoking, fasting, and others.22 All helped 
orient political deliberations in a deep cultural context in which decisions were made 
not by virtue of power invested in leaders more or less independent of community 
review, but by leaders’ capacity to persuade others to join in assent and action. 
Individuals might accumulate influence and authority in several symbolic or cultural 
currencies, like family position, age, history of success in hunting, war, or diplomacy, 
or they might be possessed of special charisma or acuity. Proficiency in arbitration and 
skill at rhetoric were particularly valued for their non-confrontational means of 
resolving competing interests and cultivating dispositional Cherokee civics.23  
Consensus was by no means easily built, and when it could not be reached, 
three options surface in the historical record: no decision at all would be made, those 
recalcitrant in their dissension could withdraw or abstain from the debate with the 
understanding that the towns they represented would not be bound by the conclusion, 
or in extreme cases, dissenters might mount a revolutionary opposition. The second 
was the usual means of amicably allowing others to forge as complete a consensus as 
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they were able. But as Albert Wahrhaftig explains, for all the importance of harmony 
to the Cherokee habitus, it was subordinate to “the more compelling ideal of rightly 
identifying the people’s path. Those who are certain that they are right must live 
according to that knowledge, accepting the consequent exacerbation of disharmony 
and alienation from others.”24 The last option, for matters in which even withdrawal 
could not be countenanced, might proceed in several ways, two of which seem to 
recur: removal not just from a particular decision but in greater or lesser degrees from 
the body politic, or outright insurrection against the established order. Neither took 
place as a matter of course, but there are several instances of such dramatic rupture in 
Cherokee history, including the Chickamauga revolt over land cessions, the Old 
Settlers’ removal to Arkansas to escape white depredation, the legendary deposition of 
the priestly class, and White Path’s rebellion against too much and too swift 
acculturation.  
By the 1820s, circumstances had led Cherokee culture away from consensus-
based rule toward increasing political and governmental centralization. It was this shift 
that occasioned White Path’s revolt and similar opposition from some traditionalists to 
the ratification of the Cherokee Constitution in 1828. As the demand for Indian lands 
mounted in the American southeast, the Cherokees circled their wagons, as it were, to 
protect against the unscrupulous US practices of treating with autonomous Cherokee 
groups or towns, attempting to bind the entire tribe to cessions made without their 
input, and punishing all tribal members for the disruptive or aggressive actions of a 
few. Beginning in the early 1800s, the primary protectionist strategy by which they 
aimed to maintain control over lands, coalesce the cultural body, and increase the 
material economy was through consolidating towns’ political powers into a 
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streamlined, central state apparatus that would function as the sole representative body 
authorized to negotiate on the tribe’s—now, the nation’s—behalf.25  
The development was swift, from the establishment in the late 1700s of a tribal 
council modeled on town councils (often called the National Council, which continued 
to be dominated by locally-minded conservatives), to that of a standing legislative 
body (the National Committee) in 1817, and of a judiciary in 1821. Concomitantly, 
coercive authority moved from social to political structures with the uninterrupted 
inclusion of war-time leaders in the regular government and the creation of a police 
force in 1808. In 1820 the nation was divided into districts for the purpose of electing 
leaders to the national government, a shift away from election by more numerous 
towns. The culmination of these measures was the ratification of the Constitution in 
1828, in which the Cherokees declared themselves politically on a par with the other 
nations of the world. Though modeled more or less on the US Constitution, that of the 
Cherokees differed in several points, such as its explicit assertion of divine authority 
and the communal ownership of land.26 Not entirely an unprecedented invention, the 
Constitution mostly codified the structural changes already obtaining in practice, such 
as the growing political and coercive powers of the administrative bodies and the 
chiefs (the principal and deputy chief offices had consolidated and supplanted those of 
the red and white chiefs), whose authority was formerly more symbolically influential 
than imperiously commanding.  
All this movement from an equilateral periphery to a central authority 
constricted the diversity of heard viewpoints, and the investment of power in the hands 
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of fewer elected officials not only divested town councils of local control, it also 
gradually vacated the processes and opportunities whereby town members 
communicated their input to their leaders. In the interests of efficiency, the slow and 
deliberative consensus-based model of decision-making formerly practiced within and 
among the Cherokee town confederation gave way to a swifter, more decisive 
organization based on majority rule. This central government became the product and 
producer of a nationalist consciousness that insisted on the subordination of local 
concerns to those of the larger body, effectively stifling public discourse in its 
promotion of acquiescence to the greater good, as defined by a concentrating, power-
holding cadre. Combined with other changes such as the decline of medicine men’s 
authority (due to causes detailed in the first chapter), centralization facilitated the 
differentiation of the political complex from the religious and social, swiftly 
disempowering and quieting the discursive contributions from priests and women, 
whose spheres formerly provided the foundations of political power.27 Opportunities 
to express alternative positions and to exercise consensus-based practices managing 
and incorporating dissent were eroded or lost as the state’s leaders amalgamated 
greater powers over both internal and external affairs.  
 
Fullbloods and Mixedbloods 
Scholars of Cherokee history have charted the changes to traditional political, 
social, and economic structures with greater nuance than I can reproduce in this 
summary, but less careful are their sketches of who created and controlled the state. 
When not seen as either an artificiality engineered by meddling Europeans, the state, if 
not the formation of the nation itself, is often understood as an inevitable but 
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inadequate reaction to the irresistible force of American imperialism. In the latter, 
slightly more empowering light, the tendency is to lionize traditionalists who pursued 
the only tragic strategy that offered any promise and to villainize those who 
subsequently appropriated the state and turned it to their own ends. (The former skips 
tribal agency entirely and jumps straight to the perceived opportunism.) As history 
tells it, intermarriage with white traders set the stage for the cooptation of the state by 
a new class in Cherokee society, that of the elite mixedblood. Discussing 
contemporary critics’ frequent dichotomization of Cherokee identity, anthropologist 
Circe Sturm writes,  
 
The Cherokee population was, and continues to be, far more complex 
than such a neat division between wealthy mixed-bloods and poor full-
bloods allows. This reductivist tendency has shaped too much of the 
debate about Cherokee identity. Running throughout much of the 
scholarly literature is an assumption that the racial ancestry of 
Cherokees correlates not just with their class standing but with certain 
social values. Full-bloods are often understood as cultural 
conservatives, as bearers of “tradition,” whereas mixed-bloods are 
expected to be oriented toward progress and change.28  
The tendency Sturm identifies is as unfortunately pervasive in history and literary 
criticism as it is in anthropology. Even critics conscious of the contradictions figures 
like Boudinot and Ross present, aware of the post hoc constructedness of the 
categories, and desirous of problematizing if not abandoning them, too often find 
themselves unable to escape its shorthand critical vocabulary, unwittingly replicating 
the binarism that arrests the volitional culture-perpetuating strategies of individuals 
and groups of any background.  
Responsibility for the creation and development of the Cherokee state belongs 
with the whole of the body politic, and Cherokees as a whole shared (and share) in its 
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successes and failures. Authorization of statism and the practices supporting it or 
undermined by it cut across the too-vividly imagined divide between nobly doomed 
traditionalists and opportunistically Machiavellian mixedbloods. While the language 
of blood had come to infiltrate Cherokee discourse before and during the Removal era, 
the meanings of terms like mixedblood and fullblood during this historical period are 
no less ambiguous than they are now in their metaphorical referral to beliefs, 
dispositions, and practices as much as to racial lineage. As Sturm insightfully argues, 
both terms accumulate references to a range of practices, beliefs, and affiliations. 
During the Removal crisis, the correlation between advocacy of Removal and 
mixedbloodedness was not so firmly theoretically established as it has become, nor 
was the opposition of both to traditionalism and fullbloodedness.  
Although I am skeptical about how well “mixedblood” describes a 
homogeneous group—what are the characteristics of mixedblood women, for 
instance? or are halfbreeds male by default?—and am positive that “fullblood” when 
describing better than three-quarters of the population tells us next to nothing at all, in 
trying to offer some history of the pattern of change, I too find myself circumscribed 
by the vocabulary and only hope that someone will deconstruct it better than I am able 
to. Three dramatic changes set the stage for the ascension of what is called the 
mixedblood class in Cherokee society: Cherokee economics increasingly came to 
depend on trade with the US; negotiations with the US government required fluency in 
English and familiarity with white customs; and the affluence and influence of inter-
married white traders effected changes that shifted the material balance of power to 
mixedblood inheritors through changes to laws administering property and descent29—
Cherokees found codification of patrilineal inheritance among the nation’s earliest 
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statutes, written into an 1808 law that also established a central police force.30 
Mixedblood families were generally wealthier, more likely to attend white missionary 
schools, in control of more property, and more often slave-holding than their fullblood 
counterparts.31 According to a demographic study of the census of 1835, just under 
twenty-three per cent of Cherokees were mixedbloods, and slightly more than thirty 
per cent of families had at least one mixedblood member.32 To this group belonged 
John Ross and Elias Boudinot. 
 
John Ross, Elias Boudinot, and the Nation against Removal 
 John Ross (known in Cherokee as Cooweescoowee) was born in 1790 in 
Cherokee country to a Scotland-born father and a mixedblood mother; by most 
accounts he was about one-eighth Cherokee and was raised in a comparatively 
untraditional household, although his contact with other Cherokees was likely frequent 
and substantive. His father was a merchant who employed a private tutor for his 
children’s education and later sent Ross to the Presbyterian mission school established 
by Gideon Blackburn in 1803, among other institutions. Although Ross was exposed 
to Christianity early and often, he did not embrace it until late, adopting Methodism in 
1829.33 After leaving school, he entered into business trading, an occupation in which 
he met with life-long success, and into land development and speculation, becoming 
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one of the five most affluent Cherokees of his day. He went into military service from 
1813 to 1814, when he fought with a Cherokee cavalry detachment with General 
Andrew Jackson against the Creeks at the Battle at Horseshoe Bend. Busy in 1813, he 
married his first wife Quatie (also known as Elizabeth Brown Henley), a Cherokee 
woman about whom little is known, besides that she was purportedly a fullblood who 
helped establish Ross’s credentials with the nation’s conservatives.34 In later years 
Ross would speak no Cherokee, at least not for any of his public addresses. While the 
historical record is unclear about how much Cherokee he spoke, it seems likely that he 
at least had some rudimentary conversational skills given his immersion in the 
Cherokee world. Critics like Boudinot, however, did not miss the opportunity to 
upbraid him for his lack of facility.35 Some five years after Quatie died on the Trail of 
Tears, Ross married Mary Stapler, a white Quaker woman from Delaware; until her 
death twenty years later in 1865 she faced with him the desperate violence of 
factionalism following Removal, enjoyed with him the prosperity of the rebuilt 
Cherokee Nation, and endured with him the ravages wrought by the Civil War. 
Following a long sickness, Ross died in 1866 in Washington, D.C., in semi-exile as he 
tried to negotiate a treaty that would ensure the Cherokees’ continuity as a united 
nation as it faced post-war factionalism and renewed US attacks on land and 
sovereignty—challenges that recurred throughout his political career.36  
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 Following his military service and despite conspicuous cultural and symbolic 
deficiencies, such as his limited command of Cherokee and his remote genealogy, 
Ross rose to unparalleled prominence as a statesman, beginning with his 
apprenticeship under the primary chief Pathkiller and assistant chief Charles Hicks. He 
served with distinction on several prominent negotiating delegations and as president 
of the National Committee. After the deaths of Pathkiller and Hicks in 1827, Hicks’s 
son served a brief term as chief, but at the next election in 1828, the General Council 
elected Ross to the office of Principal Chief, a position he would hold until his death.37 
The intervening years were perhaps the most trying the Cherokee people had ever 
faced as they attempted to stave off the United States’ relentless demands for the 
nation’s final relinquishment of its remaining lands in the east and for its displacement 
west to Indian Territory. The bitter stories of their resistance and ultimate removal on 
the Trail of Tears and of the factionalism that plagued the nation from the years before 
Removal and on past the Civil War have come to define Cherokee history for many. 
Ross’s stewardship during these dark and dangerous times testifies to his devotion and 
capable leadership. He is often accounted the leader of the “fullblood majority” 
despite his manifest affiliations with the “prosperous minority mixedblood faction,” 
and while some historical scholarship has revisited the extent to which Ross 
represented fullblood sentiments—in effect moving him from one side of the 
dichotomy to the other—little has been done to deconstruct the categories themselves 
or interrogate the stakes in their construction.  
 Bernd Peyer, for instance, argues that fullblood/mixedblood or the 
traditionalist/progressive dichotomies inadequately describe the range of social 
interaction, calling both categories “articifical” (166), but he essentially substitutes the 
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US for the traditionalists in continued dialectical opposition to an un-deconstructed 
mixedblood class. He fits Ross smoothly into this category with the claim that  
 
The only marked difference between Boudinot and Ross, other than 
Boudinot’s having signed a treaty without the required sanction of the 
Cherokee government, was the precise point in time at which he 
changed his mind about removal. Three years after the Treaty Party’s 
“capitulation,” John Ross also concluded a removal agreement with the 
US government even though the majority of the Cherokees were 
undoubtedly still against it (not to mention his earlier proposals, which 
had also been made without a public referendum).38  
While Ross was indeed more prone to progressivism than most critics have allowed, to 
stop at Peyer’s conclusion that the historical period just prior to and including 
Removal “can be characterized as a losing race between Cherokee acculturative 
survival strategies and the insatiable land greed of an expanding and increasingly 
aggressive American nation” discourages consideration of the culturally conservative 
impetus for and continued role in “survival strategies” of various casts.39 This gloss 
almost entirely ignores the traditionally preservative purposes to which acculturative 
strategies were put, effectively proclaiming the a priori triumph of the mixedblood 
over the traditionalist, and preemptively announcing the winner of the next contest 
between the US and the progressive Indian. 
 For many scholars Elias Boudinot has personified the dispositions of 
mixedbloodedness and progressivism just as Ross has those of fullbloodness and 
traditionalism, despite the irony that Boudinot had substantially more Cherokee blood 
than Ross, as did other prominent, progressive leaders like his younger brother Stand 
Watie, paternal uncle Major Ridge, and cousin John Ridge. About 1804 Boudinot was 
born Gallegina (Buck) to Oowatie (later David Watie), who was likely either full or 
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three-quarters Cherokee, and Susannah Reese, whom historian and genealogist Emmet 
Starr records as half Cherokee and half Welch, making Boudinot around three-quarters 
or five-eighths.40 I ntoe Boudinot’s blood quantum only because I have nowhere else 
seen it computed, although much has been made of Ross’s exceptional “overcoming” 
his dearth of Indian blood. Perhaps pointing out the Watie and Ridge families’ high 
percentage would undermine the vilifying association with mixedbloodedness and 
assimilation that scholars have taken pains to establish. In other respects, Ross and 
Boudinot were uncannily similar. Like Ross, Boudinot was raised in a progressive 
household, in his case the town of Oothcaloga, a community that practiced 
individualist rather than communal agricultural principles. He too was educated by a 
private tutor and in Cherokee missionary schools; the one he attended was established 
by Moravians at Spring Place in Georgia in 1801. Boudinot arrived young in 1811 and 
stayed until 1818, when he left Cherokee country to continue his education and 
training to become a missionary at the Foreign Mission School in Cornwall, 
Connecticut, run by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. 
John Ridge would join him there the next year. On the way to Cornwall, Gallegina, as 
he was still known, met the aging Elias Boudinot, president of the American Bible 
Society and Revolutionary War-era statesman, and the two were mutually impressed. 
Gallegina took on the elder Boudinot as benefactor and thenceforth adopted his name. 
Educational opportunities besides those offered by missionaries were few and far 
between, and to be sure, many Cherokees like Ross abided their proselytizing for the 
educational benefits. Boudinot, on the other hand, was a devout Christian wholly 
                                                 
40 Thurman Wilkin’s history has the brothers Major Ridge and David Watie’s mother as one-half 
Cherokee, but Starr claims both men were fullbloods. Such ambiguity proliferates, indicating a much 
more relaxed attitude toward blood quantum in early years. See Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy: The Story 
of the Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People (New York: Macmillan, 1970) 4; and Emmet Starr, 
History of the Cherokee Indians and Their Legends and Folklore, Oklahoma City, 1921, reprint 
(Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing, 2003) 473.  
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dedicated to the cause of converting Cherokee people, having himself converted in 
1820.41  
 Also like Ross, Boudinot married a white woman, but with considerably 
greater opposition than Ross endured. It was at Cornwall that Boudinot met, fell in 
love with, and in 1826 ultimately married Harriet Ruggles Gold, the white daughter of 
a school official, replaying John Ridge’s controversial interracial marriage to Sarah 
Bird Northrup in 1824. The vitriolic reaction by the ostensibly progressive 
northeasterners—which brought Gold’s own brother to the town square to burn her 
and Boudinot’s pictures in effigy—revealed to Boudinot the sharply circumscribed 
degrees to which Indians would be welcome in white society. They could become 
Christians, educate themselves, attend the country’s finest institutions (Boudinot 
aspired to study at Andover, then Yale, but was prevented by illness)—in short, they 
could mimic anything whites did so long as they understood that their reproductions, 
borne in deficiency, retained an ineradicable and insurmountable imperfection. In 
Homi Bhabha’s terms, they needed to remain conscious of their difference to dissuade 
hubristic expectations of equality. Despite the death threats and public condemnation 
in all shapes of vehement disapproval, Boudinot and Gold were married, four years 
after Boudinot had left Cornwall. She joined him in Cherokee country where they 
worked closely with missionaries on their civilizing and educational endeavors. Still 
dedicated to the civilization and Christianization of the Cherokees, Boudinot appears 
to have been utterly persuaded, however, that Indians and whites would never be able 
                                                 
41 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 3-9; Ralph Gabriel, Elias Boudinot: Cherokee and His America (Norman: U 
of Oklahoma P, 1941) 22-34; Peyer 177-81. For Ross’s religious attitudes, see McLoughlin, Cherokees 
and Missionaries 349; Moulton 7. See McLoughlin, Cherokees and Missionaries 2-3, 35-81 and in 
general for the linkage between the educational programs of the federal civilization policy and 
missionary work. 
 173 
to live equally together in United States society, and he thus turned his efforts to the 
development of the Cherokee Nation.42 
 In its attempts to strengthen national solidarity and to resist US demands for 
land cessions, the Cherokee Nation looked for public venues to communicate with its 
citizens and to make its case to foreign allies. Recognizing Boudinot’s literary and 
rhetorical talents, in 1826 the government set him to work on a speaking tour across 
the northeast to raise money for the establishment of a national academy and a 
newspaper. The government with uncommon acumen foresaw not only the cohesive, 
nationalistic force a paper would propagate, compensating for the proliferating 
fragmentation of other social and religious structures, but also its persuasive potential 
in offering sympathetic audiences alternative accounts of the unconscionable 
depredations they faced in resisting the expansion of American empire. The hoped-for 
school would have to wait, but the speech Boudinot delivered, “An Address to the 
Whites,” reprinted as a pamphlet, earned enough to buy a printing press, and a paper 
was established with the National Council’s authorization. Beginning with its first 
issue in 1828, the Cherokee Phoenix printed news, editorials, laws, and some cultural 
and religious material in both Cherokee and English, taking advantage of Sequoyah’s 
prodigious invention in 1821 of a syllabary for the Cherokee language. With the 
assistance of missionary Samuel Worcester, Boudinot drafted numerous editorials, 
selected traded content from other newspapers; corrected proofs; managed the 
business end; and translated material like the Bible, newly passed and pre-existing 
laws, and religious tracts into Cherokee, to be published in the Phoenix and separately. 
For a salary of $300 per year, he served as editor of the Phoenix from its founding 
                                                 
42 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 8-11; Gabriel 57-92; Theresa Strouth Gaul, To Marry an Indian: The 
Marriage of Harriet Gold and Elias Boudinot in Letters, 1823-1839 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina 
P, 2005) 1-52. 
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until 1832, when he found himself at odds with John Ross over the question of the 
editor’s liberty in discussing the Removal question in the nationally-owned forum.43  
 Demand for Indian land was hardly new in the early nineteenth century, but 
Jeffersonian civilization programs had checked the militancy of early years. Many 
Cherokees cooperated with the government agents and missionaries who urged 
adoption and development of white models of religion, agriculture, education, 
economy, political structure, codified governance, and more. Later, in the pages of the 
Phoenix, in speeches, anywhere it might be persuasive, Cherokees pointed to their 
advancement in civilization according to the measures set before them as a means not 
just of countering false descriptions of their continued savagery—a tactic frequently 
trotted out to demonstrate Indians’ inability to understand the principles of cultivation 
and property and to establish their consequently inferior claims to land44—but also to 
demand consistency and follow-through in federal policy. Andrew Jackson, elected to 
the presidency in 1828, promoted acquiring Indians’ remaining eastern lands through 
their removal well beyond the Mississippi. His removal policy aggressively pursued 
land cessions through means both above- and below-board, couched in the benevolent 
language of facilitating Indian civilization away from the pernicious influences of 
unscrupulous whites who could not be controlled by the federal government. Georgia 
eagerly assented to his plans, emboldened to pursue the acquisition of Cherokee lands 
under the terms of an 1802 compact in which the state relinquished its claim to 
western lands in return for the federal government’s promise to extinguish Indian 
                                                 
43 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 15-25, 87-89; Bethany Schneider, “Boudinot’s Change: Boudinot, Emerson, 
and Ross on Cherokee Removal,” English Literary History 75.1 (2008): 151-77; Robert Martin, “The 
Cherokee Phoenix: Pioneer of Indian Journalism,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 25.2 (1947): 102-18; Peyer 
182-89; Gabriel 106-27. 
44 On this period in particular, see Roy Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian 
and the American Mind, rev. ed., originally published as The Savages of America, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1953 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 1988) 53-75. 
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claims within its borders. The discovery of gold in Cherokee country only provided 
added incentive for the state to develop some means of driving out the Cherokees.45  
 The means it found maintained at least the appearance of legitimacy under the 
rule of law, a guise important to the US’s imagination of itself as a nation of justice 
and order. Heedless of Cherokee protests, Jackson’s administration exacerbated their 
troubles in pushing for the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, which 
authorized the federal government to negotiate treaties providing for final land 
cessions and removal. Jackson also withheld the annuity payments from previous land 
cessions that constituted the Cherokees’ major operational funding and withdrew the 
federal troops charged with maintaining order and protecting Cherokee boundaries 
against intrusion. Attempting effectively to abolish the Cherokee government, in 1829 
Georgia proclaimed the annexation of Cherokee country and extension of its laws 
throughout the Cherokee nation, disallowing, for instance, Cherokees mining their 
gold, contracts between Indians and whites not witnessed by two whites, any action 
that might dissuade others from removing, the assembly of Cherokee councils or 
courts, and the testimony of Indians against whites in Georgia’s courts. This last 
especially pernicious disenfranchisement essentially encouraged Georgians to robbery 
and intimidation with impunity; historians record instances of attempted rape and even 
murder that went unpunished by the state judiciary branch in its collusion with the 
Georgia governor. The Georgia Guard militia, ostensibly replacing federal troops to 
protect Cherokee and their interests, more often aided and abetted their harassment, 
such as when it twice arrested Boudinot on charges of libel.46  
                                                 
45 Grant Foreman, Indian Removal, 1989 ed. (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1932) 229-30; Kenneth Penn 
Davis, “Chaos in the Indian Country: The Cherokee Nation, 1828-35,” The Cherokee Indian Nation: A 
Troubled History 129-47. 
 
46 McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence 428-38; Wilkins 202-07, Penn Davis 142, 144; Foreman 236. 
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 Despite their difficulties, the Cherokees through advocacy in the Phoenix and 
elsewhere found allies, many of them federalists opposed to Jacksonian politics and 
sometimes also to his removal policy. Some like prominent missionary and editorialist 
Jeremiah Evarts advised the Cherokee Nation—acting as a foreign nation—to bring a 
test case contesting Georgia’s presumption of jurisdiction over Indian lands to the US 
Supreme Court. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), which challenged Georgia’s 
jurisdiction in the case of George Tassel, accused of murder, the federalist Chief 
Justice John Marshall ruled that Indian nations are not foreign in the constitutional 
sense but rather “domestic dependent nations” in a state of pupilage or wardship to the 
US government. His ambiguity then as now left some room for the exercise and 
recognition of Indian sovereignty, and Marshall himself suggested the court would 
revisit the question if the matter of jurisdiction were more firmly established. The 
opportunity arose when the missionary Samuel Worcester and others were arrested for 
refusing to take an oath of allegiance to Georgia and its laws. In Worcester v. Georgia 
(1832) the Marshall court ruled that Georgia had indeed overstepped its bounds and 
that its extension of state law over Indian land was unconstitutional and illegal in its 
encroachment on federal jurisdiction. In ordering the release of Worcester it was 
effectually ordering Georgia to desist its usurpation, but as the case made evident, the 
judicial branch had no means of effecting compliance with its rulings if faced with a 
recalcitrant executive or legislative branch. Untroubled by the revelation that the 
system of checks and balances rested upon a sandy foundation of good faith 
compliance, recognizing the judiciary’s powerlessness, and unphased by any 
compunction to execute a directive contrary to his policies, Jackson apocryphally 
remarked, “John Marshall has rendered his decision; now let him enforce it.”47  
                                                 
47 Foreman 233-35; Wilkins 207-29; McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence 438-47. 
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Elias Boudinot, John Ridge, Major Ridge and others had long been at the 
forefront of the struggle against removal, but after it became clear that the US had no 
intention of testing Georgia’s resolve for the sake of protecting the Cherokees, they 
settled on a new course.48 They began to contemplate the merits of taking the nation 
away from the Georgia Guard, away from the thieves of their property, their dignity, 
their lives—but also away from the ancestral homes of their families, away from the 
mutually constitutive land where they had been since time immemorial. Once 
Boudinot began to question the tenability of resistance to removal in the pages of the 
Phoenix, he found himself at odds with John Ross, and he resigned his editorship in 
mid-1832—more on this in the next chapter. Three years after leaving the Phoenix, as 
conditions degenerated and Ross met with increasing stubbornness in Washington 
against any accommodation for continued Cherokee presence in the east, Boudinot 
became convinced that removal was the only course that offered any chance of 
Cherokee survival, in an all too literal sense. He joined the Ridges and some twenty 
others in signing the New Echota treaty against the manifest wishes of the 
overwhelming majority of the people, ceding all remaining claims in exchange for five 
million dollars and land in what would become Oklahoma. All signed in full 
awareness that in so doing without approval of the National Council they were more 
or less subject to lawful, summary execution at the hands of any Cherokee citizen who 
found it expedient. Major Ridge himself had not only helped pass the law forbidding 
unauthorized land cessions, but he had also served as co-executioner in the killing of 
Doublehead, a chief who ceded land without approval in 1807.49  
                                                 
48 Wilkins 229-78 has a thorough account of the events leading up to the treaty signing; also see Penn 
Davis 139-44; Foreman 244-50, 264-69; Moulton 50-86; Grace Steele Woodward, The Cherokees 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1963) 171-90. 
49 Wilkins 36-38; R. Strickland 77-78. 
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Although Ross mounted a persuasive campaign to discredit the fraudulent 
treaty—publishing pamphlets detailing its spurious origin, marshalling support from 
the likes of Ralph Waldo Emerson and John Quincy Adams, and gathering some 
fifteen thousand signers of a petition protesting its ratification—the Senate did ratify it 
and then-president Martin Van Buren signed it into law in 1835. Ross kept up the 
campaign for the next three years, but in 1838 federal troops began moving Cherokees 
at bayonet-point into stockades.50 Some four thousand, about a quarter of the tribe, 
died on the Trail. Boudinot and the Ridges died not there but shortly after their arrival 
in Indian Territory, all killed the same day in 1839.51 Major Ridge was shot while 
riding along a trail; John Ridge was dragged from his bed and multiply stabbed in 
front of his wife and son. While constructing his new home, some men approached 
Boudinot saying a friend needed medicine, and as he went to get it, they attacked him 
with knives and hatchets and crushed his skull.  
These were the circumstances, these the stakes, these the lives—of my own 
farming people, leaving their twenty-five acres in corn in the old Hickory Log district 
for Goingsnake District, a thousand miles away—that mattered in the rhetoric of 
removal. As I turn now to the literature to unpack the metaphors, frame the historical 
context, tease out the connotations, and survey the research, I bear them in mind. 
                                                 
50 In his consenting opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justice William Johnson opposed 
designating Indian tribes “nations” as a matter of principle, writing, “Where is the rule to stop? Must 
every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of 
land to hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state? We should indeed force into the family of nations, 
a very numerous and very heterogeneous progeny” (The Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia, 30 
US 1, Supreme Ct., 1831, 25). As Priscilla Wald keenly observes, “His use of the word ‘kraal,’ an 
Afrikaner term for an enclosed village or the animal pen within the village (like the English term 
‘corral’), shows just how loathe Johnson was to claim human kinship with indigenes.” Perhaps these 
stockades, terribly reified, were the “petty kraals” he had in mind. See Wald, Constituting Americans: 
Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form (Durham: Duke UP, 1995) 25. 
 
51 For closer treatment of events following the signing through the trail and the assassinations in Indian 




“No Weapon to Use but Argument”:  
The Removal Rhetoric of Elias Boudinot and John Ross 
 
 
In language commonly thought “assimilationist,” both John Ross and Elias 
Boudinot championed the civilization programs the US proffered as a means of 
resolving its Indian troubles, but far from evidencing their unconditional acceptance of 
whites’ exterior representations of Indianism, to modify Said’s phrase, it is telling that 
they advocated civilization programs not just to Cherokees but also to the US itself. As 
they questioned the consistency of the US’s policies of civilization and Removal, they 
insisted that the civilizers follow through on their promises to provide the educational 
opportunities and protection guaranteed by treaties as a matter of general humanitarian 
concern. When they advocated civilization to Cherokee audiences, however, it was not 
as an end in itself nor with approbation of the full demise of Cherokee culture, but 
rather as a means of strengthening internal resources and ensuring the survival of the 
Cherokee nation as a distinct cultural-political entity. Even when Boudinot concluded 
that those goals could not be accomplished in the east and began to consider Removal, 
it was only as a means towards this larger goal, contrary to Ross’s insistence that 
national and cultural distinctness depended upon unanimity. I do not choose up sides 
in this chapter or attempt to prove that the treaty party members were traitors or 
patriots, or that Ross was a tyrant or savior. Instead, I look behind the opposition to the 
alterations to the habitus that exacerbated the factionalism and violence that plagued 
the nation for decades afterwards. While I understand US colonialism as the primary 
culprit, I am interested here in the Cherokees’ own actions and reactions, their exercise 
of control over their world. This alternative reorientation to the context of epistemic 
continuity and rupture, with the understanding that not every volitional act is de facto 
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justified, condemnable, or even simply effective, suggests that although political 
centralization admirably aspired to defend the nation’s physical and cultural 
boundaries, its attendant hegemonic strategies and homogeneous postures ran counter 
to deliberation and dissent as irrepressible dispositions of the Cherokee habitus. 
Much of Boudinot’s writing and rhetoric prior to his pro-Removal shift 
proclaimed the progress the Cherokees had made toward civilization, against 
competing and pervasive arguments that alleged the savagery or at least the savage 
state of Indians in general and/or Cherokees in particular. In his fundraising speech 
“An Address to the Whites,” he states, “it cannot be doubted that the nation is 
improving, rapidly improving in all those particulars which must finally constitute the 
inhabitants an industrious and intelligent people. It is a matter of surprise to me…that 
the Cherokees have advanced so far and so rapidly in civilization. But there are 
powerful obstacles…The prejudices in regard to them in the general community are 
strong and lasting.”1 Such prejudices were manifested in debates over whether Indians 
could progress into civilization at all, an argument Boudinot counters with concrete 
evidence, statistics, and specific examples. He turns the indictment into an 
incumbency: “The time has arrived when speculations and conjectures as to the 
practicability of civilizing the Indians must forever cease…It needs only that the world 
should know what we have done in the few last years, to foresee what yet we may do 
with the assistance of our white brethren…”2 The discourse of savagery, like that of 
Orientalism, was accruing institutional authority, emanating from religious, scientific, 
political, and other sectors, and its representations from privileged positions of 
                                                 
1 Elias Boudinot, “An Address to the Whites Delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, on the 26th of 
May, 1826, by Elias Boudinott, a Cherokee Indian,” Philadelphia: William Geddes, 1826, reprinted in 
Cherokee Editor: The Writings of Elias Boudinot, ed. Theda Perdue, originally published Knoxville: U 
of Tennessee P, 1983 (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1996) 72. 
2 Boudinot, “Address” 69-70. 
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exteriority were marshaled as proof that removal was in the best interests of both the 
savage and civilized.3 Boudinot’s denial of the hegemonic belief that Indians were 
incapable of civilization or progress, despite his qualified acceptance of the general 
developmental paradigm, is no small thing, nor is his turning of the tables on his white 
audience, alleging that prejudice on its part, not incapacity on the Indians’, most stood 
in the way of progress for both. Realizing that progress would require effort on both 
sides. 
He returns over and over to themes of progress and civilization, often in 
contradistinction to Cherokee traditions, expressing hopes that superstition and savage 
institutions might soon be eradicated, using language we now find shockingly 
saddening, but perhaps then calculated to curry favor and excite white audiences to 
sympathetic activism. For instance, having recorded a description of clan structure and 
its administration of the blood law of homicide revenge, he writes, “Our readers will 
say, ‘those were savage laws indeed.’ They were, and the Cherokees were then to be 
pitied…But we can now say with pleasure, that they are all repealed, and are 
remembered only as vestiges of ignorance and barbarism.”4 Ignorance and barbarism 
are opposed by Christianization and civilization, whose implements—but not whose 
administration—Boudinot solicits from white benefactors. His striking anti-
traditionalist sentiments seemingly leave little room for doubt about Boudinot’s 
attitudes, but they are called into question by a closer examination of what progress in 
civilization, apparently the converse of traditionalism, consists in his rhetoric. He calls 
                                                 
3 Theda Perdue, Cherokee Editor 13; Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978) 21; also see 
Roy Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind, rev. ed., 
originally published as The Savages of America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1953 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: U of California P, 1988) 56-58, 63-75. 
4 Elias Boudinot, “Indian Clans,” Cherokee Phoenix 18 Feb. 1829: 2, col.5, reprinted in Cherokee 
Editor 108. 
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for development and retention of already existing institutions, such as the rule of law 
(under which the blood law was a particular instance he disapproved of), not the 
wholesale eradication and substitution of all such superstructures in, for instance, 
governance, worship, industry, or culture.  
Failing to understand in Boudinot’s rhetoric the narrow construction of 
“civilization” and the breadth of traditional practices and beliefs additionally set aside 
from the civilizing enterprise, many of his critics have understood such passages and 
his advocacy of progress as a personal cultural inadequacy manifested in a rejection 
and repudiation of all facets of distinctly Cherokee culture, further hypothesizing a 
reciprocal rejection on the part of Cherokee communities—a conjectural negation of 
Cherokee identity in the past that is therefore authorized in the present. Theda Perdue, 
for instance, writes:  
 
The Cherokee Nation was composed primarily of traditionalists who 
clung to the culture Boudinot dedicated his life to eradicating… 
Boudinot, in seeking to create a homogeneous “civilized” nation, was 
going against the widespread tendency among Cherokees to accept 
divergent lifestyles and customs as long as they did not jeopardize the 
community. And because he was part of a very small minority which 
tried almost to compel people to undergo a cultural transformation, 
other Cherokees probably viewed him with some suspicion…Elias 
Boudinot was a tragic figure not just because he made a serious error in 
judgment or because he paid the ultimate price but because he could 
not accept his people, his heritage, or himself. He was the product of 
colonization, and his thoughts and deeds may well tell us as much 
about our own culture as about nineteenth-century Cherokees.5 
Structuring Cherokee history and agency in Manichean opposition, Perdue turns the 
limitations of binarism to her advantage, on one hand tidily clearing away the 
exceptions and ambiguities Boudinot presents to these generalizations of 
progressivism as internalized colonialism (which are only too-representative of critical 
                                                 
5 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 33. 
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material on Boudinot), and on the other suspending traditionalism in time, withholding 
from it the means or interest to effect alteration to the habitus, however dire or 
promising the circumstances. Traditionalists may only “cling”—in doomed 
desperation, I suppose—to a disappearing past, hoping against hope to save the 
“thing” of traditional culture from the forces opposing it. Whatever its purpose,6 this 
ossification of tradition and the associated aspersions cast on those who might seek to 
make any change—that they are inescapably corrupted by colonial contact, prohibiting 
them from accepting their people, heritage, or selves—may indeed “tell us more about 
our own culture” than we might wish to know: that Indians, “their” history and “their” 
agency are for “us” to tell and for “us” to read. “Their” purposes are not their own, but 
may serve to elucidate “our” interests. This—not Boudinot’s work to strengthen and 
preserve his people—is the “product of colonization”: to have our intellectuals, our 
histories, our capacity to shape our own lives, stripped away and defined by their 
connections to the original, the only real, “us.” 
Against Perdue’s claim that “Throughout his life, Boudinot maintained that the 
preservation of his people depended solely upon abandonment of their own traditions, 
culture, and history,”7 I argue that Cherokee traditions, culture, and history were 
conveyed in his ideas of civilization and progress, though they were by turns overt, 
tacit, defiant, untheorized, or unconscious. Further, they are enacted in the expression 
of the ideas. They are enunciatively performed forces themselves, not pieces of 
flotsam tragically clung to against their eventual, inevitable sinking. I am not claiming 
Boudinot was everywhere attempting calculated rhetorical subversion or that he was 
                                                 
6 I want to add, I don’t believe Perdue malicious, not in the least. I believe her to be an ally of Cherokee 
people and a scholar whose work has championed Cherokee agency and excited others to do the same. I 
do, however strenuously disagree with her methodology and her conclusions in this instance. 
7 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 3. 
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not influenced by or even essentially “on board” with mainstream ideas of civilization 
and progress. But insofar as his speeches and Phoenix editorials were largely directed 
to white audiences, that he would use terms calculated to find favor with those 
audiences is not surprising. I also find occasion to wonder how his and many other 
Cherokees’ understandings of progress and civilization depart from those of his critics, 
historical and contemporary, and how their conceptions—developed by Cherokees for 
Cherokee purposes during an early point in white relations, and thus at not-too-distant 
remove from the traditional habitus—might reflect that cultural mediation, might 
retain some vestige of that communal agency.  
Most criticism conveniently opposes Ross to Boudinot on the matter of 
tradition. Maureen Konkle, for instance, points to Ross’s cooperation with John 
Howard Payne on his early ethnography and concludes, “It appears that Ross 
understood traditional knowledge as history and, unlike Ridge and Boudinot, believed 
that it should not be rejected but rather written down and accounted for, and 
celebrated.”8 Such sympathies notwithstanding, Ross too found occasion to invoke the 
language of civilization together with a repudiation of tradition, writing to President 
James Monroe, 
 
Father. The ignorant and wretched condition of your red children 
makes them in some degree inferior to their white brethren…Your 
magnanimous and benevolent exertions have not been in vain, as 
respects the Cherokees, education, agriculture, manufacture, and the 
mechanic arts have been introduced among them, and are now 
progressing…The liberal encouragement given by the nation for 
general improvement, cannot fail to accomplish their complete 
civilization. True, there are many who have been raised under the 
native habits of their ancestors…but under the present aspect of 
improvement, they will not fail to encourage their children to adopt the 
                                                 
8 Maureen Konkle, Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and the Politics of Historiography, 
1827-1863 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2004) 48. 
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prevailing habits of industry and civilization; therefore as the old 
stubbles disappear, the new sprouts will flourish under cultivation.9 
A year later he would write to President John Quincy Adams in a yet more strident 
tone: “for the sake of civilization and preservation of existence, we would willingly 
see the habits and customs of the aboriginal man extinguished, the sooner this takes 
place, the great stumbling block, prejudice, will be removed.”10 Like Boudinot, Ross 
ricochets the rhetoric of moral inferiority back at those first firing the accusations, 
indicting whites’ uncivilized bias as the primary impediment to Cherokee progress, 
not any deficiency of theirs in ability or effort. Contrasting the two, Perdue claims, 
“John Ross was personally as highly acculturated as Boudinot, but Ross represented 
traditionalists and did so without exerting any pressure on them to change their beliefs 
or way of life,”11 yet what besides “pressure” for change did Ross, as president of the 
National Council then Principal Chief, exert in the passage of laws altering 
inheritance, political centralization, and encouragement of civilization? The 
“extinguishing” of tradition through civilization for which Ross seems to be calling, 
like Boudinot’s relegation of it to mere “vestiges” is not, however, unequivocal, for it 
is subordinated to the “preservation of existence.” Though Ross and Boudinot do not 
say as much, I argue that the eradication of tradition that they seem to advocate ought 
not be understood as the desirable erasure of all traditions, but as the alteration or 
perhaps abandonment of certain untenable or sacrificial practices or principles—or 
just the appearance of such “progress”—in order that the greater number of other 
practices enacting and comprising the habitus might be preserved. That those practices 
                                                 
9 John Ross, “To James Monroe,” 19 Jan. 1824, The Papers of Chief John Ross, ed. Gary Moulton, vol. 
1 (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1985) 59. Ross’s name appears at the head of others’ signed to the letter. 
Subsequent references to Ross’s writings refer to this volume. 
10 John Ross, “To John Q. Adams,” 12 Mar. 1825, 105. Ross’s signature appears above those of 
G[eorge] Lowrey and Elijah Hicks. 
11 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 33. 
 186 
are not theorized or enumerated in no way makes them less part of Cherokee 
traditions. The missing element that brings the total to more than the sum of the parts 
may even reside in the principles and practices yet undeclared. 
Boudinot like Ross adopted the rhetoric and programs of civilization and 
progress precisely to further this culturally and politically preservative goal, using the 
most effective defense available to them. As Ross put it, “The Cherokees, under any 
circumstances, have no weapon to use but argument.”12 Ostensibly borrowing from 
what Perdue calls the “basic European creed,” Boudinot emphasized several 
component features Cherokees should adopt to become like “‘civilized’ peoples [who] 
had farms, republican governments, Christian churches, and systems of writings,” as 
opposed to “‘Savages’ [who] hunted for a living, relied on frequently brutal customs 
for their law, worshiped nature or idols, and lacked a written language.”13 In “Address 
to the Whites” he details “those particulars which must finally constitute the 
inhabitants an industrious and intelligent people,” in which the Cherokees are 
progressing and best “act as a powerful argument in favor of Indian improvement: 
First. The invention of letters. Second. The translation of the New Testament into 
Cherokee. And third. The organization of a Government,” also adding success in 
education and industry.14 He would brandish evidence of that progress in his editorials 
up to 1832, representatively proclaiming, “the common Indian among the Cherokees is 
not declining, but rising.”15 Boudinot’s writings were practical, not philosophical, and 
                                                 
12 John Ross, Letter from John Ross…in Answer to Inquiries from a Friend Regarding the Cherokee 
Affairs with the United States (Washington, D.C. [?]: n.p., July 1836) 455. 
13 Perdue, Cherokee Editor 13. 
14 Boudinot, “Address” 72-74. 
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he offers few definitive theorizations of “improvement,” “civilization,” and the like, 
but statements such as these—particularly in their affiliations, in the practices 
informing and informed by the principles—afford some opportunity to explicate his 
brand of progress. 
The first evidentiary feature of Cherokees’ capacity for becoming civilized, 
“the invention of letters,” is fundamentally about their educability and desire for 
education, the point of which is the preservation of the Cherokee as a distinct cultural 
and political body. As for much of the US, religious institutions offered the Cherokee 
the only practically available vehicle for education, and in Boudinot’s speech both 
religion and education are linked to writing—distinctively Cherokee writing. After 
lauding Sequoyah’s achievement, Boudinot makes the three-way connection explicit: 
“The translation of the New Testament, together with Guest’s mode of writing, has 
swept away that barrier which has long existed, and opened a spacious channel for the 
instruction of adult Cherokees.”16 The barrier of illiteracy primarily stands in the way 
of evangelism for Boudinot, but the passage’s ambiguity also suggests the attenuated 
opportunities for discourse, which are broadened by writing as a conduit for national 
communication. This interpretation is strengthened when we recall the purpose of his 
talk was to raise money for a national paper. When Ross wrote to Sequoyah, then 
living with western emigrants, presenting him with a congratulatory medal for his 
invention of the syllabary, he too identifies the similar “untraditional” connections 
among the Cherokee language and white religion and education: 
 
The present generation have already experienced the great benefits of 
your incomparable system. The old & the youth find no difficulty in 
learning to read & write in their native language and to correspond with 
their distant friends with the same facility as the whites do. Types have 
                                                 
16 Boudinot, “Address” 74. Boudinot refers to Sequoyah’s English name, which has also been spelled 
(George) Guess and Gist. 
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been made and a printing press established in this nation. The scriptures 
have been translated & printed in Cherokee; and whilst posterity 
continues to be benefited by the discovery, your name will exist in 
grateful remembrance. It will also serve as an index for the aboriginal 
tribes, or nations, similarly to advance in science and respectability…17  
Ross demonstrates the value writing has in Christian evangelism and in learning, but 
in also pointing to its cohesive force—its capacity to bring together in words those 
separated by geography, age, or religion—he puts writing, “advance” in education, 
and religion in the service of “nationing,” the political movement that makes nations 
of tribes. Though cognizant of internal differences and subsidiary affiliations, Ross 
understands them as ancillary to a unified national consciousness, and he particularly 
values the roles of education and writing in its service. 
Encouraging education as a means of developing a specifically Cherokee 
civilization appears throughout the rhetoric of this period. In a May 1828 editorial 
tallying the projected high costs of removal, Boudinot suggests the funds might be 
better spent on schooling and hopes that Cherokee learning will continue in the native 
tongue: “With this money let their [sic] be a college founded, where every advantage 
of instruction may be enjoyed. Let books, tracts, &c. be published in Cherokee and 
English, and distributed throughout the Nation and every possible effort be made to 
civilize us, let us at the same time be protected in our rights.”18 Two important 
dispositions are revealed here: first, as languages in no small part structure and 
generate the knowledge that inheres in cultures, with marked differences among them, 
the propagation of the Cherokee language as a component in formal education and in 
connecting communities in national discourse via the newspaper and other printed 
material marks a material commitment to upholding a profound cultural 
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distinctiveness along the road to civilization. Boudinot’s work translating religious 
texts with their abstractions, the poetry of hymns with their rhythms and aesthetics, or 
simply Cherokee’s basic classificatory verbs that conjugate for texture, shape, 
flexibility, etc., or the ten pronominal prefixes, would have no doubt made him keenly 
aware that some things can only be said—can only be thought—in Cherokee, with its 
singular denotations, associated connotations, and sets of deferred meanings. Such 
complexity would surely have inspired in the man made of words a desire that that 
knowledge and way of knowing be retained. Though he urges Cherokees to learn 
English, I have nowhere found that advocacy tied to an attack on Cherokee. At 
Brainerd and at Cornwall, the missionaries’ interest in learning native languages as a 
means of aiding their evangelism no doubt helped Boudinot see the advantages of 
bilingualism. To be sure, not all missionaries were so (counter-) progressive, and some 
marked native languages for eradication, cognizant of their cohesive and “atavistic” 
influence, an influence Boudinot turned to preservative advantage.19  
Second, the closing conjunctive phrase of this excerpt, “let…every effort be 
made to civilize us, let us at the same time be protected in our rights” reminds his 
readers of their freely-accepted responsibilities both to offer access to civilization and 
education (and, as it turns out, cultural nationalism) and to protect the Cherokees’ 
rights to their land and sovereignty. The government had pledged itself to do both in 
Jefferson’s civilization programs and since its first treaties with the oft-repeated 
promise that by allying with and placing themselves under the US’s “protection,” the 
Cherokees would be guaranteed in their security. But what precisely were the rights 
Boudinot wanted preserved? Like the terms progress and civilization, he frequently 
leaves them undefined, perhaps because he imagines them self-evident, or perhaps 
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because he prefers to maintain in his readers their unproblematic understandings and 
to allow the cultural resistance in his to go unspoken. He does offer some clues in a 
January 1829 editorial: 
 
The causes which have operated to exterminate the Indian tribes that 
are produced as instances of the certain doom of the whole Aboriginal 
family appear plain to us…they were precisely such causes as are now 
attempted by the state of Georgia—by infringing on their rights—by 
disorganizing them, and circumscribing their limits. While he possesses 
a national character, there is hope for the Indian. But take his rights 
away, divest him of the last spark of national pride, and introduce him 
to a new order of things, invest him with oppressive laws, grievous to 
be borne, he droops like the fading flower before noon day sun…There 
is hope for the Cherokee as long as they continue in their present 
situation, but disorganize them, either by removing them beyond the 
Mississippi, or by imposing on them “heavy burdens,” you cut a vital 
string in their national existence.20 
Rights, then, are political and national in character as the legitimating principles of 
self-government—of sovereignty, as we now call it. In his language of organization, 
he stakes for the Cherokee Nation an equal claim to those rights America asserted in 
the Declaration of Independence to form a government, “organizing its powers in such 
form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,” and to 
protect itself from foreign infringement and oppressions like those perpetrated by 
Georgia. (He again recalls Jefferson’s objections: “In every stage of these oppressions 
we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms: our repeated petitions have 
been answered only by repeated injury…We have warned [“our British brethren”] 
from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable 
jurisdiction over us”). Asserting the Cherokees’ right to a “national existence,” to 
maintain their own geographic and conceptual limits, he declares independence for the 
Nation wherein its people may deliberate and determine their own course.  
                                                 
20 Elias Boudinot, editorial, Cherokee Phoenix 28 Jan. 1829: 2, col. 5, reprinted in Cherokee Editor 105.  
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Traditionalists had done so in the past, not just in times preceding European 
contact, but in their insistence on the very civilization programs that later critics have 
used as evidence of acquiescence to colonial imposition. Several instances testify to 
the Cherokees’ volitional control over education in the nation, from their near-
expulsion of missionaries who had failed in their promises to provide instruction, to 
the community-built schools at Creek Path, to historian William McLoughlin’s general 
sense that “Missionary schools tended to be founded in response to local requests for 
them rather than according to any prearranged plan.”21 The National Council’s 
advocacy of the introduction and maintenance of schools brought it at one point in 
1819 to delegate John Ross and others to look into plans “to establish an endowment 
to support schools by selling a tract of its [the nation’s] land that would fetch a good 
price.”22 They were successful in having the project included in the treaty they signed 
in February of 1819, allowing for the sale of twelve square miles to establish a school 
fund.23 As late as 1833, Ross pressured Lewis Cass, Jackson’s Secretary of War, to 
learn “what disposition has been made of the lands reserved under the treaty of 1819 
for the purpose of raising a school fund for our nation, and if sold, to state the amount 
of the proceeds and also the application made of the same.”24 Such a transaction points 
up the deficiency of the monist characterization of traditionalism as uniformly 
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opposed to or incapable of understanding Christianity, education, or the principles of 
fungible property. The integrity of the nation depended not solely on past principled 
practices of worship, industry, place, etc., but also on its people and their capacity to 
exercise agency in a dramatically changed and changing world, one that demanded the 
benefits of education and adaptability.  
The nation’s leaders directed Boudinot to work for the same ends. One object 
of his 1826 fundraising tour was the establishment of a national secondary academy, 
the benefits of which he thought so evident that he saw no need to “spend one moment 
in arguments, in favour of such an institution; need I speak one word of the utility, of 
the necessity, of an institution of learning.”25 He would, though, write of the project 
and its proposed funding via real estate profits in a later editorial, arguing, “The 
Cherokees as a nation have had sufficient time to learn and appreciate the advantages 
of knowledge: for what else distinguishes them from their brethren?...It becomes every 
citizen then, particularly every ruler, as a guardian of the nation’s welfare, to do his 
utmost endeavor to forward education…It is this which will preserve us from the 
common burial place of Indians—oblivion in which many tribes are forgotten, & to 
which many would suppose us to be hastening.”26 Here, as in Ross’s letter to 
Sequoyah quoted above celebrating the syllabary as “an index for the aboriginal 
tribes,” Boudinot’s language suggests an exceptionalist attitude, and while both were 
Cherokee chauvinists, they situate their progress in education as a matter of context 
rather than of essential predilection. More important than education itself, though, are 
“the advantages of knowledge,” principle among them that the “nation’s welfare” may 
be better guarded and “preserve[d],” and if somewhat haughtily, they held up their 
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efforts as a method other tribes might emulate to similarly protect their cultures. 
According to Boudinot’s reasoning, education is not a means by which civilization 
supplants traditionalist culture but one of defending it and physically preserving Indian 
lives; it emerges as the primary strategy by which politicians can uphold their primary 
protective duties to the people. For him and other Cherokees, securing access to 
education was early on a paramount responsibility of the political arm. 
The commitment to education was so much the product of collective political 
agency that it was written into the sixth article of the Constitution of 1827, which was 
ratified by the conservative National Council: “Religion, morality and knowledge 
being necessary to good government, the preservation of liberty and the happiness of 
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged in this 
Nation.”27 Absent from the US Constitution but present in that of Massachusetts, this 
article establishes with remarkable clarity the benefits the Cherokee Nation identified 
in education’s interrelationship not just with religion but also with the polity, in its 
cultivation of an informed, critically thinking population that through the aid of 
educational institutions established by the government would ultimately improve 
government itself, “knowledge being necessary to good governemnt.” An educated 
people further works toward “the happiness of mankind” and “the preservation of 
liberty”: goals carefully constructed in parallel phrases that indicate their equal footing 
with and relevance to the practices of political sovereignty, through the people’s 
principled and informed governance of the government. McLoughlin argues that this 
clause was controversial among those opposed to change too drastic and swift, noting 
its careful wording that equivocates how positively the Nation saw the connection 
between religion and education. The wording, and, of course, the article’s very 
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inclusion nonetheless endorse education, undoubtedly anticipating the Cherokees’ own 
administration of their schools.28 
Although not citizens of the US, the Cherokee’s treaties bound the nations 
together and provided the foundation for their political relations, and appeals to the 
history and the structure of those negotiations between equals in sovereignty became 
staples of Cherokee anti-Removal rhetoric. Ross regularly invoked treaty history in his 
memorials to Congress, his speeches, and throughout his writing.29 Boudinot, too, 
criticized US failures in its Indian policies by frequent reference to treaties. In his anti-
removal editorials, he made the US’s upholding of its treaty obligations an express 
measure of the nation’s Constitutional legitimacy, its consistency in its Indian policy, 
and its own professed standards of civilized and Christian conduct. As historian 
Angela Pulley Hudson summarizes, “He accused the US government of supreme 
hypocrisy by illustrating the ways in which the measures taken by state and federal 
officials were wholly opposite to both the spirit and letter of the US Constitution.”30 In 
the same 1829 editorial in which he discusses the right of organizing sovereign 
government over and against Georgia’s attempt to impose its Othering laws, he writes, 
“the United States must either defend us in our rights, or leave us to our foe. In the 
former case, the General Government will redeem her pledge solemnly given in 
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treaties.—In the latter, she will violate her promise of protection, and we cannot, in 
future, depend consistently, upon any guarantee made by her to us, either here or 
beyond the Mississippi.”31 His call for the US to uphold its treaties by claiming the 
jurisdiction delineated in the Constitution intersected with the emergent conflict over 
the powers of the federal government and those of the states, effectively challenging 
the US to demonstrate its commitment to constitutional precepts not just for the 
Cherokees’ sake, but in order to prove that its national presence was not empty 
posture. 
In an 1831 editorial, he observes the challenge to federal power posed by 
South Carolina’s threat to nullify protective tariffs: “The conduct of the Georgia 
Legislature is indeed surprising—one day they discountenance the proceedings of the 
nullifiers of South Carolina—at another, they even out-do the people of South 
Carolina, and authorize their Governor to hoist the flag of rebellion against the United 
States! If such proceedings are sanctioned by the majority of the people of the U. 
States, the Union is but a tottering fabric, which will soon fall and crumble into 
atoms.”32 His reference to the US as a “fabric,” a contrivance of human hands 
denaturalizes the nation as permanently given and reminds his readers of the need for 
maintenance against its degeneration, here requiring attendance to consistency in 
policy and philosophy. If the US were to prove unable to carry out the promises made 
in treaties as “the supreme law of the land,” 33 quoted from the Constitution’s sixth 
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article, then citizens, states, tribes, and foreign governments likewise could not 
“depend consistently” on its other guarantees, past, present, or future.  
His critique of consistency accrues meaning throughout his editorials. When 
some members of Congress opposed to the Indian Removal Act amended it with a 
declaration of the inviolability of preceding treaties, he bristles with irony at the empty 
display of sympathy: “We confess our ignorance, our utter ignorance, of the views of 
the majority of the members of Congress, so far as they have been developed, on the 
rights of the Indians, and the relation in which they stand to the United States, on the 
score of treaties; nor can we discern the consistency of contending for the 
unconstitutionality of these treaties, and yet at the same time, declaring that they shall 
not be violated.”34 He skewers the rational inconsistency of declaring that treaties must 
be upheld while in the very same act Congress authorizes their abrogation. His 
rhetoric simultaneously treats consistency as a foundational logical principle and as a 
definitional quality of substantiality, that is, an interrogation of what it is that things 
consist of, things like treaties and constitutionality. He asks that the US behave 
consistently in both substance and method: it should unambiguously declare what 
treaties are and how they will be treated. To help the US’s apparent confusion, he 
suggests that it simply look to its own definition of treaties as the “supreme law of the 
land,” and appends the Cherokee understanding that they are “solemn instruments,” 
imposing “sacred obligations,”35 entered into freely and supported by the rule of law, 
which ought to be theoretically consistent in its non-contradiction and its durability. 
Consistency thus also becomes a matter of temporality. Boudinot argues that if the US 
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fails to act with predictable regularity toward states’ challenges to federal power, as he 
claims it has not in its condemnation of South Carolina and its indulgence of Georgia, 
it will not long consist as a nation, but will “soon fall and crumble into atoms.” He 
prophecies that if the US will not uphold its treaties and bind states to comply with 
federal law, the failure to support and exercise the legitimating authority of the 
Constitution would undermine the US’s moral and structural integrity, and its 
abrogation of its promises to its peer nations and to itself will jeopardize its ability to 
long endure, certainly in its self-proclaimed guise as a moral, Christian nation.  
Boudinot regularly remonstrates with his audience to reverse the US’s 
oppressive, coercive, and disingenuous course on the basis of its incompatibility with 
the Christian precepts upon which the nation was ostensibly founded and operated, 
and by which it justified its right of expansion. In a particularly Jeremianic letter sent 
in to the Phoenix while he was on another fundraising tour, he writes, 
 
To take our lands by force is a serious matter—it is fraught with 
considerations full of interest to the people of Georgia themselves and 
to the whole Union…It would be robbery to all intents and purposes. 
And would the General Government look on with indifference and see 
its solemn pledges trampled in the dust? “There is a Lion in the way” 
whether the Government of the United States interferes or not—The 
integrity of the Union is at stake. As respects the Cherokees…They 
reside on the land which God gave them—they are surrounded with 
guarantees which this Republic has voluntarily made for their 
protection and which once formed a sufficient security against 
oppression. If those guarantees must now be violated with impunity for 
purposes altogether selfish, the sin will not be at our door, but at the 
door of our oppressor and our faithless Guardian.36 
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If his biblical metaphors and references are untraditional, the purposes to which he 
turns them—the protection of tribal lands, criticism of harmful policy, assertion of 
inherent sovereignty—are pointedly conservative. Boudinot here invokes Proverbs 
26:13 (“The slothful man saith, ‘There is a lion in the way, a lion is in the streets’”) in 
a dual critique that charges the US with a sluggard’s indolence for its failure to 
intervene in the criminal and sinful “robbery” of Cherokee land. In an addition to the 
verse’s customary reading as a commentary on spiritual laziness, he identifies Georgia 
with the lion, charging it with a predatory rapaciousness that violates not just 
Cherokee rights, but also the US’s volitional treaty agreements, and even the will of 
God inasmuch as it was He who established the Cherokee in their homelands.  
While Ross does not seem to have been as devout as Boudinot, his rhetoric 
calling the US to account on the basis of its own religious precepts is transposable 
with Boudinot’s. He closes an early letter to Congress, “whilst the Cherokees are 
peacefully endeavoring to enjoy the blessings of civilization and Christianity, on the 
soil of their rightful inheritance; and whilst the exertions and labors of various 
religious societies of these United States are successfully engaged in promulgating to 
them the w[o]rd of truth and life, from the sacred volume of holy writ, and under the 
patronage of the General Government—they are threatened with removal or 
extinction.”37 Ross’s rhythmic emphasis chiasmatically reveals the bitter irony of the 
US’s false patronage, which urged the Cherokees to accept treaties’ promises of 
civilization—the “truth” secreting “removal”—that they might come to greater 
security—the “life” bearing “extinction.” That ironic critique extends as well to the 
hypocrisy of promulgators of the faith who, like Boudinot’s slothful man/nation, 
ignore their own culpability in the nation’s duplicity. 
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Protesting the New Echota treaty late in the anti-Removal campaign, he would 
level the same comparative strategy in his pamphlet “Letter from John Ross…to a 
Gentleman of Philadelphia”:  
 
The first of your ancestors who visited as strangers the land of the 
Indian, professed to be apostles of Christ, and to be attracted by a desire 
to extend the blessings of his religion to the ignorant native. Thousands 
among you still proclaim the same noble and generous interest in our 
welfare; but will the untutored savage believe the white man’s 
professions, when he feels that by his practices he has become an 
outcast and an exile? Can he repose with confidence in the declarations 
of philanthropy and universal charity, when he sees the professors of 
the religion which he is invited to embrace, the foremost in acts of 
oppression and of outrage?38  
Chiasmus again characterizes Ross’s movement back and forth between appearance 
and reality: the acumen displayed by the savage, the native become alien, the 
benevolence unmasked as rapacity. This rhetorical structure syntactically replays his 
anxiety over the perfidy of the “civilizers,” religious or civic, demonstrating his full 
awareness that just because whites might have said something, it wasn’t necessarily 
so, no matter how sacrosanct the vocabularies in which surreptitious agendas were 
couched. Both he and Boudinot raise the Cherokees’ embrace of Christianity as a 
bulwark against US aggression by demonstrating the hypocrisy of one Christian 
people assaulting another, particularly after declaring that the Indians’ conversion 
would unite them as allies. Such careful use of irony should also alert us to the 
possibility that he and Boudinot, too, understand that motives may be prudently 
hidden in the invocation of particular discourses that lend rhetorical authority.  
Like their contemporary William Apess (Pequot), Boudinot and Ross accuse 
the US and Georgia of gross failure to meet their own standards, charging that “The 
intruders… have acted more like savages towards the Cherokees, than the Cherokees 
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towards them.”39 Though Boudinot here refers specifically to illegal settlers on 
Cherokee lands, it seems clear in another editorial that he finds the same savagery in 
the Georgia legislature’s “extension of tyrannical and unchristian laws, which 
threatens to blast all our rising hopes and expectations,” albeit clothed in frock coats 
instead of animal skins.40 A Methodist itinerant minister and author, Apess similarly 
offers white readers a literary mirror framed by the discourses of Christianity and 
civilization. Nationalist Jace Weaver celebrates Apess’s reflective analysis, 
subversion, and resistant stance in his writings, avowing “The rest of Apess’s work 
[besides his autobiography] must be viewed as resistance literature, affirming Indian 
cultural and political identity over against the dominant culture.”41 Though it seems to 
me (and to Weaver himself, confining his focus to Boudinot’s editorials) that the 
analysis could apply as well to Boudinot’s passionate entreaties and invectives against 
white depredation and his demands for justice and recognition of the Cherokee Nation 
in the east, Weaver is compelled to concur with Perdue in his final evaluation. He 
writes that “in his pursuit of ‘civilization’ for the Cherokee, it says much about his 
views of community that Elias Boudinot could not, over the course of his lifetime, 
ever envision any positive alternative other than assimilation or Removal,”42 a 
summary judgment I find untenable read against his editorials. Between 1826 and 
1832 Boudinot staunchly opposed Removal, and many “external” alternatives 
commonly understood as the imposition of unequivocal civilizing efforts often already 
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inhered in or were transformed by culturally distinct dispositions. Without considering 
the damage done by such limiting assumptions to our ability to theorize or even 
recognize Native agency, many critics have supposed principled practices enacting 
education, dissent, diplomacy, et al., outside Native cultural and historical experience. 
Boudinot and Ross intended that their questioning of the legal and moral 
consistency of US policy would make the Cherokees’ problem one of general 
relevance to “the whole Union,”43 not only as a matter entreating compassion and 
empathy for the Cherokee exclusively but as one that touched on the principles of 
Christianity, humanism, justice, and lawfulness for everyone. Boudinot’s 
recapitulations of the Union’s official and unofficial narratives of itself, together with 
his warnings that it would “soon fall and crumble” if it did not act in accordance with 
them, were meant to spur his readers into activism on the Cherokee’s behalf but may 
instead have occasioned a defensive reaction to what Priscilla Wald calls a recognition 
of the Cherokees’ uncanny and threatening reprise of the US’s own founding, 
revolutionary moment. Elaborating on the consonances between the US and the 
Cherokee constitutions, which also echo throughout Boudinot’s editorials, Wald 
argues that the very similarity between the Cherokees’ declaration of nationhood, 
principled on its claim to the rights of a civilized people, and that of the United States, 
as a nation borne of rhetorically articulated rebellion, was more alarming than 
ingratiating through its destabilization of the US’s nationalist and exceptionalist auto-
narrative, which legitimated its instantiation on the basis of natural rights endowed to 
some (those civilized, for which we may read “white”) and not others (savages or “not 
white”). She writes of the Cherokee’s ratification of their Constitution, “outrage 
stemmed from anxieties that were exacerbated by the profound threat of Cherokee 
separatism to the collective identity. The Cherokee Nation’s becoming like but not of 
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the United States political entity, mirroring without acceding to its conditions, seemed 
to jeopardize the terms of a United States identity.”44 The danger to the US arises from 
“those ways in which, as Homi Bhabha suggests, ‘mimicry is at once resemblance and 
menace,’” insofar as “Cherokee sovereignty would validate a permanent Cherokee 
presence on lands considered by Georgia to belong to the state. Such a presence would 
challenge the integrity of the state and of the Union,” most acutely in the power it 
imagined it had to declare its borders and police its interior.45 If the Cherokees did not 
come under Georgia’s jurisdiction yet fell within its boundaries, they would embody 
the revolutionary anxiety over an imperium in imperio, inhabiting an uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable gap in state power that it could not abide.  
Wald is most closely concerned with the lacuna the Cherokee’s suit in 
Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia exposed in the constitutional definitions of personhood, 
claiming “In effect, the Cherokee bid for recognition by the Unites States as a foreign 
nation was a bid for full personhood within those bounds.”46 I believe Wald’s 
argument generally glides too easily from what might more rightly be understood as 
citizenship rather than personhood, a slippage that dodges the question of what 
guarantees of rights the US Constitution makes to non-citizens. Nevertheless, 
Cherokees to be sure were negotiating for a limited extension of federal power over 
the state of Georgia on their behalf, a negotiation required of them given their relative 
powerlessness to check Georgia’s affront and preconditioned by their historical 
acquiescence to place themselves “under the US’s protection.” The request for 
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recognition, constituent to that for intervention, thus does capitulate to an agreement to 
be “bounded” by federal authority, but importantly, the Cherokees imagined limits to 
those limits. To a certain extent their bid for recognition as a foreign nation expressly 
asked for exclusion from the US citizenry and from federal authority when they didn’t 
need it, calling for an as-yet unimagined relationship in which the federal government 
would protect the self-declared rights of unbounded, non-citizen persons.  
Though John Ross and former attorney general William Wirt, the Cherokees’ 
lawyer in the Supreme Court cases, crafted a careful legal argument, the Constitution’s 
ambiguity on the relationship of Indians to the US surely suggested that Marshall’s 
ruling would depend on questions not answered in black letter law; they hoped, for 
instance, his federalist leanings would incline him to assert federal authority. With 
little legal precedent, the suit makes its case not least on principles of natural rights, 
especially ownership of land and establishment of government. The suit, like 
Boudinot’s editorials, also pleads for a humanist sympathy against manifest injustice, 
particularly insofar as the Cherokees’ social progress should leave no doubt that they 
were capable of managing their own affairs, managing them well, and that injustice 
committed against them was committed not against a tribe of proto-humans but 
against a duly constituted nation of civilized people. Marshall summarizes the plea:  
 
They have established a constitution and form of government, the 
leading features of which they have borrowed from that of the United 
States…They have established schools for the education of their 
children, and churches in which the Christian religion is taught; they 
have abandoned the hunter state, and become agriculturists, mechanics, 
and herdsmen; and, under provocations long continued and hard to be 
borne, they have observed, with fidelity, all their engagements by treaty 
with the United States. Under the promised “patronage and good 
neighbourhood” of the United States, a portion of the people of the 
nation have become civilized Christians and agriculturists; and the bill 
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alleges that in these respects they are willing to submit to a comparison 
with their white brethren around them.47 
Once again, Cherokee volition turns the purportedly assimilative civilization program 
towards the reinforcement of the nation’s distinctiveness. As Wald points out, the 
comparisons the suit makes—on one hand suggesting equality with US polity and on 
the other insinuating the inferiority of their (and the northern jurists’) lower-class 
“white brethren” on the other—may not have served as well as Wirt and Ross might 
have hoped, challenging as they were to the US’s ideas of itself as unilaterally 
sovereign within its declared borders and as inherently superior to its brown brethren. 
Wald’s reading of the socio-psychological operations of the uncanny in the US 
response to Cherokee presence is insightful and persuasive, but stopping at a fearful or 
discomforted reaction to a challenge to the self—and here we must make the leap to a 
collective and homogeneous imagined self—deemphasizes other forceful causes of the 
Cherokees’ invasion by Georgia, its rejected claim to nationhood, its abandonment by 
the US congress and people, its loss of land and life. She writes, “Cherokee Nation 
was finally about the incomprehensible hole in the map within the perimeters of 
Georgia. Marshall’s narrative of the Union could make no sense of it, and the 
Cherokee bid for nationhood American style only further complicated that 
narrative.”48 It was not simply that the US could not imagine limits to its boundaries 
and influence in a new relationship based on separate equality, but that it would not, 
for such a relationship stood as a barrier to a national auto-narrative not passively 
characteristic of the zeitgeist but actively produced by and producing a will to 
accumulate power and appropriate Indian land. Wald rightly observes, “Ostensibly 
reading Constitutional law, [Marshall] was in fact writing it,” arguing that in his 
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decision he “recast in a distinctly Unionist narrative the often contradictory policies 
toward indigenous peoples, policies that veered between removal and an assimilation 
that secured the appropriation of their land and identity.”49 The decisions in the 
Marshall trilogy—Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Worcester v. Georgia, and Johnson v. 
McIntosh—certainly “recast” historical precedents, with some glazes more 
philanthropic than others, but they additionally append new chapters onto the corpus 
of US colonial law. The contradiction Wald finds in the methods of Indian policy 
reflected in Cherokee Nation are finally only too consistent with their unspoken 
purpose: the assertion of federal power over Indians and their lands, within or without 
the current national borders. To this overriding goal all others touching on Indian 
matters—legal, moral, humanist—could ultimately bend.  
 
“The Toleration of Diversified Views” 
Perhaps Boudinot and Ross came to recognize the paradoxical consistency, 
doomful in its legality and portent, of this controlling agenda of US Indian policy that 
the weapon of argument—the counter-rhetoric of civilization and Christianity—
espoused by them, white allies, anyone, was powerless to stop. Ross espied the 
destination of the US’s seemingly rudderless meanderings with epiphanic eloquence: 
“The Cherokees…are surely the best judges of their own true situation, [and] can 
properly appreciate…the expressed sympathy for their misfortunes, and the avowed 
benevolence towards the Indian race, all of which amounts simply to this: ‘we want, 
and intend to take your lands, and are sorry you are unwilling for us to do so in our 
way.’”50 Boudinot, convinced that the Cherokees would never in the US be allowed 
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the free exercise of their natural rights or be treated with anything but a pretense of 
equality; assured of the federal government’s indifference to their sufferings in its 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches; and frightened at the imminent threat of 
an unofficial genocidal campaign, at some point in early 1832 began to soften his 
stance against Removal. Though he did not specifically argue for it in his editorials, 
while he was with John Ridge on a fundraising tour in the northeastern US, his brother 
Stand Watie edited the Phoenix and perhaps at Boudinot’s direction included a notice 
that the delegation was considering a treaty providing for Removal, a possibility the 
very mention of which Ross would not allow.  
Ross and the National Council were unwilling that the Phoenix should express 
anything but a unified front against Removal and prohibited Boudinot from writing 
anything in its pages to the contrary. Whether because he could no longer 
conscientiously advocate resistance, was dedicated to the freedom of the press, or saw 
the writing on the wall, he and Ross came to an understanding in August of 1832 and 
Boudinot resigned as editor. In his letter of resignation printed in the Phoenix he 
explained his irresolvable conflict: “Were I to continue as Editor, I should feel myself 
in a most peculiar and delicate situation. I do not know whether I could, at the same 
time, satisfy my own views, and the views of the authorities of the nation. My 
situation would then be as embarrassing as it would be peculiar and delicate…I love 
my country and my people…I cannot tell them that we will be reinstated in our rights, 
when I have no such hope…”51 The competition between his duties of conscious and 
of office is exacerbated by his reiterated sense of peculiarity and delicateness, words 
that most obviously describe an awkward, or as he has it, potentially “embarrassing” 
social scene, or that might more subtly indicate a recurring sense of singular oddity 
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and fragility. The quick tendency is to read Boudinot’s sense of peculiarity into his 
personal identity, formed in uncommon social circumstances in many ways and places 
separate from Cherokee people, but this reading makes no sense of the vulnerability 
echoing in the delicacy of his situation. That vulnerability should be read into the 
juxtaposition he raises not between himself and the people, whom he declares he loves 
(whether or not they love him back), but between himself and the “authorities of the 
nation”—that is, between the individual and the state. Whatever misgivings he might 
have had, he grew increasingly convinced of the necessity of Removal in the next 
years, and in 1835 as a leader of the Ridge/treaty party, acting without authorization, 
he signed the fraudulent treaty of New Echota, fully aware of that in so doing he 
gained no security but rather invited his own death. Perhaps even in his earliest 
misgivings about the consonance of his thinking with official policy, he became 
acutely aware that dissent—especially when uncommon or peculiar—entailed 
vulnerability, and to the very entity possessed of the ultimate coercive power. 
Conjecture about the specific cause of his change of course, connected with his 
signing of the Removal treaty, has preoccupied many Boudinot scholars. Most 
attribute his shift to Jackson’s refusal to enforce the Worcester decision; McLoughlin, 
Peyer, and Weaver add the loss of support from political and missionary allies who 
began to advocate Removal. In an influential argument, Perdue predicates his 
intransigence to coming under Georgia’s jurisdiction, which might have allowed the 
Cherokee to stay in the east with subsequent US citizenship, on his experience with 
racism in Cornwall. He apparently learned there not only about racism but also how to 
accept it. Upon his return, “Boudinot continued to be an ardent advocate of 
‘civilization,’ but so completely did he embrace the tenets of Western culture that he 
seems to have accepted the dominant white attitudes toward Indians…His resistance to 
the absorption of the Cherokees into white society probably stemmed from a belief 
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that Indians and whites could never be equals. At the very least, Boudinot’s encounter 
with and perhaps subconscious acceptance of white racism reduced to an afterthought 
the idea of Indian assimilation.”52 (Perdue here is referring to assimilation within the 
citizen-boundaries of the US, not to the Cherokees’ assimilation of the principles of 
civilization and Christianity.) Seemingly, not wanting to live among whites, like 
wanting to live like whites, is evidence of an internalized colonial consciousness—and 
such is the advantage of alleging an assimilationist consciousness: once leveled, it can 
be adapted to account for practically any exigency. I must admit that the logical basis 
of asserting that Boudinot went from believing that whites would never treat Indians 
as equals to believing Indians were not whites’ equals escapes me.  
Maureen Konkle, despite her empowering reading of political volition in early 
American Indian writing, unwittingly reinforces Perdue’s failure to decode Native 
agency in the interplay between civilization and the full range of traditional 
dispositions, even as she recovers Cherokee agency in the creation of the nation. She 
writes, “apparently rejecting all aspects of Cherokee practices and belief, accepting the 
EuroAmerican definition of civilization as being essentially ‘like’ whites, and insisting 
on natural equality with whites cause problems in the spokesmen’s [e.g., the treaty 
party’s] discourse…Ridge and Boudinot rejected traditional practices outright, 
characterizing them as the primitive foundation from which the Cherokees were 
moving ever forward but not something to be retained in any manner whatsoever.”53 
This analysis replicates the all-or-nothing dichotomy between assimilation and 
traditionalism that ignores practices inhering in the habitus, theorized or not. Not all 
aspects of “Cherokee practices and belief” were rejected out of hand by progressive-
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minded figures like Ridge and Boudinot—besides their obvious ties to Cherokee 
culture, such as their retention and public use of the language (not small things on 
their own), insistence on distinct boundaries, strong family ties, deliberate return to 
Cherokee country, and intellectual advocacy for Cherokee and other Indian groups, I 
question whether anything short of an early, complete, and permanent removal from 
Cherokee communities and individuals could possibly effect the type of erasure their 
critics claim they consciously sought. Additional untheorized traditional practices 
carried on in progressive developments could be found anywhere: in agriculture, say, 
with the cultivation of native and newly introduced crops by traditional labor 
cooperatives like the gadugi using technological innovations like plows, or in religion, 
discussed in the last chapter, or in the principled practices structuring consensus, such 
as deliberation, debate, and dissent. 
The council house—the traditional site where Cherokees congregated and 
argued for weeks before reaching consensus—gradually emptied as the centralized 
government assumed control over both internal and external decisions. But for a time, 
the pages of the Phoenix promised the nation an alternative place to gather and stay 
apprised of national goings-on, yet the potential of that imagined locus was 
circumscribed by the inherited precept that general dissent and deliberation as 
impediments to decisive action should yield to the duly-delegated if at times obscure 
authority of the elected government. The general council founded the Phoenix with the 
understanding that it would advocate explicitly nationalist political goals and 
accordingly provided for only a qualified freedom of the press, which Ross explained 
in his 1828 annual message:  
 
The public press deserves the patronage of the people, and should be 
cherished as an important vehicle in the diffusion of general 
information, and as a no less powerful auxiliary in asserting and 
supporting our political rights…The only legislative provision 
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necessary for conducting the press, in our opinion, is to guard against 
the admission of scurrilous productions of a personal character, and 
also against cherishing sectarian principles on religious subjects. The 
press being the public property of the Nation, it would ill become its 
character if such infringements upon the feelings of the people should 
be tolerated. In other respects, the liberty of the press should be as free 
as the breeze that glides upon the surface.54 
The sole express injunctions against ad hominem attacks and denominational 
squabbles afford the editor wide latitude, with the proviso that the paper is 
fundamentally national and that its ends should work toward the inculcation of a 
nationalist consciousness. There is little doubt that the nation controls the press, but 
lost in the shuffle is the matter of who it is that rightfully controls the nation. As 
“public property,” the “public press” suggests a theoretical right of access by the 
people, an access that was in practice sharply curtailed, both in material the editor’s 
office would express or allow to be expressed by others.  
Perhaps anticipating the potential contingencies in operating a newspaper 
simultaneously free and bound, the National Council in the Cherokee Constitution 
made no assurances of the freedom of the press. After the conflict with Boudinot, Ross 
publically clarified the expectations of future editors: “The views of the public 
authorities should continue and ever be in accordance with the will of the people; and 
the views of the editor of the national paper be the same. The toleration of diversified 
views to the columns of such a paper would not fail to create fermentation and 
confusion among our citizens, and in the end prove injurious to the welfare of the 
nation. The love of our country and people demands unity of sentiment and action for 
the good of all.”55 The logic of the passage seems valid and sound enough: the paper 
depends on the authorities for its views, just as the authorities depend on the people. 
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Theda Perdue goes so far as arguing that Ross in this view “expressed the traditional 
Cherokee approach to politics in which councils reached a consensus and chiefs had 
no power to enforce their will.”56 A close reading, however, reveals not a conservative 
consensual disposition so much as an assertive display of a dramatically concentrated 
locus of power, couched in the rhetoric of egalitarian tradition.  
Ross subtly switches here the dependent relationship between the polity and 
the people in a classic reenactment of the government’s legally transcendent 
emergence. The public invests the state with the responsibility to protect the public, a 
responsibility that extends to protecting the public from itself, effectively elevating the 
state to a superintendent position outside the rules of its own creation—a state forever 
in a state of sovereign exception. Its claim to legitimacy endures in tautology: what the 
state does is best for the people because the people created it to do what is best for 
them. This unassailable rationale equating the state’s operation and the people’s best 
interest excuses the repeated ellipsis of the subject in Ross’s injunction—who might 
harbor “diversified views” if not the people? Who, exactly, will not tolerate those 
views and demand “unity of sentiment”? Will it be the people who will police these 
transgressions of ideology, or will it in fact be the police?57 The rhetoric of 
nationalism conveniently articulates no difference. The freedom to express views at 
odds with the public authorities—that is, elected and sitting officials—would 
henceforth “be as free as the breeze that glides upon the surface,” but would penetrate 
no deeper.  
We might expect a national paper to stick to the party line, but Ross 
problematically extended his insistence on an enforceable nationalist consciousness to 
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the general public. In his annual message of 1833, he spoke at some length on the 
principles informing his conception of unity: 
 
It is a self evident truth, that no community can successfully surmount 
an opposing difficulty and attain the object of desire, unless the 
members thereof can and do exercise a controlling influence of 
common interest, so as to ensure harmony and perseverance among 
themselves by unity of sentiment and action, and the force of this truth, 
is equally applicable to nations…we cannot be too strongly impressed 
with the necessity of pursuing that course which is best calculated to 
meet the views, interest and welfare of the people. On all important 
questions, when a difference of opinion arise in regard to their rights 
and interest, the sentiments of the majority should prevail, and 
whatever measure is adopted by that majority for the public good, 
should be the duty of the minority to yield, and unite in the support of 
the measure, this is the rule of order, sanctioned by patriotism and 
virtue; whilst a contrary course would lead to faction, confusion, and 
injury.58 
Ross takes his turn to adopt the language of the Declaration of Independence, calling 
acquiescence to the state as the national institution entrusted with “controlling” the 
common interest a “self evident truth,” ironically co-opting the language of a 
document that articulates the principles of insurrection. His reference to smaller 
communities gestures toward traditional, town-based dispositions of consensus, but he 
mistakes the practices of persuading that prevailed therein, in the absence of coercive 
authority in the traditional political habitus, for the practices of “controlling,” a more 
efficient if less democratic—and less traditional—set of dispositions. He similarly 
invokes the traditional principle of harmony but understands it as a condition that may 
be mandated, dodgily using a subject-less language of power and control. Harmony 
for Ross is a state to be commanded by a “force” that disappears in passive syntax but 
nevertheless “calculates,” “impresses” us to “pursue,” and “prevails.”  
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Traditional consensus and deliberation were balancing acts that required 
recalibration with every movement, agreement, deferral, denial, or compromise. The 
rule by majority that Ross sanctions by virtue and patriotism, but not by tradition, is 
less about balancing than about acclimating the people to imbalance. Rule by 
consensus is the rule of all by all through the but-too-obsolete practices of 
compromitting—binding together in agreement. Majority rule may be entered into 
freely, but it also takes advantage of coercive institutions to help those out of balance 
who might be feeling discomfited adjust to the “rule of order.” Ross offers majority 
rule as the only method of order rather than an option among others, subtly turning the 
“rule of order” into the order of rule; that is, the principle of order sanctions the 
practice of ruling, of exercising control. He again carefully equivocates subjective 
agency, dissolving enforcement into the natural order instead of identifying it as a set 
of coercive practices and institutions under state control. Characteristic in its ellipsis of 
volitional subjects and objects, the last ambiguous sentence, ostensibly a warning that 
the body politic may come to harm if dissent prevails, also veils a threat: while “a 
contrary course would lead to faction…and injury,” a patriot might well bring injury 
to a faction.  
Ross was committed enough to ideological uniformity that he led or 
countenanced efforts to unseat from their leadership roles Boudinot and the Ridges, 
who were impeached by members of the National Council for “maintaining opinions 
and a policy to terminate the existence of the Cherokee community on the lands of 
[their] fathers.”59 The treaty party pressed for a trial to defend themselves and offer 
their own account of the obstacles they believed made continued resistance to 
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Removal untenable and futile, but Ross declined either to offer them a hearing or to 
dismiss the charges. These measures he deemed necessary even after he spearheaded 
the indefinite suspension of elections, a move designed to sustain the government and 
avoid conflict with Georgia law, which had outlawed any exercise of Cherokee 
government, but one that engendered resentment among treaty party members who 
were by degrees removed from policy deliberations.60 Politically excommunicated, 
denied access to any venue for public discourse—effectively silenced—the frustrated 
treaty party members, convinced both of the necessity of a final, immediate settlement 
of the Cherokees’ deplorable and worsening condition and of their own superior 
judgment, signed the treaty of New Echota, betraying the trust of the great majority of 
the Cherokee people and themselves abandoning the principled practices of consensus. 
In his pamphlet Letters…A Reply to John Ross, written to justify his and the 
treaty party’s actions in signing the New Echota treaty, Boudinot described the 
conditions that lead the treaty party to such measures, complaining of the (C)hief 
source of their discontent: 
 
…we will state what we suppose to be the great cause of our present 
difficulties—our present dissensions. A want of proper information 
among the people. We charge Mr. Ross with having deluded them with 
expectations incompatible with, and injurious to, their interest. He has 
prevented the discussion of this interesting matter, by systematic 
measures, at a time when discussion was of the most vital importance. 
By that means the people have been kept ignorant of their true 
condition…The original error was in the refusal of the leaders and 
advisers of this nation to discuss the question which is now agitated 
only in the last extremity, and in closing every avenue by which the 
people might be reached with correct information.61 
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Much of Boudinot’s justification for the treaty party’s actions hinged on similar 
claims, that if the people were as aware of the full state of affairs as the leaders, they 
would consent to relocate the Nation in the west, and many critics have debated the 
proposition. Most agree that Ross was not entirely forthcoming in his public addresses 
about severity of the US’s pressure, its increasing refusal to negotiate on any 
conditions but total removal, or the concessions for a treaty he had already offered, 
whether in earnest or as delay tactics.62 I am skeptical that reading between the lines of 
Ross’s dealings can reveal a great deal more than we already know about his 
allegiance to the Cherokees’ clear mandate to stay in the east, the Cherokees’ 
commitment to remain in their lands, or the depth of the treaty party’s devotion to the 
Cherokees’ distinct survival.  
What concerns me more here is the clear auto-theorization of the experience of 
ideological oppression Boudinot articulates on behalf of the treaty party. Though his 
claim that Ross closed “every avenue” exaggerates the extent to which the treaty party 
was truly incommunicado (he made this claim in a pamphlet he paid to have printed, 
after all), it does raise important questions about leader-citizens’ responsibility to echo 
the party and/or public line, their responsibility to act in accordance with their best 
judgment and conscience, and according to what principles, traditional or progressive, 
conflicts arising among diverse dispositions should be mediated. Though in most of 
the document Boudinot protests too much, he does unwittingly confide some 
ambivalence in this passage. His preamble ostensibly promises it will reveal the cause 
of the treaty party’s dissensions, but the syntax is appositive: the “dissensions” rename 
the “cause of the difficulties.” Less dissolutive is his general, though belated hesitancy 
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arising from the stupefying complexity of the “interesting matter” of the Cherokees’ 
“difficulties”—problems of such enormity they slip in only as meiosis, as 
anesthetizing euphemisms. Boudinot yearns throughout the documents reprinted in 
Letters for discussion as a “vital,” i.e., urgent and life-giving practice, once widely 
enacted but “progressively” constricted. His letter of resignation from the Phoenix 
editorship, reprinted in Letters, not only confides his reluctance to propagandize 
against his better judgment but also exhorts “every citizen to reflect upon the dangers 
with which we are surrounded…to talk over all these matters, and, if possible, come to 
some definite and satisfactory conclusion.”63 His pleas for public deliberation issue 
perhaps from the embodied habitus, disposed as it was to consider matters in due time, 
concluding only when conclusion was possible, in repeated consultation with various 
communities, open to the influence of authorities like clan mothers, elders, and 
spiritual leaders. He searches for a space of participatory deliberation, a place where 
dissent belongs: a nation of people conversing with rather than controlling each other. 
His problem is historically systemic rather than personal, more about the general 
stricture of spaces, opportunities, and practices of dissent extending from the 
Cherokees’ cession of local to central authority than it is about Ross’s muzzling of the 
national newspaper’s editor. 
As far as the specific case is concerned, Boudinot’s defense of the treaty 
party’s actions in Letters does not hold up even on its own grounds. At one moment he 
claims authority for the signers under a written compromise negotiated with Ross but 
in another disavows the legitimacy of the agreement because of alterations Ross made 
after the treaty party signed it. The alterations were in fact approved by John Ridge, 
the de facto leader of the pro-treaty contingent, and Boudinot seems to have tacitly 
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approved them as well.64 Although he rails against what he believed to be 
disingenuousness on Ross’s part, the treaty party had finally forced Ross into a 
compromise, and the treaty advocate leaders John Ridge and Stand Watie were 
included in the delegation that Ross empowered, “with full powers from the Cherokee 
people in general council assembled, to make such a Treaty as may appear to us best 
calculated to ensure the present peace and future posterity of our country.”65 Ross led 
this group to Washington to negotiate a “final adjustment of the existing difficulties,” 
as he equivocated to Lewis Cass.66 While this delegation was in Washington, 
Boudinot and Major Ridge formed another at New Echota, bent now not on finding 
some compromise but on exercising control. Following the widespread protest against 
the New Echota treaty, Boudinot justified it as “the best that can be done for the 
Cherokees, under present circumstances,” and urged Ross to give up his protestations 
and instead convince the Cherokee people of the impossibility of obtaining any better 
conditions.67 This he should do over and against objections to one-sided 
negotiations—objections founded on the principle of mutual consent, like “One party 
has no right to take away any part of it [a compromise], or to make any additions 
without the consent of the other…One party cannot bind in this manner the other; 
much less can one individual bind both the contracting parties”68—grievances he made 
against Ross’s alteration of the compact with the treaty party but which went 
unnoticed in his own actions.  
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But proving the treaty party’s error and Boudinot’s dumbfounding hypocrisy 
does not require endorsement of all Ross’s measures, against the signers or even in his 
rightful defense of Cherokee lands, as some critics have tended to do. Too many of his 
dispositional adjustments tended toward the centralization of power and its 
alienation—its removal—from the hands of the Cherokee people. Perdue justifies 
Ross’s restrictions on the freedom of the press and general freedom of speech with her 
reading of traditional politicism: “In prohibiting dissent, Ross expressed the traditional 
Cherokee approach to political disputes. Originally, the Cherokees arrived at decisions 
through consensus, and anyone who could not agree simply withdrew so that the 
group could present a united front. Since the Cherokees overwhelmingly opposed 
removal, Boudinot and other proremoval Cherokees should have withdrawn and 
maintained silence, according to traditional Cherokee ethics.”69 Though I appreciate 
the search for enduring dispositions, I believe the interplay between adaptation and 
perseverance to be more complicated than Perdue here implies. First, as consensus 
gave way to centralization, the option of withdrawal was dramatically curtailed. 
Whereas once-existing multiple communities not consenting to decisions could 
formerly decline to be bound by them without reprisal, withdrawal in the post-
Constitutional era, at least as far as movement off the land was concerned, entailed 
disapprobation, disenfranchisement, near-total loss of resources, the possibility of state 
punishment, and renouncement of the rights of citizenship from the only community, 
making it an increasingly remote possibility.  
Second, prohibiting dissent in an exercise of political coercion is hardly a 
traditional disposition. In a selective departure from tradition, coercive powers were 
invested in political leaders based on the conservative volition to perpetuate the bulk 
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of the habitus, yes, but even the harmony principle informing the practice of 
consensus offers insufficient cause to order or control the people’s expression. 
Harmony, again, is about developing balance, not enforcing unanimity, about 
participation, not suppression, and as Albert Wahrhaftig argues, despite its prominence 
it was not a superlative principle but one subordinate to the incumbency to lead the 
people on the right path, even into revolution if necessary. Other agentive adaptations 
to the habitus, like republican governance itself, to some degree similarly authorize 
leaders to depart from the wishes of their constituents when they don’t align with their 
better judgment and conscience—“peculiar” as those cases may be.  
Most importantly, dissent itself was not—is not—anti-traditional. Dissent in 
fact inheres in the principled practice of consensus, for only from the toleration of 
diverse views can consensus be “reached,” as Perdue claims it was.70 I encourage 
readjusting focus towards the reaching, rather than the having, of agreement, for what 
precedent would be set by capitulation to a version of traditionalism with a near-total 
authorization of state ideological authority? Then as now, dissent is vital, in 
Boudinot’s phrase, to push the nation to become as representative of the people as it 
purports to be, especially on those questions said to be too momentous to allow the 
expression of diversified views and that it deems too peculiar. Dissent, deliberation, 
and development belong as much to the Cherokees’ habitus as to any other group’s, 
and no matter the weight of the versions of the public good or tradition narrated by the 
nation-state, academics, or even the nation-people, we have a responsibility to 
interrogate their accuracy and utility, perhaps even their morality.  
 What might we learn were we to confront head-on the messiness, the 
contradictions in the courses pursued by Ross as well as by Boudinot? Are there 
traditions requiring progressive interventions superordinate even to Ross’s all-
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consuming campaign to remain in the eastern homelands? In fact, both regularly 
argued against Removal not only on the grounds that the lands were the homes of their 
ancestors since time immemorial—and to be sure, they argued this emphatically—but 
on assertions of the right to independent, distinct sovereignty. As Ross stated in a 
proposal for land cessions to Lewis Cass, “it will be impossible for the Indian tribes to 
be perpetuated as distinct independent communities within the limits of the United 
States—not because they are destitute of such rights, and do not hold a strong claim on 
the protection of this Govt.—but because it is evident that…the Govt. will not afford 
that necessary protection which the Indian right demands.”71 Boudinot in Letters 
invokes the same rights of self-governance, reprinting the treaty party’s 1834 
resolutions that harmonize surprisingly well with Ross’s determination that the 
Cherokees be “perpetuated as [a] distinct independent communit[y]”:  
 
Resolved, That it is our decided opinion…that our people cannot exist 
amidst a white population, subject to laws which they have no hand in 
making…that the suppression of the Cherokee Government, which 
connected this people in a distinct community…will completely 
destroy everything like civilization among them…That, although we 
love the land of our fathers, and should leave the place of our nativity 
with as much regret as any of our citizens, we consider the lot of the 
Exile immeasurably more to be preferred than a submission to the laws 
of the States…That we are firmly of the opinion, that a large majority 
of the Cherokee people would prefer to remove, if the true state of their 
condition was properly made known to them.—We believe that if they 
were told that they had nothing to expect from further efforts to regain 
their rights as a distinct community, and that the only alternatives left to 
them is either to remain amidst a white population, subject to the white 
man’s laws, or to remove to another country, where they may enjoy 
peace and happiness, they would unhesitatingly prefer the latter.72  
The distinctness so important to both sides of the New Echota treaty debate stands in 
marked contrast to allegations that advocacy of Removal was synonymous with an 
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eradication of all traces of Cherokee culture, for in its mostly unnamed components 
resided the very distinctness that all sought to preserve. The independence they tried in 
their respective ways to secure was not exclusively political, although both Boudinot 
and Ross elevated the political sphere to a superintending role over other cultural 
principles and practices of nationhood.  
Neither supposed that emigration would spell the actual end of Cherokee 
sovereignty or the nation, and once each was finally convinced of Removal’s 
inevitability, they turned their attention to reasserting their independence in the 
western Cherokee Nation. “Peace and happiness” there were hardly as directly 
forthcoming as Boudinot promised, but the dispositions of independence, self-control, 
and self-sufficiency retained throughout the habitus in practices of governance, 
dissent, industry, and more perpetuated a distinctly Cherokee identity throughout the 
period of rebuilding, the violence of the Civil War years, the next round of 
reunification and rebuilding, and the temporary, limited dissolution of the Nation in 
the Dawes era. Most histories of the Cherokee have written their survivance, in Gerald 
Vizenor’s term, as pointedly political, but the material ascendency of the political and 
its appropriation of traditionalism, reinforced in the exterior representations of 
Cherokee history, culture, and literature, have occluded alternative stories of non-
politically nationalistic agency on the part of the people. Perhaps centralization as a 
means of streamlining the Cherokee government’s efficiency was the right answer to 
the imperial Removal policy; perhaps it was the only answer. I do not believe it is still 
the only answer. Since the 1800s, Cherokee Nation governance has increasingly 
centralized, exacerbating tensions with those dissenting from the policies they had no 
hand in creating, and disempowering or disenfranchising growing numbers according 
to a reactionary and decidedly untraditional paradigm. Accommodating the rights of 
Cherokee people today may well require assimilating such alien processes as slow 
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deliberation, rational dissention, and consensus-based rule, over and against 
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